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ARTICLE S

CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION AND THE STRUCTURAL
TRANSFORMATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
By
JRB RuHm*

The path of environmentallawhas come to a cliff called climate
change, and there is no turning around As climate change policy
dialogue emerged in the 1996s, however, the perceived urgency of
attention to mitigation strategies desgned to regulate sources of
greenhouse gas emissions quickly snuffed out meaningfulprogress on
the formulation of adaptation strategies designed to respond to the
effects of climate change on humans and the environment Only
recently has this "aidaptation deficit" become a concern now actively
induded in climate change policy debate Previously treating tak of
adaptationas taboo, the climate change policy world has begrudgingly
accepted it into the fold as the realit of failed efforts to achieve global
*Matthews & Hawkins Professor of Property, The Florida State University College of Law,
Tallahassee, Florida. B.A., J.D., University of Virginia; LL.M., George Washington University;
Ph.D., Southern Illnois University. I am thankful to Lewis & Clark Law School for the
opportunity to present the lecture upon which this Article is based as their 2009 Natural
Resources Law Institute Distinguished Visitor, and to the talented students and staff at
Envirornenta Law for helping me turn it from a lecture to a written work product. Robin
Kundis Craig, David Hodas, Jim Huffman, John Kostyack,. David Markell, and John Nagle
provided insightful reviews of draft versions and early presentations of this work. I was also
tremendously aided by comments and encouragement I received in response to postings of
early concepts and later drafts of this work on the environmental law professors listserv,
enviawprofs; including those from Tony Arnold, Wil Burns, Cinnamon Carlarne, Barbara
Cosens, Deb Donahue, Melinda Harm Benson, Elizabeth Burleson, Joe Feller, Rob Glicksman,
Paul Kibel, John Knox, Catherine LaCroix, Andrew Long, Gary Meyers, Linda Malone, Uma
Outka, Zyg Plater, Jim Salzmnan, Rob Verchick, Geoffrey Wandesforde-Smith, Jonathan Wiener,
and Doug Yarqon. The FSU College of Law provided support for my research assistants, Jake
Cremer and Andrew Hoek, and for my work on the Article in general. All errors and omissions
are, of course, my own doing. Please direct questions and comments to jruhl@law.fsu.edu.
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mitigation policy has combined with the scientific evidence that
committed warming will continue the trend of climate change well into
the future regardlessofmitigationpolicysuccess.
But do not expect adaptationpolicy to play out for environmental
law the way mitigation policy has and is Likely to continue, Mitigation
policy has been framed as an initiativeprimarily within the domain of
environmentallaw-a form ofpollution control on steroids-andthus
it will be environmentallaw that makes the first move and otherpolcy
reahsthat apply supportorpushback By contrast,environmentallaw
does not "own" adaptationpolicy; rather,numerous policy fronts will
compete simultaneously for primacy and priority as people demand
protection from harms and enjoyment of benefits that play out as
climate change moves relentlessly forward This makes it all the more
pressing for environmental law, early in the nation's formulation of
adaptationpolicy, to find its voice and establsh itsplace in the effort to
close the adaptationdeficit.
Toward thatpurpose, this Article examines the context andpolicy
dynamics of climate change adaptationand identifes ten trends that
will have profound normative and structural impacts on how
en vironmentallaw fits in: 1) shift in emphasis from preservatonism to
transitionalism in natural resources conservation policy, 2) rapid
evolution of property rghts and bability rules associated with natural
capital adaptation resources, 3) accelerated merger of water law,
land-use law, and environmental law, 4) incorporation of a human
rights dimension in climate change adaptationpolicy, 5) catastrophe
and crisis avoidance and response as an overarchingadaptationpolcy
priority, 6) frequent reconfigurations of transpolcy Enkages and
trade-offs at all scales and across scales, 7) shift from "front end"
decision methods relying on robust predictive capacity to "backend"
decision methods relying on active adaptive management, 8) greater
variety and flexibility in regulatoryinstruments, 9) increasedreliance

on multiscalargovernance networks, and 10) conciliation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The path of environmental law has come to a cliff called climate
change, and there is no turning around. Someday, maybe soon, the federal
government will take the big leap and enact new legislation designed to curb
our nation's greenhouse gas emissions. Whether it is through a carbon tax, a
cap-and-trade program, or some new regulatory innovation, the measure will
be hailed by many and derided by many others. The supporters will throw a
big party, and the opponents will hold a wake. When the hangovers wear off
the next day, however, one thing will still be soberingly true no matter how
aggressive the newly-minted legislation: Humans and our fellow species are
looking into a future of climate change that will last a century or more, and
we've done very little in the United States to prepare ourselves for it.
Indeed, the policy world's fixation on achieving, or blocking, federal
greenhouse gas emission legislation as part of our national strategy for
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climate change mitigation' has contributed to our neglect of national policy
for climate change adaptation.2 This wrong turn happened early in the
development of domestic climate change policy. As Professor Dan Tarlock
observed in 1992, at the time there was "a growing split between
environmentalists who advocate mitigation, and 'rational' resource policy
analysts who have strongly endorsed adaptation."' Adaptation was winning
the day, on the premise that "we should adopt the easy, low cost mitigation
strategies to reduce energy use and then concentrate on selecting the most
efficient adaptation strategies."4 Tarlock insightfully suggested three reasons
for exercising caution in pursuing that approach:
First, adaptation is based on the ideology of scientific progress, a faith that is
open to question. The principle message of environmentalism is that the tenets of
Enlightenment thinking must be re-evaluated since science and technology may
not always prevent serious harm or make things better. Second, the degree of
friction in the proposed institutional responses is often underestimated so
institutions may not perform as expected. Adaptation clearly exposes winners
and losers in a reallocation. It is not reasonable to expect losers to accept all

1 Climate change mitigation "refers to options for limiting climate change by, for example,
reducing heat-trapping emissions such as carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and
halocarbons, or removing some of the heat-trapping gases from the atmosphere." U.S. GLOBAL
CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 10-11

(2009), available at http//downloads.globalchange.gov/usimpacts/pdfs/climate-impacts-report.pdf;
see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: MITIGATION
app. at 716 (Bert Metz et al. eds., 2001), available at http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc-tar/
wg3/pdf/app.pdf (mitigation strategies involve "an anthropogenic intervention to reduce the
sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases").
2 Climate change adaptation "refers to changes made to better respond to present or future

climatic and other environmental conditions, thereby reducing harm or taking advantage of
opportunity. Effective mitigation measures reduce the need for adaptation." U.S. GLOBAL
CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 11; see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY app. at 869

(M.L. Perry et al. eds., 2007) ("Adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or
expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2opportunities."),
app.pdf. Climate change adaptation is also known as "climate proofing," see Paul Stanton Kibel,

Climate Adaptation Pobcy at the ContinentalLevel: NaturalResources in North America and
Europe,'27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 1, on fie with author), and as
"coping," see U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Adaptation, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/effects/
adaptation.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
3 A. Dan Tarlock, Now, ThinkAgain AboutAdaptation, 9 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L 169,170 (1992).
4 Id A representative example of this line of thinking prevailing at the time is found in
RICHARD N. COOPER, ENVIRONMENT AND RESOURCE POLICIES FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY 41-50
(1994). The 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change mentioned
adaptation but was not regarded at the time as placing any significant emphasis on adaptation
strategies as a policy objective, focusing instead on mitigation goals. See E. Lisa F. Schipper,
Conceptual History of Adaptation in the /NFCCC Process, in THE EARTHSCAN READER ON
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE 19, 19 (E. Lisa F. Schipper & Ian Burton eds., 2009) (hereinafter
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE]. See generally Daniel Bodansky, The United National
Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 451 (1993)
(recounting the decisions made at the convention and its focus on efforts to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions).
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losses. More generally, institutional inflexibility is increasingly being adopted as a
means to protect legitimate interests excluded from dominant resource allocation
regime.... Third, many institutions have no fair and adequate mechanism to
deal with global warming. In these cases, adaptation is the adoption of a no
action strategy, which may often be the most costly one. 5

As news about climate change grew steadily worse in the years after
Tarlock's assessment,' the domestic policy pendulum quickly swung sharply
in mitigation's direction. Indeed, the challenge of climate change was
portrayed as so exceptional, and the need for a new mitigation policy of
sweeping dimensions thus so pressing, that talk of adaptation became taboo
for fear it midght knock the mitigation train off its tracks and lead to
complacency.' In their impressive book on the topic, The EarthscanReader
5 Tarlock, supra note 3, at 170-71. Tarlock was responding to views about adaptation
policy expressed in Paul E. Waggoner, Now, Think of Adaptation, 9 AIZ. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 137
(1992). Tarlock, supra note 3, at 170 n. 7.
6 A premise of this Article is that the climate system is changing at anomalously rapid rates
compared to historical trends, and that anthropogenic (human-induced) sources of greenhouse
gases (prim-arily carbon dioxide) are a significant causal factor. I do not endeavor here to
convince anyone of this, nor do I go into more detail about the science behind how greenhouse
gas emissions and other climate-forcing phenomena contribute to global climate change. The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), an international scientific project
representing hundreds of scientists, has produced a series of reports, including a
comprehensive set in 2007, synthesizing scientific information on climate change and its effects
on human and ecological conditions. See, e.g, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANtGE 2007: SYNTESIS REPORT (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/
assessment-reportar4syr/ar4.syr.pdf. A more recent synthesis of the science and observed
trends of climate change is found at UNITED NATIONS ENv'T PROGRAMME, CLIMATE CHANGE
SCIENCE COMPENDIUM 2009 (Catherine P. McMullen & Jason Jabbour eds., 2009), available at
http://www.unep.orgpe/cScienceCompendiui209/ccScienceCompendium2009-W-ulen.pdf. Two
highly accessible r'eports for those less scientifically inclined are available from the National
Academy of Sciences. See NAT'L ACADEMY OF Scis., ECOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
(2009), available athttp://dels.nas.edu/delS/rpt briefs/ecological-impacts.pdf; NAT'L ACADEMY OF
SCIS., UNDERSTANDING AND RESPONDING TO CLIMATE CHANGE (2008), available at
http://deis.nas.edu/dels/rpt briefs/climate change_2008-fmnal.pdf. I recognize that there remains
tremendous uncertainty about how climate systems will in fact change under different
emissions scenarios and about the efficacy of different mitigation strategies. It is already
evident, for example, that the 2007 IPCC findings overestimated some climate change effects
and underestimated others. See Pallava Bagla, No Sign Yet of Himalayan Meltdown, Indian
Report FRnds, 326 SCI. 924 (2009) (while some glaciers appear to be melting faster than IPCC
predictions, glaciers in India may be melting slower); Richard A. Kerr, Amid Worrisome Signs of
Warmiing, 'Clmate Fatigue'SetsIn, 326 Sci. 926 (2009) (discussing examples). The IPCC studies
have also been dragged into the "Climategate" public relations fiasco, in which the content of

e-mails and other materials hacked from the accounts of several IPCC scientists at Climatic
Research Unit of the University of East Anglia in Norwich, England, has led to questions about
the scientists' personal motives and scientific practices. See Climate Research Unit E-mail
Hacking Incident, http://en.wildpediaorg/wild/Climategate (last visited Apr. 18, 2010) (providing
a thorough, up to date, and even-handed account). Nevertheless, I believe the vast weight of
evidence points in the direction of anthropogenicaily caused climate change. My focus is not on
causal factors, however, but rather on the ways in which it is likely humans wiil need or desire
to adapt to the harmful and beneficial impacts of climate change at local and reglonal scales.
7 For a discussion of the portrayal of climate change mitigation in policy literature as

exceptional" in policy scope and thus demanding measures outside the bounds of
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on Adaptation to Climate Change," E. Lisa F. Schipper and Ian Burton
sum up the tension that existed through the 1990s and well into the
following decade:
[Interest in adaptation was overwhelmed by concern about the need to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions and stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gas
concentrations. Proponents of adaptation faced two obstacles that were
attributed to adaptation: reducing the apparent need for mitigation; and playing
down the urgency for action. For one, 'adaptationists' were distrusted because
their proposals seemed to undermine the need for mitigation. Critics felt that
belief in the potential. value of adaptation would soften the resolve of
governments to grasp the nettle of mitigation and thus play into the hands of the
fossil fueis interests and the climate change [skeptics]. In addition, because
climate change was popularly perceived as a gradual process, adaptation was
not considered urgent as there would be time to adapt when climate change and
its impacts became manifest. These views dominated in the mid and late 1990s. 9
The problem is that mitigation policy soon ran into the same three
problems Tarlock suggested would plague adaptation policy: Institutions
lack the political will .to impose tough lifestyle sacrifices on people in
general; those who expect to be losers, were a mitigation regime to gear up,
have squawked loudly in objection to the anticipated regulatory measures;
and no fair and adequate mechanism has been devised to deal with the
conventional air pollution regulation models, see John Copeland Nagle, Climate Exceptionalism,
40 ENvrL L.53 (2010).
8 ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CH-ANGE, supra note 4.
9 E. Lisa F. Schipper & Ian Burton, UnderstandingAdaptation:Onigins, Concepts, Practice
and Policy in ADAPTATION

TO CLIMATE CHANGE,

supra note 4, at 1, 7; see also Waggoner, supra

note 5, at 146 (1992) ("The first obstacle to adaptation is reluctance to contemplate it.").
The concern over adaptation crowding out mitigation in political spheres is not unfounded.
Mitigation expenditures, for example, impose significant costs in the present, but cannot be
expected to deliver results potentially for decades. Investments in mitigation, moreover, have
significant positive externalities, as any improvement in climate conditions is shared globally,
whereas the benefits of adaptation investments will usually accrue primarily to the community
making the expenditures. These features of mitigation compared to adaptation often are argued
as leading to an inherent political bias in favor of adaptation investments. See generally Thomas
C. Heller, Environmental Realpoliik: Joint Implementation and Climate Change, 3 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL

STUD. 295, 309 (1995) ("[Tlhe usual collective action problems associated with

public goods demand that strategies aimed at mitigation create institutions able to coordinate
and monitor a cooperative regime. Adaptation, by contrast, is local in character and requires no
commitment to common solutions."). Another source of this bias is what Professor Eric Biber
refers to as
the concept of "backlash"-the possibility that there will be a significant push to repeal
or roll back -regulatory standards in the context of delayed harm problems. Backlash
might occur in the context of delayed harms because of the inevitable gap between the
initiation of regulatory controls and the beginning of any actual declines in the levels of
environmental harm. The risk of backlash is accentuated because of the fragile political
support for most regulatory systems that address delayed harms, and because the
changes in the environment that delayed hanns cause may undermine the political
support for continued environmental regulation.
Eric Biber, Climate Change andBaclash, 17 N.Y.U. ENvrI. L.J. 1295, 1299 (2009).
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distributional effects of a comprehensive regulatory regime even if the
political will were there to put one in place.'0 So, as with adaptation,
mitigation is often portrayed as a scientific and technological challenge that
eases us out of the climate change problem without sacrifices or loserspump greenhouse gases into the ground; invent a cheap solar panel; launch
mirrors into space; seed the oceans with iron."
Today it is abundantly clear that these drags on the formulation of our
domestic climate change policy are persistent and debilitating.
A comprehensive national strategy that successfully reduces greenhouse gas
emissions to levels thought to be adequate to arrest climate change, a feat
which the United States obviously could not accomplish alone even if it
were known what those levels should be, quite clearly is not around the
political comner.12 And it is just as clear that the miracle technological
10 As Harvard University oceanographer and IPCC member James J. McCarthy concisely
sums up the situation: "What is lacking is resolve." Earl Lane & Becky Ham, As Climnate Change
Intensifies, McCarthy Urges Adaptation Focus, 326 Sci. 680, 680 (2009), available at
http://www.sciencemag.orgcgi/reprint326/5953/680.pdf (quoting James J. McCarthy); see also

Robert W.Hahn, Climate Policy-SeparatngFactfrom Fantasy 33 HARV.

ENVrL

L. REV. 557, 560

(2009) ("[Nlational leaders appear to lack the political will to achieve global emission
reductions in a timely manner."). Not that we weren't warned of this way back at the beginning
of it all. As Robert M. White, then-president of the National Academy of Engineering, said before
the 1990 annual meeting of the American Society of International Law,
It is likely that no matter what policy actions we take, fully arresting the climate
warm-ing is just not in the cards. Bringing about international agreement on procedures
for mitigating climate warming will be difficult and lengthy. The law of the sea
negotiations are a good analogue. They took fifteen years, and the United States has yet
to sign the Law of the Sea Treaty. Reasons for the reluctance of the United States relate
to the demands of the developing nations for significant technology transfer and
economic assistance. These issues, which have so far stymied U.S. adherence to the Law
of the Sea Treaty, will be even more complicated and more pervasive in any treaty of the
atmosphere that is negotiated.
And so the likelihood is that humanity will have to adapt to some climate changes.

Robert M.White, The Great ClimateDebate, 84 Am.

SOC'Y INT'L L

PROC. 346, 355 (1990).

11 The efficacy and risks associated with these and other climate engineering fixes are hotly

debated in the science and engineering communities. See Gabriele C. Hegeri & Susan Solomon,
Risks of Climzate Engineering, 325 Sci. 955, 955 (2009); H. Jesse Smith et al, Clearing the Air;
325 Scm. 1641 (2009) (discussing the possibility of successfully implementing carbon capture and
sequestration). For discussions of some of the technological proposals and their legal
implications, see generally William Daniel Davis, WThat Does "Green" Mean? - Anthropogenic
Climnate Change, Geoengineering, and InternationalEnvironmental Law, 43 GA. L. REv. 901,
904-05 (2009); Alexandra Mass, Climate Change and Carbon Sequestraton:-Assessing a Liabilit
Regime for Long-Term Storage of Carbon Dioxide, 58 EMORY L.. 103, 108 (2008);

Jay Michaelson, Geoengineering-A Climate Change Manhattan Project, 17

STAN. ENVTL. L.J.

73, 77-78 (1998); James Edward Peterson, Can Algae Save Civilizaton?A Look at Technology
Law, and Policy RegardingIron Fertilizationof the Ocean to Counteract the Greenhouse Effec;
6 COLO. J. INT'L ENvm . & POL'Y 61 (1995).
12 1 have no expertise and offer no opinion about what levels of reductions in greenhouse
gas emissions are necessary globally to arrest climate change, and what share of those
reductions the United States ought to bear. Whatever the answer is to both those questions, we
are nowhere near to being close to those reductions in either respect; thus, formulation of an
adaptation strategy is a necessity.
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breakthrough is not past the research stage. Add to that the unavoidable
reality of so-called committed 'warmding-the climate change already built
into the climate system as a result of past greenhouse gas emissions-which
will play out for many decades even if one of these breakthroughs happened
yesterday,13 and the cold war between mitigation and adaptation is finally
thawing. Climate change is already happening, and more is yet to come no
matter what, thus a consensus is building that mitigation needs adaptation,
and vice versa, even if they fundamentally are different and sometimes
competing policy thuts14
It is not, in other words, an either-or choice between mitigation and
adaptation.' 5 The time when such a choice could have been made-when
13 "[Nbo matter how aggressively heat-trapping emissions are reduced, some amount of
climate change and resulting impacts will continue due to the effects of gases that have already

been released." U.S.

GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM,

supra note 1, at 11; see also Richard

A. Kerr, How Urgent Is Climate Change?, 318 So. 1230, 1230 (2007) ("The system has built in
time lags. Ice sheets take centuries to melt after a warming. The atmosphere takes decades to
be warmed by today's greenhouse gas emissions."); V. Ramanathan & Y. Feng, On Avoiding
DangerousAnthropogenicInterference with the Climnate System: FormidableChallengesAhead,
105 Paoc. NAT'L AcAD. Sci. 14,245, 14,245-46 (2008) (estimating conutteid warmi-ing of 2.4"C
even if greenhouse gas concentrations are held to 2005 levels), Susan Solomon et al.,
Irreversible Climate Change Due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 106 Paoc. NAT'L AcAD. Sd. 1704,
1704 (2009) (estimating a 1000-year committed warming effect).
14 The Government Accountability Office recently identified this thawing effect:
Thus far, federal government attention and resources have been focused on emissions
reduction options, climate science research, and technology investment. In recent years,
however, climate change adaptation-adjustments to natural or human systems in
response to actual or expected climate change-has begun to receive more attention
because the greenhouse gases already in the atmosphere are expected to continue
altering the climate system into the future, regardless of efforts to control emissions.
GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTrATION: STRATEGIC FEDERAL PLANNING
COULD HELP GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS MAKE MORE INFORMED DECISIONS 2 (2009), available at

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10113.pdf. Thus, in contrast to the 1992 Convention, see supra
note 4, the so-called Copenhagen Accord of 2009 recognizes that "[elnhanced action and
international cooperation on adaptation is urgently required." Conference of the Par-ties to
the Framework Convention on Climate Change, Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7-19, 2009,
Report of the Conference of the Parties at Its Fifteenth Session, at 6, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010) (advance unedited version of Copenhagen Accord,
Dec. 2/CP. 15) available at http://unfecc.int/resource/docs/2009/copl5/eng/l la~l.pdf#page=4.
An alternative way of conceptualizing the thawing of climate change mitigation and adaptation
is as components of an overall pollution policy, in this case a global pollution problem.
Professor John Nagle has outlined four general responses to pollution: prevention, control,
avoidance, and tolerance. See Nagle, supra note 7, at 67-68. Climate change mitigation fits the
prevention and control categories of Nagle's typology, and adaptation encompasses avoidance,
in that it reduces harms but not emissions, and tolerance, in that it covers coping with the
harms that cannot be avoided. Nagle points out that pollution policy in general has increasingly
accommodated avoidance and tolerance strategies, such as measures to impose institutional
controls on contaminated sites rather than provide full remediation, and noise abatement
ordinances that do not prevent all noisy inconveniences. See id at 67-68, 86, 88. Climate change
adaptation, in this framework, thus seems like pollution policy as usual, albeit on a much more
complex scale. Id at 82-88.
15 See John Smithers & Barry Smit, Human Adaptation to Climatdc Variability and Change,

in ADAPTATION

TO CLIMATrE CHANGE,

supra note 4, at 15, 18 ("It is increasingly accepted that the
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starting to install a meaningful mitigation regime could have obviated the
need to ever have to think about adaptation-is long since past by many
decades. There is no choice any longer. "Mitigation and adaptation are both
essential parts of a comprehensive climate change response strategy.""
There certainly is room for argument over the relative mix of the two
strategies and how much to spend respectively on them, questions I do not
address here.17 But almost all recent legal scholarship and policy dialogue
now recognizes that formulating and implementing adaptation strategies
must in any case be a significant component of our domestic climate change
law and policy.'8
basic decision facing governments and society is not whether to pursue limitation or adaptation
strategies, but rather how to combine these approaches. . . . ").
16 U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supranote 1, at 11.
17 It is not possible at this time to assemble reliable data and projections required to
engage in such an analysis at a level of detail necessary to make meaningful decisions.
The obvious tension between mitigation and adaptation is that spending more on one, if the
measures are effective, reduces the need for the other, but there is no a priori basis for
determining which strategy deserves greater investment globally, regionally, nationally, or
locally. See Christopher D. Stone, Beyond Rio: "Insuring"AgainstGlobal Warming,86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 445, 474-75 (1992). For some general expositions on these questions reaching a
variety of conclusions, see JOSEPH E. ALDY & WILLIAM A. PIZER, ISSUES IN DESIGNING
U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE PoucY (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 08-20-REV, 2008),
available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/rff-dp-08-20%5Bl%5D.pdf; Hahn, supra note 10;
Jason Scott Johnston, A Looming Policy Disaster,REG., Fall 2008, at 38; Jody Freeman &
Andrew T. Guzman, Sea Wals Are Not Enough: Climate Change and U.S Interests(Univ. of Cal.
Berkeley Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Paper No. 1357690, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1357690 (follow "One-Click Download" hyperlink).
18 See, e.g., Katherine M. Baldwin, NEPA and CEQA: Effective Legal Frameworks for
Compelling Considerationof Adaptation to Climate Change, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 769, 775 (2009),
available at http//weblaw.usc.edu/why/studentsorgs/lawreview/documents/BaldwinforWebsite.pdf
("[Aldaptation measures must still be employed to combat the impacts of climate change that
will inevitably occur, despite the institution of heroic mitigation efforts."); Alejandro E.
Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing UncertaintyThrough a Learning
Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 17 (2009) available at http:I/www.law.emory.edu/fileadmin/
journals/eWj/59/59.1/Camacho.pdf ("Unfortunately, legislators and regulators in the United States
and elsewhere have only begun to consider the role of adaptation in combating climate
change."); Robin Kundis Craig, "Stationarity Is Dead"-Long Live Transformation:
FivePrinciplesfor Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARv. ENvTL L. REV. 9, 14 (2010)
("American environmental law and policy are not keeping up with climate change impacts and
the need for adaptation."); Daniel A. Farber, Adapting to Climate Change: Who Should Pay.,
23 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 1, 2 (2007) ("Adaptation has been a neglected topic .... In my view,
this is a mistake."); Peter Hayes, Resilienceas EmergentBehavior,15 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENvTL.
L. & POL'Y 175, 175 (2009) ("[Tlhe main game is now adaptation which renders mitigation no less
urgent, but shifts the political equation in dramatic ways that cannot be ignored any longer.");
Thomas Lovejoy, Mitigation andAdaptation for Ecosystem Protection,39 Envtl. L Rep. (Envtl.
Law Inst.) 10,072, 10,073 (2009) ("The adaptation part of the climate change agenda is only just
beginning to get attention, and needs much more right away."); Ileana M. Porras, The City and
InternationalLa w: In PulsuitofSustainableDevelopment 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 537, 593 (2009)
("Most climate change experts and policy-makers recognize that adaptation and mitigation are
not mutually exclusive strategies but must, on the contrary be employed in tandem."). One
contemporary anti-adaptionist holdout in the post-thaw literature is found in Matthew D. Zinn,
Adapting to Climate Change:EnvironmentalLaw in a Warmer World, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 61 (2007).
Zinn claims that "climate change presents a choice for public policy: mitigate our contribution
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The period during which adaptation policy was in the doghouse,
however, stunted progress on forging its theory, design, and implementation.
The accruing "adaptation deficit"" has grown large, putting us far behind the
European Union, Australia, and many other nations in this respect.20 In short,
"the United States ... lacks sufficient investment in the sciences required for
moving beyond climate science to define impacts and vulnerabilities."2 1
Domestic law and policy are in no better shape. To be sure, legal scholarship
on climate change policy is sharply on the rise.n Most of it, however, focuses
on the configuration of instruments and institutions to accomplish
mitigation, as in the debates over the efficacy of carbon taxes versus
cap-and-trade2 and the advantages of federal top-down versus local bottomto it or attempt to adapt to a changing world." Id. at 61. Having adopted that questionable
either-or choice as the policy premise, perhaps as a straw man, in an effort to support the
"mitigation-preferring policy" choice, id. at 66, Zinn then goes on to explore "how unchecked
climate change, in a world of adaptation rather than mitigation, might alter environmental law,"
id at 65. His apocalyptic vision of such a world is, indeed, more than scary, but there are no
serious proposals to be found in the prevailing legal or policy literature advocating we adopt
what Zinn calls an "adaptation-preferring climate policy-one that wholly or mostly rejects
mitigation." Id. at 63. Any assessment of the evolution of environmental law in such a scenario,
or of any field of law for that matter, thus is likely unrepresentative of what can be expected in
a dual mitigation-adaptation strategy. That said, Zinn's work is useful as a strong reminder that
mitigation policy must, sooner or later, be effective to avoid having climate change overwhelm
our adaptive capacity.
19 For discussion of the term "adaptation deficit," see Ian Burton, Chmate Change and the
AdaptationDefici4 in ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 4, at 89, 90, 91-92.
20 The European Union (EU) maintains an active website on climate change adaptation
policy with links to adaptation policy white papers and the national adaptation strategies of EU
nations. See European Commission, Living with Climate Change in Europe, http://ec.europa.eu/
environment/clinat/adaptationl/index-en.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2010). For a recent detailed
comparison of the different national strategies, see ROB SwART ET AL., PARTNERSHIP FOR
EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH, EUROPE ADAPTS TO CLIMATE CHANGE: COMPARING
NATIONAL ADAPTATION STRATEGIES (2009), available at http://www.peer.eu/fileadmin/user
upload/publications/PEERReportl.pdf, and for a general overview of the thrust of EU
adaptation policy, see DARRYN McEVOY ET AL, ADAPTATION AND MAINSTREAMING OF EU CLIMATE
CHANGE PoLIcY: AN ACTOR-BASED PERSPECTIVE (Ctr. for European Policy Studies, CEPS Policy
Brief No. 149, 2008), availableathttp://www.ceps.eu/ceps/download/1424.
21 Eric J. Barron, Beyond Clirnate Science, 326 Scl. 643, 643 (2009) (noting the author is the
director of the National Center for Atmospheric Research).
22 In a search conducted April 17, 2010, 1181 files in Westlaw's Journals and Law Reviews
(JLR) database used the terms "climate change" and "mitigat!" (which includes variations such
as mitigate, mitigates, mitigation, and mitigative) at least once in the same sentence, with 778
(66%) of those published in 2007 or later. Similarly, 1015 files used the terms "climate change"
and "adapt!" at least once in the same sentence, with 655 (65%) published in 2007 or later.
In both cases, but particularly with the adaptation references, the coverage in many of the
publications is fleeting or even amounts to no more than a citation to a document that contains
the search words in its title.

23 CompareRobert N. Stavins, A Meaningful US. Cap-and-TradeSystem to Address Cimate
Change, 32 HARv. ENvTL L. REV. 293 (2008) (advocating a cap-and-trade system), and Jonathan
B. Wiener, Property and Prices to Protect the Planet 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 515 (2009)
(same), with Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhimann, Combating Global Climate ChangeWhy a Carbon Tax Is a BetterResponse to Global Warming than Cap and Tade, 28 STAN. ENvTL
LJ. 3 (2009) (advocating a carbon tax system), Roberta F. Mann, The Casefor the Carbon TaxHow to Overcome Politics and Find Our Green Destiny, 39 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.)
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up initiatives." Although discussion of climate change adaptation, especially
more recently, is often included in those scholarly contributions,25 it is
seldom included as a significant focus and almost never with concrete
domestic policy proposals offered . 6 Indeed, the vast majority of legal
10, 118 (2009) (same), Michael Waggoner, The House Erred- A Carbon Tax Is Better than Cap
and Trade, TAx NOTEs, Sept. 21, 2009, at 1257 (same), and Michael J. Zimmer, Carbon Tax.:
Ready for Prime Thrne? 8 SusrMiNABLE DEv. L.& POL'Y 67 (2008) (same).
24 Professor Daniel Farber observes there is a "vigorous debate about the appropriate roles

of the state and federal governments in reducing greenhouse gases and mitigating climate
change." Daniel A. Farber, Climate Adaptation and Federalim:Mapping the Issues I (Univ. of
Cal. Berkeley Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Paper No. 1468621, 2009),
available at http://ssrn.con/abstract=1468621 (follow "One-Click Download" hyperlink).

Virtually every possible configuration of governance has been advocated. Compare Randall S.
Abate, Kyoto or Not, Here We Come: The Promise and Perils of the Pi7ecemeal Approach to
Climte Change Regulation in the Umited States, 15 CORNELL J.L. & Pun. POL'Y, 369, 401 (2006)
("State, regional, and local climate change initiatives may be subject to criticism, but in light of

the current federal regime, such criticism may be unduly harsh."), Kirsten H. Engel, Mfitign
Global Climate Change in the United States: A Regional Approach, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL.U. 54, 58
(2005) (outlining means of implementing a "regional interstate cooperative approach"),
Alexandra B. Klass, State Innovation and Preemption: Lessons from State Climate Change
Efforts, 41 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1653 (2008) (arguing for a more restrictive approach to federal
preemption jurisprudence), and Harm M. Osofsky & Janet Koven Levit, The Scale of Networks ?-

Local Climate Change Coalitions, 8 CHIi.J. INT'L L. 409 (2008) (arguing the advantages of a local
jurisdiction "bottom-up networking" approach), with Thomas D. Peterson et al., Developing a
Comprehensive Approach to Climate Change Policy in the United States that fUy Integrates
Levels of Government and Economic Sectors; 26 VA. ENvTL L.J. 227 (2008) (arguing for policy
formulation at all leveis), and Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globaly, The Limnits of
Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1961, 1962 (2007) ("[Slubnational state-level action is
not the best way to combat global climate change."). See generally Symposium, Federalismand
Climate Change: The Role of the States in a FutureFederalRegime, 50 Apiz. L. REV. 673 (2008).
Two points on which there appear to be universal agreement are 1) thus far, climate change
mitigation policy has been shaped largely by the states, see Patrick Parenteau, Lead Foliow or
Get Out of the War The States Tackle Climate Change with Little Help from Washingon,
40 CONN. L. REV. 1453 (2008); and 2) federal attention to formulation of a national mitigation
policy has intensified in the past year, see Geoffrey Clemm & Mark Griffin Smith, Emnergin US
Climate Policy: Where We Are and How We Got Here (Colo. College Working Paper Group,
Paper No. 2009-04, 2009), available at http://ssmn.com/abstract=~1440339 (follow "One-Click
Download" hyperlink).
25 As evidence of the recent merging of the two themes, 465 articles identified in my
literature search, supra note 22, mention both mitigation and adaptation in the same paragraph,
with 309 (66%) of those published in 2007 or later.
26 A significant exception comes from the work of water law scholars, who have been
examining the implications of climate change adaptation on water law since the early 1990s.
Their work is discussed infra Part ll.C. Notable examples of more comprehensive
contributions to the legal scholarship on climate change adaptation outside of water law
include Baldwin, supra note 18 (proposing ways environmental assessment statutes, such as
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2006), can be used to
help formulate adaptation strategies); Camacho, supra note 18 (providing a sweeping overview
of the need for adaptation and proposing an."adaptive governance" model for natural resources
management agencies); Craig, supra note 18 (outlining general guidelines for formulating
adaptation strategies); Farber, supra note 18 (examining allocation of responsibility for effects
of climate change and costs of adaptation); Ira Feldman & Joshua H. Kahan, Preparingfor the
Day After Tomorrow 8 SusTAiNABLE DEv. L. & POL'y 61 (2007) (providing a broad survey of
federal and state adaptation policies); Robert L. Glicksman, Ecosystem Resilience to
Disruptions Linked to Global Climate Change: An Adaptive Approach to Federal Land
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scholarship touching on climate change adaptation explores not domestic
preparedness, but rather the scope of responsibility developed nations have
to assist the adaptation efforts of the least developed nations most
vulnerable to the effects of climate change. 17 The latter is an important policy
concern, but the former deserves urgent and focused attention as well.
Likewise, the actual on-the-ground law of climate change, albeit still
limited in scope, is overwhelmidngly about mitigation.2n Most of the litigation
aimed at shaping climate change policy is about either forcing the
government to regulate or prohibit new sources of greenhouse gas emissions
or stopping the goverment from doing so.29 Likewise, virtually all federal,
state, and local climate change law on the books or proposed for adoption
addresses mitigation."0 Only a few adaptation planning efforts, and even
fewer concrete policies, have been adopted, so far mostly (as with mitigation
policies) by state and local governments. 3' Overall, very little litigation,
Management; 87 NEB. L. REv. 833 (2009) (offering principles of adaptive management for public
land agencies); and J.B Ruhi, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act:- Buildinig
Bridges to the No-Analog Fliture, 88 B.U. L. REv. 1 (2008) (exploring adaptation strategies that
can be taken on behalf of endangered species). Interest in the topic among legal scholars is
growing fast, however, as evidenced by the University of North Carolina Law School's recent
creation of the Center for Law, Environment, Adaptation, and Resources, the inaugural event of
whidch in 2008 was a conference on climate change adaptation. See Univ. of N. Carolina Sch. of
Law, Adapting Legal Regimes in the Face of Climate Change, http://www.law.unc.edu/centers/
clear/workshops/climatechange/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
27 For examples, see infAm Part I.D.
28 See Craig, supra note 18, at 18 ("In the United States, much of the legal attention to
climate change, whether expressed through litigation, legislation, or scholarship, has focused
on mitigation. .. .)
29 See generally Robert A- Wyman et al., So* cant Clmate Issues Likely to Be Raised in
the FederalCourts, 39 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envti. Law Inst.) 10,925, 10,925-43 (2009) (surveying the
potential scope of climate litigation but focusing overwhelmingly on issues related to
mitigation). A useful depiction of the breadth and depth of climate change litigation can be
found at a case-tracking chart that lawyers at the law finn of Arnold & Porter maintain.
See MICHAEL B. GERRARD & J. CULLEN HOWE, CLIMIATE CHANGE LrrGATION INTHE U.S., available
at http://www.climatecasechart.com. The chart divides climate change into three primary
categories: statutory claims, common law claims, and public international claims. Id. at 1.
Within the statutory claims category are claims to force the government to act, clais to stop
government action, and claims to regulate private conduct. Id My colleague David Markell and I
are preparing a more detailed empirical analysis of the cases included in the chart, very few of
which, based on our initial review, involve claims that could be described as focused on
adaptation strategies.
30 Ruhi, supra note 26, at 13 n.42.
31 In their thorough 2007 survey of international and domestic adaptation initiatives,
Feldman and Kahan conclude that "states have led the way in climate change adaptation
considerations," while "[flederal-level discussions and considerations are preliminary." Feldman
& Kahan, supra note 26, at 66; see also Camacho, supra note 18, at 46-60 (examining the
fledgling federal agency initiatives). Confirmuing this assessment, the Government
Accountability Office recently concluded a comprehensive review of federal adaptation policy
with the finding that "[wlhile federal agencies are beginning to recognize the need to adapt to
climate change, there is a general lack of strategic coordination across agencies, and most

efforts to adapt to potential climate change impacts are preliminary." GOV'T

AccouNTAnarr

supra note 14, at 5. A significant step forward came in President Obamna's October 2009
Executive Order 13,514, which among other things endorsed an interagency Climate Change
Adaptation Task Force "already engaged in developing the domestic and international
OFFICE,
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legislation, policy, or regulation in the United States has to do with how to
manage the effects of climate change on people or the environment.
This Article is intended to further catalyze and, I hope, help organize a
dialogue in legal scholarship and among policy makers with the principal
focus of developing the environmental law and policy dimension of climate
change adaptation. It adopts several premises about which little further
discussion is provided: 1) work on mitigation law and policy will continue
globally at multiple governance scales for several decades before significant
legal regimes are in place; and 2) regardless of how aggressively that work
progresses, climate warming committed to date will be exacerbated by
additional net increases in greenhouse gas emissions for the foreseeable
future until the midtigation measures take hold; meaning that 3) there will
necessarily be an extended period of measurably significant climate change;
but 4) at some point, probably many decades into the future, the mitigation
measures will gain traction on greenhouse gas emidssions and will arrest
further climate change to lead us into a new stabilized climate regime.
The first three premidses, already mentioned above, seem so beyond
serious contestation that only a Pollyanna would argue to the contrary, and
thus point inexorably to the need to define an adaptation component of
climate change law. The fourth premise-that there is actually an "end" to
climate change if we start working hard and soon on a mitigation strategyis the hopeful one about which we cannot be certain. It raises the normative
dimensions of a U.S. strategy for adaptation to climate change." See Exec.. Order No. 13,514,
74 Fed. Reg. 52,117, 52,124 (Oct. 8, 2009). To follow the work of the Task Force, see Council
on Envtl. Quality, -Climnate Change Adaptation Task Force, http:f/www.whitehouse.gov/
adninistration/eop/ceqinitiaitives/adaptation (last visited Apr. 18, 2010). The Department of the
Interior has taken the lead among federal agencies in developing adaptation policy.
See generally U.S. Dep't of the Interior Sec'y Order No. 3,289 (Sept. 14, 2009), available at
http://www.interior.gov/climatechange/SecOrder3289.pdf (addressing the impacts of climate
change on America's natural and cultural resources); U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF
THE INTERIOR, RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: STRATEGIC PLAN FOR RESPONDING To ACCELERATING
CLIMATE CHANGE 1-2, 10, 12 (2009) (public comment draft), avaiable at http:/Iwww.fws.gov/
home/climatechange/strategic.plan.htinL. The Environmental Protection Agency also has a fact
sheet posted on its website providing links to several reports the agency's Global Change
Research Program has produced on climate change impacts and adaptation. See U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, supra note 2. Up-to-date information about state mitigation and adaptation
strategies can be found through the Seventh Generation Advisors, State Climate Policy
Track, http://seventhgenerationadvisors.org/index.php?option=com-.content&view=article&id=
79%3Astate-climate-pollcy-tracker&catid=4&Itemiid= 19 (last visited Apr. 18, 2010), and through
an interactive map tool maintained by the Center for Climate Strategies, U.S. Climate Policy
Action, http://www.climatestrategies.us (last visited Apr. 18, 2010). California has established
the most detailed state adaptation strategy. See CAL. NATuRAL RES. AGENCY, CALIFORNIA CLIMATE
ADAPTrATION STRATEGY (2009), availabe at http://www.energy.cagov/2009publications/CNRA-

1000-2009-027/CNRA-1000-2009-027-F.PDF. Maryland's Commission on Climate Change also
has begun substantial policy analysis and development focused on infrastructure and health
issues. See Md. Comim'n on Climate Change, Adaptation and Response Working Groups,
http://www.mdclimatechange.us/twg.cfm (last visited Apr. 18, 2010). At the local level,
New York City offers an example of a local jurisdiction taking proactive steps toward
developing a climate change adaptation policy. See Edna Sussmnan et al., Climate Change
Adaptation:-Fostezng Progress Through Law and Regulation, 18 N.Y.U. ENv'rL. L.. 55 (2010)
(discussing various city initiatives).
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question that adaptation policy ultimately must answer when we get to the
"other side" of climate change, what do we hope to have accomplished with
adaptation law and policy? We have no analog for what the world will look
like then. 2 Unlike mitigation policy, for which the goal is clear, adaptation
policy thus has no well-defined target.3 My final premise, therefore, is that
the adaptation component of. climate change law has two overarching
dynamic goals. First, it is to effectively and equitably manage the harmns and
benefits of climate change while mitigation policy does its work. 1 Second, it
is to supply interim strategies to put us in a position to resume long-term
planning for sustainable development when climate change is "over."3
Adaptation law, in other words, is about building a bridge to get us across
the chasm of climate change intact.
To be sure, adopting both of those goals will trigger intense normative
debates about what are "harms" and "benefits" of climate change, how do we
32 Many ecologists believe we face a "no-analog" future-one for which we have no
experience on which to base projections of ecosystem change and for which models designed
to allow active management decisions as climate change takes effect are presently rudimentary
and imprecise. See Peter Cox & David Stephenson, A Changng Climatefor Prediction, 317 Sdi.
207, 207-08 (2007); Matthew C. Fitzpatrick & William W. Hargrove, The Projection of Species

DistributionModels and the Problem of Non-Analog Climate, 18

BIoDIVERsrry & CONSERVATION

2255, 2255-57 (2009); Douglas Fox, Back to the No-Analog Future? 316 Sci 823, 823, 825 (2007);

Douglas Fox, When Worlds Collide, CONSERVATION, Jan.-Mar. 2007, at 28, 32-33.
33 See Burton, supra note 19, at 93 ("What is meant by mitigation is clearly understood.
By contrast adaptation means too many unclear tings.").
34 As discussed at several points later in this Article, climate change is not all about harms-there will be benefits in many forms for many regions of human populations and for many
species. Agriculture in the United States, for example, may find benefits to warm-ing
temperatures, increased precipitation, and higher carbon dioxide leveis. See Olivier Desch~nes
& Michael Greenstone, The Economic Impacts of Climate Change: Evidence from Agricultural
Output and Random Fluctuations in Weather, 97 m. ECON. REV. 354, 355-57 (2097).
Of particular relief to many is that "the production of high-quality wine grapes is expected to
benefit from a warmer climate because of a longer growing season and more favorable growing

conditions inthe short-term." CAL

NATURAL

RES. AGENCY, supranote 31, at 94.

In 1987, the Brundtland Commission, formed by the United Nations General Assembly,
endorsed "sustainable development" as "development that meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." WORLD
35

COMM'N ON ENVT

&DEV.,

OUR COMMON FUTURE

43 (1987). Although since then more meat has

been added to exactly what that means, this definition remains at the core of sustainable
development theory. See John C. Dernbach, Sustainable Developmient Now More Than Ever, in
STUMBLING TOWARD SUSrAtNAnuxr

45, 45 (John C. Dernbach ed., 2002). Within this framework,

climate change adaptation can be thought of as an interim strategy for sustainable development
during the era of climate change. As I describe climate change adaptation infra, therefore, it is a
necessary but short-term predicate for returniing to a position of long-term sustainable
development planning, in that climate change will be too complex for us to know at any point
what is sustainable development within the meaning of the definition. See Robert W. Rates,
et al., Sustainability Science, 292 Sd. 641, 641-42 (2001). Indeed, adaptive measures taken to
avoid potentially disastrous effects of climate change, such as massive water transfers to
sustain urban populations or erecting vast sea wall complexes to protect coastal populations,
may not be compatible with current (or future) conceptions of sustainable development
policies and practices. For an insightful discussion of sustainable development in the context of
climate change, see David L. Markell, Greening the Economy Sustainably, I WASH. & LEE J.
ENERGY, CLIMATE,

& ENV'T (forthcoming 2010), available at httpI//ssmn.com/abstract--1376380

(follow "One-Click Download" hyperlink).
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manage" them, and what set of conditions will position us to resume
"sustainable development." I do not attempt to resolve those questions here.
Rather, this Article is intended to describe the policy space within which
those questions will be debated in the field of environmental law. Climate
change will impose unyielding physical, biological, and social constraints on
what is possible to achieve through environmental law, but it will also exert
tremendous structural pressures on the very design and implementation of the
law itself. Environmental law, in other words, will undergo its own structural
transformation regardless of the normative adaptation goals we set for it,
which in turn will limit the normative goals we can hope to achieve with it.
This Article, therefore, is aimed primarily at describing how environmental
law is likely structurally to be shaped, constrained, and even liberated by the
realities and demands of climate change adaptation, so that we can better
understand how to apply it and what to expect to accomplish with it.
Part II briefly describes the context within which climate change
adaptation and adaptation law will evolve. It starts with a 'survey and
synthesis of some of the prevailing theories of climate change adaptation,
then outlines the features of climate change adaptation in its three modes:
1) resistingthe effects of climate change to maintain the status quo in'situ;
2) transformingin situ to new physical, economic, and social arrangements
to adapt to climate change; and 3) moving in search of better conditions for
adaptation. Climate change impacts prompting one or more of these
adaptive responses will come in three simultaneous waves putting relentless
pressure on environmental law. First will be the direct alterations to regional
and local environments caused by the macro effects of climate change, such
as inundation of wetlands caused by sea level rise and vegetation transition
caused by reduced rainfall. Central goals of environmental law, such as
ecological conservation, will be severely challenged in these contexts.
Second will be the direct environmental impacts of human adaptation
responses, such as coastal armoring to withstand sea level rise and increased
water diversion and usage to offset lower rainfall. Environmental law has
always attempted to manage human behavior toward the environment, and
that job will be more complex than ever when aimed at climate change
adaptation behavior. Finally, environmental law must interact with other
fields of law and policy and manage the indirect environmental spillover
effects of adaptive responses that have little or nothing to do directly with
the environment, such as in national security, imm-igration, public health,
human rights, finance, housing, and trade policies. Environmental law has
long recognized the need to address policy spillover effects, but they will be
intensified in the climate change adaptation *context.
Part III of the Article then describes the ten structural trends I predict
environmental law will experience over the next few decades as it is shaped by
the adaptation modes and pressures outlined in Part II. Although I confess to
relying on a strong dose of my own experience and perspective in formulating
the trends, I have endeavored in earnest to make them more than just the world
according to J.B. Ruhl. First, I conducted a literature survey by culling through
the legal scholarship covering climate change adaptation in some substantial
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way and accounting for dominant themes and perspectives.6 Based on that
assessment, I articulated and organized a set of trends, which I then-briefly
described in several postings on the environmental law professors listserv,
envlawprofs, for reactions from anyone willing to comment. I received many
insightful comments, based on which I refined my list to these ten trends:
1. Shift in emphasis from preservationism to transitionalism in natural
resources conservation policy
2. Rapid evolution of property rights and liability rules associated
with natural capital adaptation resources
-3. Accelerated merger of water law, land-use law, and environental law
4. Incorporation of a human rights dimension in climate change
adaptation policy
5. Catastrophe and crisis avoidance and response as an overarching
adaptation policy priority
6.

Frequent reconfigurations of transpolicy linkages and trade-offs at
all scales and across scales

7.

Shift from "front end" decision methods relying on robust
predictive capacity to "back end" decision methods relying on
active adaptive management

8.

Greater variety and flexibility in regulatory instruments

9.

Increased reliance on multiscalar governance networks

10. Conciliation
The first six of the trends reflect forces that will transform the
boundaries and capacity of environmental law. The next three trends
anticipate shifts in the policy instruments, decision methods, and
institutional restructuring that will follow inevitably from the first six trends.
The final trend captures some holistic observations about the posture of
environmental law in the period of climate change adaptation.
Notwithstanding the rather sprawling scope encompassed in the ten
trends, an overarching theme emanates from their collective impact: Do not
expect adaptation policy to play out for environmental law the way
mitigation policy has and is likely to continue. Mitigation policy has been
framed as an initiative primarily within the domain of environmental law, a

36 As previously mentioned, supra note 22, as of April 17, 2010, 1015 fles in Westlaw's
Journals and Law Reviews (JLR) database used the terms "climate change" and "adapt!" at least
once in the same sentence. I reviewed all of them to identify those treating the topic of climate
change adaptation in law (not limited to environmental law) in some substantial manner. I also
culled through entries on the Social Science Research Network and legal blogs in search of
similar publications. I reviewed each of the final set of articles to identify the author's
assessment of the development of the law in response to the modes and pressures of climate
change adaptation discussed in Part HIof this Article.
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form of pollution control on steroids, and thus it will be environmental law
that makes the first move and other policy realms that apply support or
pushback. By contrast, environmental law does not "own" adaptation policy;
rather, numerous policy fronts will compete simultaneously for primacy and
priority as people demand protection from harms and enjoyment of benefits.
This makes it all the more pressing for environmental law, early in the
nation's formulation of adaptation policy, to find its voice and establish its
place in efforts to close the adaptation deficit.
H. WHAT IS CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION?
I ask readers to take as a given that climate change impacts under any
realistic mitigation scenario are going to be complex and unpredictable over
the next century. 37 The major categories of probable impacts for humans and
the environment in the United States include the following:
Climate change will stress water resources....
*...

Crop and livestock production will be increasingly challenged....

...

Coastal areas are at increasing risk from sea level rise and storm surge. .

...

Risks to human health will increase....

...

Climate change will interact with many social and environmental strsse....
.. Thresholds will be crossed, leading to large changes in climate and ecosystems. 3

I provide details in Part HII where needed to advance the discussion, but
for now it suffices to acknowledge that climate change will play out over the
globe in a multitude of dynamidc, feedback-plagued, nonlinear physical and
biological trends that will be uneven spatially and temporally across the
planet and will pose numerous policy trade-offs.9 Sea level will rise here and

37

For evidence, see INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 6, passimn;
ENVT PROGRAMME, supra note 6, passim; U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH

UNITED NAniONs

PROGRAM, supra note 1, passim. I offer no specific predictions about the intensity, distribution,
o r longevity of impacts in any local or regional setting. Indeed, I argue later in this Article that
such predictions are beyond current modeling capacity and thus policy decisions should not be
made based on the assumption of robust predictive capacity. See bafra Part H1.1G.
38 See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 12. For a comprehensive

assessment of global impacts and impacts in other countries, see
ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supranote

INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL

2, passim.

39 The scientific literature exploring these complex dynamics and exposing our lack of
understanding about what lies ahead as temperature rises is legion. See, e.g., DANIEL B. FAGRE
ET AL, U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCn. PROGRAM: THRESHOLDS OF CHANGE INECOSYSTEMS 5-13 (2008)
(public review draft) (U.S. Geological Survey, Synthesis and Assessment Product 4.2, 2009),
available at http:/downloads.ciatescience.govsapsap4-2/sap4-2-final-report-alLpdf (examining
numerous positive feedback properties leading to nonlinear thresholds in climate change
dynamics); Alinut Ameth et al., Clean the Air, Heat the Planet 326 Sci. 672, 672-73 (2009)
(examining the feedback effects between conventional air pollution control and climate change
mitigation, concluding that complex positive and negative feedback links exist, and that, on
balance, the evidence and models suggest that "air pollution control will accelerate warming in
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fall there;0 there will be more rain here and less there;4 1 some species will
die, some will move, and some will stay;42 some crops will fail where they
once thrived and some will thrive where they once had no hope;4 some
humans will get poorer, some richer, some will move around, and some will
die. The picture of how these and other impacts will play out will change
over time, and it will all be happening under a new set of rules about which

the coming decades"); Gordon B. Bonan, Forests and Clmate Change: Forcings, Feedbacks,
and the Climate Benefits ofForests,320 Scl. 1444, 1444-49 (2008) (explaining the complex and
nonlinear forest-climate interactions); I. Eisenman & J.S. Wettlaufer, .Nonlinear Threshold
Behavior During the Loss of Arctic Sea Ice, 106 PRoc. NAT'L ACAD. ScI. 28, 28-31 (2009)
(describing the nonlinear "tipping points" in the ice-albedo feedback effect); Jerome Gaillardet
& Albert Galy, Himalaya-CarbonSink orSource.? 320 Sci. 1727, 1727-28 (2008) (explaining the.
uncertainties of the sinks and sources of the carbon geological cycle); Steven W. Running,
Ecosystem Disturbance,Carbon,and Climate, 321 SCI. 652 (2008) (explaining the uncertainties
of ecological sinks and sources such as fires and insect epidemics). Dust, pollutant haze, and
other aerosols in the atmosphere, for example, deflect incoming solar radiation and thus have a
cooling effect. See Richard A. Kerr, Another Global WarmingIcon Comes UnderAttack,317 Sc.
28, 28 (2007) (explaining that because "[alerosols cool the planet by reflecting away sunlight
and increasing the reflectivity of the clouds," climate change models can vary widely depending
on assumptions about aerosol levels). Other research focuses on the nonlinear effects these
feedback loops have on the pace of change, such as acceleration of ice sheet melting.
See Richard A. Kerr, Both of the World's Ice Sheets May Be Shrinkdng Faster and Faster,
326 Scl. 217 (2009). As temperatures rise on average, moreover, other positive and negative
feedback effects are triggered that could amplify or impede further warming. Melting tundra, for
example, releases more greenhouse gases, and researchers have found this effect is far
exceeding expected levels because of its feedback properties. See K.M. Walter et al., Methane
Bubblingfrom Siberian Thaw Lakes as a PositiveFeedback to Clmate Warming,443 NATURE 71
(2006). The effect leads to a positive feedback loop in the following manner. As the greenhouse
gases are released, they contribute to warming that melts the tundra faster, which releases
more greenhouse gases more rapidly, and so on. See Katey M. Walter et al., Methane Bubbling
from Northern Lakes: Present and Future Contributions to the Global Methane Budget,
365 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'Y A 1657, 1671 (2007). This effect is believed to have played a
significant role in the last deglaciation. See KM. Walter et al., ThermokarstLakes as a Source of
Atmospheric CH, Duringthe Last Deglaciation,318 Scl. 633, 633 (2007). Ecologists believe these
and other transformations in the tundra "could be a one-way ticket," meaning they are
irreversible. See John Bohannon, The Big Thaw Reaches Mongolia'sPristineNorth, 319 Scl. 567,
568 (2008). Researchers believe there is a strong potential for similar nonlinear change effects
throughout the world's peatlands. See Nancy B. Dise, PeatiandResponse to Global Change,
326 Sci. 810 (2009). For other examples of ecological thresholds of irreversibility that climate
change is likely to cross, see ADVISORY COMM. FOR ENVTL. RESEARCH & EDUC., NAT'L Scl. FOUND.,
TRANSITIONS AND TIPPING POINTS IN COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS 28-31 (2009), availableat
http://www.nsf.gov/geo/ere/ereweb/ac-ere/nsf6895_ere-report_090809.pdf.
40 J.X. Mitrovika et al., The Sea-Level Fngerprintof West Antarctic Collapse,323 Sci. 753,
753 (2009) (suggesting that although generally global sea levels will rise as a result of a collapse
of the West Atlantic Ice Sheet, gravitational changes associated with loss of the ice sheet could
actually lead to a net sea-level fall in some places).
41 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 6, at 8 (explaining likely
precipitation increases and decreases in various regions of the world).
42 Eric Post et al., EcologicalDynamics Across the Arctic Associated with Recent Climate
Change,325 Scl. 1355 (2009).
4 See, e.g., GERALD C.NELSON ET AL., INT'L FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INST., CLIMATE CHANGE:
IMPACT ON AGRICULTURE AND COSTS OF ADAPTATION 4 (2009), availableat http//www.ifpri.org/
sites/default/ffles/publications/pr2l.pdf.
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over time, and it wil all be happening under a new set of rules about which
we know very little at the moment." How bad it will, be for any particular
local or regional community is unclear; indeed, it won't be so bad for some
people or other species in some places-it might even be smashingly good. 1
The bottom line for policy, therefore, is that planning for the future
based on the climate of the past will lead to folly.' Climate change wil
require people to develop new strategies for avoiding and recovering from
its harms and capturing and harnessing its benefits. This wil become a
costly global undertaking 7 with potentially significant environmental
impacts of its own."8 Environmental law thus necessarily will be part of the
policy formulation mix, and to play that role, environmental law will need a
theory of adaptation to better understand the modes in which people wil
44

See U.S.

GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM,

supra note 1, at 11 (i[Slociety won't be

adapting to a new steady state but rather to a rapidly moving target. Climate will be
continually changing, moving at a relatively rapid rate, outside the range to which society has
adapted in the past.").
45 Although the science and economics of climate change acknowledge this uneven
distribution of effects and corresponding costs and benefits, most legal scholarship on climate
change emphasizes only the bad effects: For a discussion of the policy complexities raised by
the distribution of human costs and benefits associated with climate change, arguing that
prevailing domestic mitigation policy proposais do not adequately take the benefits into
account, see Johnston, supra note 17, at 38-41. It is probable that some other species will also
enjoy benefits from climate change. See, eg., Post et al., supra note 42, at 1355 (discussing the
potential benefits of a warming climate for reindeer). As discussed infra Part Lll.G, I believe it
would be foliy to attempt to design mitigation or adaptation policy around any sort of
cost-benefit analysis of the relative harmis and benefits of climate change. Nevertheless, where
benefits do accrue to humans or other species, I see no point in ignoring them when designing
adaptation strategies.
46 See Rosina M. Bierbaumn & Robert B. Zoellick, Development and Climate Change, 326 Sci.
771, 771 (2009) (arguing that "[pllanning for the future based on the climate of the past will
erode development gains, deepen vulnerabilities, and increase inequities" and noting the
authors are Dean of the School of Natural Resources and Environment at the University of
Michigan and President of the World Bank, respectively).
47 The International Institute for Environment and Development recentiy released a review
and assessment of global climate change adaptation cost estimates, which not surprisingly are
expected to differ from sector to sector and from region t'o region and to vary widely based on
assumptions about timing, intensity, and technique of mitigation and adaptationi strategies.
See MARTIN PARRY r AL, ASSESSING THE COSTS OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: A REVIEW OF
THE

UNFCC

AND OTHER RECENT ESTIMATES

(2009), available at http://www.lied.org/pubs/pdfs/

1i5O1IIED.pdf. The report concludes that prior estimates of $49-$171 billion global investment
per year through 2030 for necessary adaptation initiatives underestimates likely funding
needs by a factor of two to three. See id, at 8-14. In another recent study, the World Bank
estimates that developing nations face an adaptation price tag of $754$100 billion annually
WORLD BANK, THE COSTS To DEVELOPING COUNTRIES OF ADAPTING TO
CLIMATE CHANGE: NEW METHODS AND ESTIMtATES: ExEcuTIVE SUMMARY: CONSULTATIVE DRAFT

through 2050. See

(2009), available at httpJ/siteresources.wordbanlorg/INTCC/Resources/Executivesununary.pdf.
The European Environment Agency has also provided a useful report on the complexity of
estimating adaptation costs. See EUROPEAN ENvT AGENCY, CLIMATE CHANGE: THE COST OF INACTION
AND THlE COST OF ADAPTATION §3, at 22-35 (2007) (reviewing the main methodological issues).
48 1 discuss in Parts 11 and ElI several contexts in which adaptation will take the form of
physical alteration of land and other resources, thus raising the potential for direct and indirect
environmental impacts. Zinn's evaluation of the extreme "no mitigation" policy scenario dwells
significantly on this effect. See Zinn, supranote 18.

382

382

~ENVIRONMENTAL LA W

(o.4:6
[Vol.
40:363

adapt and the pressures doing so will place on the environment and
environmental law.
A. AdaptationPolicy Parameters
Unlike the story in legal scholarship, the body of literature on climate
change adaptation from the physical, social, and policy sciences is already
massive and growing at a stunning rate. It is also difficult to make sense of
the emerging theory in terms relevant to legal discourse, as the literature
proposes all variety of models for understanding what climate change
adaptation is about but offers very little in the way of concrete frameworks
for building hard law to apply at national, state, and local governance scales.
I cannot hope here to comprehensively review the full scope of the
theoretical foundations being advanced; rather, I have extracted and
synthesized from the various leading sources seven parameters that authors
present as the predominant drivers of adaptation policy design, each of
whidch defines a range of policy perspectives or options summarized in
Table 1 at the conclusion of this section.
1. Actor
Although formulation of climate change policy is more often associated
with the public sector leading the way with planned initiatives, climate
change adaptation policy will be profoundly influenced by strategies and
initiatives from the private sector taking autonomous initiatives. 49 Private
markets and institutions will adapt to climate change with individualized and
industry-wide strategies and initiatives that may go a long way toward
facilitating the reduction of harms and the harnessing of benefits of climate
change. Moreover, within the two -categories, public and private, a broad
array of actors is defined, including various scales. of government and types
of private actors, including individuals, corporations, and nongovernmental
organizations, all with keen interest in adaptation policy.' In addition to
basic questions of which governance scale is appropriate for public
planning, therefore, the public sector also will need to consider the role and
regulation of private autonomous adaptation efforts.

49 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Glossary of Climate Change Terms, http://www.epagov/
climatechange/glossary.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2010) ("Various types of adaptation can be
distinguished, including ... private and public adaptation, and autonomous and planned
adaptation."). Public adaptation is generally associated with planned adaptation, and private
adaptation with autonomous adaptation. See JOHN M. ANTLE, RES. FOR THE FUTURE,
AGRICULTURE AND THE FOOD SYsTEm: ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE 4 (2009), availabe at
http://www.rff.org/rfE/documents/RFF-Rpt-Adaptation-Antle.pdf ("Many ... adaptations at the
farm level and in the broader food system and economy are made without governent
involvement and are referred to as autonomous adaptaton.... Other adaptations that involve
government intervention are referred to asplannedadaptations").
50 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLATE CHANGE, supranote 2, at 720.
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2 Response Orientation
Many adaptation policy theorists distinguish between proactive
adaptation strategies (also known as preventative, or anticipatory) and
reactive strategies."' Proactive strategies anticipate climate change impacts
to design measures that will reduce harm or harness benefits, in the future,
such as crop and livelihood diversification, seasonal climate forecasting,
com~munity-based disaster risk reduction, famidne early warning systems,
insurance, water storage, supplementary irrigation, and so on.5 2 1By contrast,
reactive strategies design responses based on observed climate change
impacts as they occur through measures such as emergency response,
disaster recovery, and midgration. 5 " Many climate change impacts could be
addressed through either orientation. The United States Fish and Wildlife
Service explains the distinction:
Reacting to climate chne ... is reactive adaptation. Combating rising sea levels
by pumping sand ashore to replenish beaches and maintain existing habitat for
nesting sea turtles and shorebirds is an example of reactive adaptation. A second

approach to responding to climate change is to manage toward future, and often
less certain, landscape conditions by predicting and working with the effects of
climate change.... An example of anticipatory adaptation is planning for sea
level rise by modeling future shoreline conditions; developing shoreline "retreat"
plans (including relocation of infrastructure) that allow rising sea leveis to erode
existing beaches and establish new shorelines landward for nesting sea turtles
and shorebirds; and monitoring the results."'
In general, the perception is that "a 'wait and see' or reactive approach
is often inefficient and could be particularly unsuccessful in addressing
irreversible damages, such as species extinction or unrecoverable ecosystem
damages, that may result from climate change," though in some cases there
may be no choice but to wait and see.6

3. Adaptation Goals
It is stating the obvious that the goal of most climate change adaptation

policy development is to'minimize and recover from the harms of climate
change. But that cannot be the exclusive focus. Although it is not often
acknowledged in the climate change mitigation dialogue, which is mostly
about preventing climate change because of its perceived distributional
harm to -some populations and net aggregate harm to humans and the
environment, climate change will produce benefits for many humian
51

See id; camacho, supra note 18, at 15; Feldman &Kahan, supranote 26, at 67; U.S. Envtl.

Prot. Agency, supra note 49 ("Various types of adaptation can be distinguished, including
anticipatory and reactive adaptation. .. .)
52 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CuLATE CHANGE, supra note 2, at 721.
53 Id.
.54 U.S. FIsH & WILDLIFE SERV., supranote 31, at 11 (emphasis omitted).
55 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2, at 721; see also Camacho,
supranote 18, at 16.
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communities and other species, in some cases substantial benefits.56
Temperature and rainfall changes, for example, will open up new
agricultural or recreational possibilities for areas previously limited in these
respects."' Hence, the goal of regional and local climate change adaptation
policy frequently will be about taking advantage of change and making life
better, not worse, for people and other species. This will no doubt be
politically sensitive, as many communities will be struggling predominantly
to reduce harm, but securing benefits when and where they are available will
nonetheless be an inevitable goal of adaptation policy in general and often
times a primary goal locally.
4 Management Target
In broad termas climate change will initiate environmental impacts in
two different dimensions. One will be changes in variabilit of natural events
for which we already have developed adaptive strategies, such as floods,
hurricanes, and fire.5a Also known as Type I adaptation, the challenge here
will be whether the existing adaptive strategies are sufficiently robust to
manage the effects of increased or decreased frequency of these natural
events. 9 The other dimension of effects involves the absolute changes to the
environment that will result from climate change, such as sea level changes,
reduced glacial coverage, and higher mean surface temperatures."o We have
not developed tested adaptation strategies for these changes, also known as
Type II adaptation, simply because we have not experienced them in the
past several centuries over any significant period of time.6' There will also be
synergistic effects between these two types of change, as for example when
increased hurricane frequency combines with higher sea levels to
exacerbate coastline and inldand vulnerability in some areas.6
5 Policy Foundation
Climate change adaptation will involve a mix of substantive and
proceduralstrategies and innovations. Professor Alex Camacho describes
government substantive adaptation in three categories: 1) altering the
environment to rmiimize the effects of climate change, 2) regulations and
other measures to alter the way private actors interact with the
environment, and 3) agency management planning designed around
adaptation.63 By contrast, procedural adaptation involves "strategies that
manage the regulatory programs and processes that develop more direct

56

See Desch~nes & Greenstone, supra note 34, at 354.

5

Id.

58 See Burton, supra note 19, at 90.
59 See id
60 See id
61 See id

62

See id

63 Garnacho, supra note 18, at 21-22.
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strategies."6 These could include new decision making processes, such as
the use of adaptive management in natural resources management, and far
broader changes to institutional and governance systems.' The same
two-pronged approach could be used in private sector climate change
adaptation as well.
6 CapitalEmployed

Climate change adaptation will be a capital-intensive undertaking, but
we will not be limited to using only technological capital. We will also be
deploying financial capital to invest in new technologies and institutions,
,humancapital in the form of adaptation knowledge and skills, social capital
in groups and institutions with new normns and practices, arid naturalcapital
such as wetlands and coastal dunes to provide adaptive capacity 6 6
Responding to increased storm surge frequency and intensity along coasts,
for example, could rely on technological capital in the form of seawalls,
financial capital in the form of modified insurance and financing policies,
human capital in the form of improved building techniques, social capital in
the form of emergency response and retreat practices, and natural capital in

the form of enhaticed coastal wetlands and dune systems .6 1

It

will only

infrequently be obvious which form of capital investment will prove most
effective at avoiding harm or harnessing benefits, and often there will be
trade-offs inherent in selecting one mix of capital versus an alternative.
7 Strategy
Adaptation to climate change impacts will leverage two different but
closely related strategies focused on deflecting and recovering from the
blows of climate change.'8 One is to reduce vulnerabiliyby improving the
reliability of infrastructure and other mechanisms designed to shield human
communities and ecosystems from the harmful effects of climate change,
such as by constructing seawalls to protect coastal areas or limiting new
development permits on coasts likely to experience sea level rise.i9 If the

64

Id at 23.

See id at 23-24. Camacho's focus is on procedural adaptation strategies, particularly
adaptive management, which are taken up inzfr Part f11.11.
65

66 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supranote 2, at
67 See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 152.

727-28.

68 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHtANGE, supra note 2, at 720 ("Adaptation to
climate change takes place through adjustments to reduce vulnerability or enhance resilience in
response to observed or expected changes in climate and associated extreme weather events.");

John Handiner & Stephen Dovers, A Typology of Resilience- Rethkdng Institutions for
SustainableDevelopment in ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 4, at 187, 196; Nathan
E. Hultman, Worth More Than GoodAdvice: Lessons of HurrcaneKattiafor Development in a
Changinmate,11 GEO. PuB. PoL'Y REv. 47,49-50 (2006).

69 See JONATHAN ENSORE &RACHEL BERGER, UNDERSTANDING CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION:
LESSONS FROM COMMUNITy-BASED APPROACHES 13-16 (2009) (describing types of climate change
hazards and impacts, and how vulnerabilities can inform adaptation strategies); P. Mlick Kelly &
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risks associated with vulnerability can be reduced through such methods,
less harm will be sustained and less capital will need to be deployed to
recover from the effects of climate change. Yet, not all the risks of climate
change can be reduced in this manner, as costs, technological constraints,
lack of knowledge, and mistaken assumptions will lim-it the capacity to
improve reliability. The other strategy thus focuses recovering from the blow
of climate change by enhancing resilience to impacts, such as through
improved emergency response techniques and habitat restoration methods."7
Many human communities and ecological landscapes will require a mix of
these strategies to make effective use of available technological, financial,
human, social, and natural capital.'
Table 1. Climate Change Adaptation Design Parameters
Parameter
Actor
Orientation
Goals
Management Target
Policy Foundation
Capital Employed
Strategy

Design Options
Public-Planned 4* Private-Autonomous
Proactive (a/k/a Preventative, Anticipatory) <C*
Reactive
Harm
<-- Capture and Harness
Avoid and Repair
Benefits
Change in Variability <*Absolute Change
Substantive <- Procedural
<* Human <* Social <*
Natural
Reduce Vulnerability <= Enhance Resilience

Technological

<*' Financial

B. Modes ofAdaptation
As the previous Subpart illustrates, climate change adaptation measures
will come in many combinations of policy parameters and the mix of federal,,
state, local, and private responses is likely to be exceedingly complex. But
no matter what the mix and what form any particular adaptation policy
'assumes, every adaptation measure is designed to facilitate one or more of
three possible modes of adaptation for local and regional human populations
and for other species and their ecosystems: 1) resistthe effects of climate
change to maintain the status quo in situ; 2) &ansfonn physical, social,
environmental, or economnic conditions in situ to minimize harm or maximidze
benefits associated with climate change impacts; or 3) move humans or other
species to locate better adaptive capacities.
W. Neil Adger, Theory and Practice in Assessing Vlnerabilty to Climate Change and
FacilitatingAdaptation,in ADAnrATiON TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 4, at 161, 167-74.
70 See ENSORE & BERGER, supra note 69, at 17-25; Handmer & Dovers, supra note 68, at
187,190-204.
71 Blending the two strategies together is often described under the label of "adaptive

capacity." See, e.g, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2, at 729; Brian
H. Hurd, Challenges ofAdapting to a ChangingClmate, 26 UCLA J. ENVEL. L. & POL'Y 77 (2008).
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Take as examples the city of Miami, Florida, and the nearby Biscayne
Bay Aquatic Preserve, which the state of Florida established in 1974 to be
"preserved in an essentially natural condition so that its biological and
aesthetic values may endure for the enjoyment of future generations." 2
These human and natural environments face substantial threats from climate
change impacts such as sea level rise, introduction and loss of species, loss
of coastal resources, and more frequent and intensive storm events, to name
but a few .73 Mliamid's city managers and the Preserve's resource managers
could adopt either of the three adaptation policy goals, but with vastly
different policy implications.
1. Resist
Some people like the status quo. iamid, for example, might want to stay
as close as possible to the way Miami is today, notwithstanding climate
change. The city might invest in this resist mode of adaptation by building
seawalls, using pesticides to control invasive disease-bearing insects and
parasites, importing more sand, energy, and -water to support its beach
tourism industry, and establishing health management systems to deal with
increased disease. The Preserve managers might work tirelessly to import
water, soils, and other resources to prop up wetlands and corals diminished
from climate change, and they may intervene to prevent species from
moving into or out of Biscayne Bay in response to climate change. 74
.Obviously, this kind of resistance to climate change can only go so far
on a local basis. The capital costs needed to resist all the effects of climate
change would be daunting in many locations. Even where sufficient financial
capital is available to make that kind of investment, fierce competition
among localities for access to water, energy, and other resources necessary
for sustained resistance is likely to be the norm. Indeed, on a macroregional
or national scale the resist strategy cannot be uniformly maintained-to the
extent managing numerous areas such as Miami and the Preserve for the
status quo depends on importing water, energy, or other resources from
somewhere else, then obviously not every human and natural environmnent
can be managed for the status quo. Nevertheless, it is likely many areas of
the nation will take measures to retain at least some aspects of the status quo
through adoption of the resist mode of climate change adaptation strategies.

72 FLA_ STAT. ANN. § 258.397(l) (West 2009).
73 For an overview of the variety of climate change impacts Florida's coastal areas are likely
to face, see NATURAL REs. DEF. COUNCIL, FEELING THE HEAT INFLORIDA: GLOBAL WARmiNG ON THE
L4DcAL LEVEL (2001), availabe at http://www.nrdc.org/globalwamning/florida/floridapdf. The
legal implications of this extensive. array of problems are explored in Kelley M. Jancaitis,

.lorida on the Coast of Climate Change Responding to Rising SeaS, 31 ENVIRONs ENVrL L. &
POL'Y J. 157 (2008).
74 The resist mode of adaptation has also been referred to as "hard resilence." See Marcus
Moench, Adapting to Climate Change and the Risks Associated wvith Other Natural HazardsMethods for Moving from Concepts to Action, inADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 4,
at 249, 256-72.
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2. Transform

The transformative effects climate change will have on conceptions of
variability and change in human and natural environments will undermine
the very premise of many resistance strategies. The resist mode of
adaptation is likely to be swamped by climate change in many contexts,
shifting the focus of performance from maintaining the status quo to
measuring how far off the status quo conditions have moved. Given this
reality, some communities and resource managers are likely simply to adopt
a transform mode of adaptation from the start. Transform modes of
adaptation assume that maintaining the status quo is either not feasible or is
not a desirable policy goal because of costs or other trade-offs, and thus
adopt transition and change as integral parts of adaptation policy."5 Miamni's
city managers, for example, may hope to replace beach tourism with some
other form of tourism. And rather than try to hold on to existing coastal
structures and infrastructure supporting them, Miami midght decide to
impose significant beachfront setbacks and stop providing new public
infrastructure to continue supporting new private development along the
existing coast.7 ' Similarly, the Preserve 's managers may decide to replace
species-specific goals with broader goals such as conserving an overall mix
of biodiversity without regard to species assemblage or the health of a
particular species. What passes as Miamid" or the "Preserve," in other words,
would no longer be referenced from the status quo of the past but rather
from the anticipated future.
3. Move

The stark reality of climate change is that conditions could exhibit
extreme swings for the better Or worse in some areas. In those
circumstances, it is possible neither the resist mode nor the transform mode
of adaptation will be viable. Conditions may become too stressed in some
areas to tolerate, or too good in other areas to forego. If people decide to
leave Miami for other areas, or if the Preserve's resource managers decide to
engage in assisted migration of species to other aquatic settings, that reflects
a decision that maintaining the status quo in situ is not feasible 7or
practicable and that transformation with change in situ is not viable either.

75 In its most basic form, the transform mode of adaptation can be thought of as little more
than a coping strategy, an approach many people in least developed nations wil have no choice

but to adopt. See Susanna Davies, Are CopingStrategies a Cop-Out?, in ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE
CHANGE, supra note 4, at 99. As described in the text, however, the transform mode of
adaptation could involve concerted measures to adapt to climate change while pursuing
economic and social improvement. Id. at 110-11.
76 These are among the risk mninimization measures being reconmmended to South Carolina.
See S.C. DEP'T OF HEALTH &ENvTL CONTROL, ADAPTING TO SHORELINE GHANGE: A FOUINDATION
FOR IMPROVED MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING IN SOUTHI CAROLINA 20-2 (draft 2009).
77 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2, at 736-37.
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The move strategy is already evident in the shifting ranges of some
species. 8 Of even greater concern to climate adaptation policy is' the
likelihood that people numbering in the hundreds of millions may be
displaced from climate change "hot spots" and seek refuge elsewhere. 79
Human m-igration in response to environmental change has been
experienced before mostly in connection with local disasters, whereas
climate change may trigger broader, longer, and more persistent migratory
responses.' But who will welcome climate refugees, and who is prepared for
them whether welcome or not?
C EnvironmentalPolicy Pressures

Climate change adaptation carried out through the three modes, using
various combinations of the adaptation policy parameters, will present three
sources of pressure on the environment that will require formulation of
environmental policy decisions: 1) direct environmental effects, 2) the
environmental effects of human adaptation, and 3) policy spillover effects.
1. Direct-EnvironmentalEffects

One set of environmental policy decisions for climate change
adaptation will involve measures to respond on behalf of the environment to
the direct effects of climate change, such as sea level rise, species
migrations, and shifting hydrology, that mitigation policy has yet to arrest
and which have not been the target of broader adaptation policy initiatives.
Environmental law has always had the dual functions of controlling sources
of harm (e.g., pollution control) and responding to the effects that have not
been. or cannot be avoided (e.g., site remediation).8 ' Climate change
adaptation will require us to think more innovatively, however, as we design
policy measures in the resist, transform, and move modes to assist species
and ecosystems in avoiding harm and harnessing benefits of climate change.
For example, Section 4(a) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) 1
provides for designation of "critical habitat" of endangered species that
includes "specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the

78

See Post et at., supranote 42, at 1355-56 (discussing Arctic species).

Summarizing studies by various international aid organizations, the Asian Development
Bank estimates 50 million environmentally displaced people by 2010 and over 200 million by 2050.
See ASIAN DEv. BANK, CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION IN AsIA AND THE PAcIinc: ExEcuTvE
79

2 (draft 2009).
See Elizabeth Burleson, Climate Change Displacement to Refuge, 25 J. ENvTL. L. & LITG.
(forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 1-2), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract--1470486 (follow
"One-Click Download" hyperlink); Jane McAdam, Environmental Milgration Governance 1
(Univ. of New S. Wales Faculty of Law Research Series, Working Paper No. 1, 2009), available at
SUMMARY
80

http://ssrn.com-/abstract= 1412002 (follow "One-Click Download" hyperlink).
81

See generally I

FRANK

P.

GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAw

§ 1.02, at 1-8 to -13

(2009) (describing pollution control and conservation of natural resources as two of the major
branches of environmental law).
82 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006).
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species ...upon a determination .., that such areas are essential for the
conservation of the species."' 5 This authority could provide a viable way to
respond to ecological reshuffling of species. To the extent climate models can
predict with reasonable certainty where a species midght successfully migrate to
adapt to changes brought about by climate change, a credible interpretation of
the critical habitat provisions would allow the agency to "reserve" those areas
through critical habitat designations, 8 ' thus helping to secure migratory
corridors and the species' transitional and final ecological homes.
This approach to facilitate species as they adapt through a move mode
would also provide an effective tool to guide human adaptation measures to
minimidze effects in designated areas, thus securing a greater chance for the
species to withstand climate change transitions and establish a viable
population in its new ecological home. Of course, that is part of the
problem-measures designed to assist species and ecosystems in adapting
to climate change could constrain human adaptation measures, and vice
versa, which leads to the next type of policy pressure.
2. En irornentaIEffects of Human Adaptation

Just as the primary threats to species and ecosystems before climate
change centered around human-induced ecological change, it is likely that
the resist, transform, and move modes of human adaptation to climate
change will play a leading role in threatening environmental resources. For
example, climate change is likely to lead human populations to increase
rainwater harvesting and water storage, adjust the timing and location of
crop plantings, relocate seawalls and other storm barriers, move urban
infrastructure to account for changing water supply opportunities, and shift
recreational facilities such as ski slopes to higher altitudes, to name just a
few probable responses."
Several formns of human adaptation impacts will present the most
pernicious of such threats. First, many human communities are likely to find
it necessary and possible to migrate to avoid rising sea levels along coastal
areas, to relocate agricultural land uses, and to obtain secure water supplies
from ever distant locations.' 5 These migrations and transfers of resources
will necessarily involve some conversion of land uses in areas that presently
provide suitable ecological conditions for particular species, in some cases
at scales sufficient to pose a threat to the species .8 ' Relocated human
communities will likely also introduce ecological degradations from new or
amplified pollution, noise, water diversions, and other stresses. 85 Many
83
84

Id § 1532(5)(A).
See Ruhi, supra note 26, at 35-37.

supranote 6, at 57.
See Norman Meyers, EnironmentalRefuges in a Globally Warmed World, 43 BIOSCIENCE

85 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
86

752, 752-58 (1993).
87 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC TEcHNIcAL PAPER V: CLIMATE
CHANGE AND BIODIVERSITY

3-4 (2002), availabe at http://www.ipcc.cb/pdf/technical-papers

cfimnate-changes-biodiversity-en.pdf.
88

See id at 42-43.
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human communiuties, relocated or not, also will implement climate change
mitigation and adaptation measures designed primarily to protect human
health and welfare, such as coastal flood barriers, which in some cases
could threaten ecological conditions for other species. 9 Even planting of
forests to sequester carbon could degrade conditions for some species.9
Lastly, human adaptation to climate change involving population relocations
and increased flow of goods and resources to new settlement areas is likely
to introduce nonmative species to local ecosystems, some of which will
establish successfully."'
3 Policy Spillover Effects

Climate change adaptation will engage a far broader policy realm than
just environmental policy, and the focus of other policy fronts such as
national security, immigration, public health, and food supply is likely not to
place environmental impacts at the forefront of decision-making processes."
Environmental law* thus will be faced with managing the spillover
environmental effects of these other policy decisions, and often will do so
not as an "insider" in the decision process. This will not be a new role for
environmental law by any means, but climate change could present such
pressing and immediate policy response needs in these other contexts that
environmental law sees itself pushed even harder to the margins.
Ill. TEN STRUCTURAL TRENDS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

-The previous Part. outlines the policy context of climate change
adaptation. There will be, widespread need at national, state, and local
governance scales to design and implement strategies that facilitate how
humans, other species, and ecosystems resist, transform, and move in
response to climate change. 3 Every such adaptation initiative can choose
from a complex mix of policy parameters, and every such adaptation
initiative could present environmental impacts of its own. Particularly over
the next two decades, as adaptationpolicy initially ramps up, environmental
lawyers can expect a highly dynamic period of change.

89 See id at 43.
90 See id at 36.
91 The Environmental Protection Agency has suggested that "important progress has been

made in identifying climate change effects on invasive species, but. :, our understanding of
effects on specific species and interactions of other stressors needs to be improved." Effects of
Climate Change on Aquatic Invasive Species and Implications for Management and Research,
72 Fed. Reg. 45,046, 45,047 (Aug 10, 2007). Most invasive species introductions are human
induced. Peter M. 'Iitousek et al., Biological In vasions as GlobalEnvironmenta Change, 84 Am.
ScllmrnsT 468, 468 (1996).
92 See discussion in/in Part tIII.F.
93 See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 6, at 56
("[Aidditional adaptation measures will be required at regional and local levels to reduce the
adverse impacts of projected climate change and variability, regardless of the scale of
mitigation undertaken over the next two to three decades.").
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To be sure, no one could reasonably accuse environmental law of being
static; indeed, the forty-year story of modern statutory environmental law is
one largely of change. But it has been a story primarily of goal-oriented
change motivated from within environmental law to address discrete
pollution media and conservation objectives." Those days are over.
Environmental law does not "own" climate change adaptation policy. Rather,
it may be just the reverse, as national, state, and local adaptation priorities
place tremendous pressure on environmental law to partner with other
fields of law in facilitation of adaptation. I am not sure where this leads, but I
have some ideas about how climate change adaptation policy will most
profoundly transform environmental law-ten of them to be exact.

A. Trend One: Shift in Emphasis from Preservationismto Transitionalism
in NaturalResources ConservationPolicy
The development of environmental law has taken many of its cues from
environmental and ecological sciences, which themselves have evolved over
time."5 With ecology in particular, the trend over the past half-cent~ury has
been increasingly to focus on the complex flux qualities of ecosystems and
to place less emphasis on conceptions of stasis and natural stability.'
Nevertheless, the "dynamic equilibrium" model that is now firmly in place in
ecology is based on the assumption of "stationarity," which as Milly et al.
explains is "the idea that natural systems fluctuate within an unchanging
envelope of variability."" Although ecologists understand that the envelope
can be stretched by natural and anthropogenic events, those are considered
manageable disturbances. In the context of water resources, for example,
Milly et al. argue that
Itihe stationarity assumption has long been compromised by human
disturbances in river basins. Flood risk, water supply, and water quality are
affected by water infrastructure, channel modifications, drainage works, and
land-cover and land-use change. Two other (sometimes indistinguishable)
challenges to stationarity have been externally forced, natural climate changes
and low-frequency, internal variability (e.g., the Atlantic multidecadal oscillation)

enhanced by the slow dynamics of the oceans and ice sheets. Planners have tools
94 See generally A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigmin Ecolog and the Partial
Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121 (1994) (discussing the broad
objectives of pollution risk remediation and biodiversity protection and the overall paradigm
shift in the scientific justification for environmental law).

95 See Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science on
American Law: An Introduction,69 Cu.-KENT L.REV. 847 (1994).
96 See Reed F. Noss, Some Principles of Conservation Biology, as They Apply to
Environmental Law, 69 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 893, 893 (1994) ("Among the new paradigms in

ecology, none is more revolutionary than the idea that nature is not delicately balanced in
equilibrium, but rather is dynamic, often unpredictable, and perhaps even chaotic."); see also

Bryan Norton, Change, Constancy,and Creativity The New Ecology and Some Old Problems,
7 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 49 (1996); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Law and the New Ecolog:

Evolution, Categories,and Consequences,22 EcoIDGY L.Q. 325 (1995).
97 P.C.D. Milly et al., StationarityIsDeadWhither WaterManagement 319 Sci. 573,573 (2008).
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to adjust their analyses for known human disturbances within river basins, and
justifiably or not, they generally have considered natural change and variability to
be sufficiently small to allow stationarity-based design."
Legal scholars who have traced the influence of this scientific paradigm
shift on environmental law find, as is often'the case, law lagging behind."
Legal regimes that formed before the dynamic equilibrium model was well
developed, particularly conservation programs such as the ESA, the
1
Wilderness Act,'" and the National Wildlife Refuge System,m to this day
depend heavily on the natural stability model of ecosystems and the strategy
of setting aside habitat reserves to implement it.'" Only recently has the
discipline of ecosystem management emerged with any concrete policy
force to prompt movement toward the dynamic equilibrium model.'0 This
newer, more flexible conservation orientation, however, still depends
strongly on the stationarity premise and its appeal to "natural" and "native"
models of ecosystem dynamics.'O For example, the disciplines of habitat
restoration and enhancement, which rest at the foundation of newer
approaches to conservation policy such as wetlands and habitat mitigation
banking, assume that we know the bounds of the stationarity envelope for
the given ecosystem and can work to preserve them in perpetuity. "

98 Id. (citations omitted).
99 See Bosselman & Tarlock, supranote 95; Holly.Doremus, The EndangeredSpecies Act:
Static Law Meets Dynamic World, WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y (forthcoming 2010), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1444164 (follow "One-Click Download" hyperlink); J.B. Ruhl, Thinling

of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean Up the Environment by
Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 Hous. L. REV. 933 (1997); Tarlock, supra note 94;
Jonathan Baert Wiener, Beyond the BalanceofNature, 7 DuKE ENvrL. L. & POL'Y F. 1 (1996).
100 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (2006).
101 National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1966,16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd-668ee (2006).
102 See Craig, supra note 18, at 32-40 (examining "environmental and natural resources law's
most basic paradigms of regulation and management: preservation and restoration"); Doremus,
supra note 99 (manuscript at 25-30) (describing conservation policy as relying on
"[t]he triumvirate of harvest regulation, restrictions on commerce, and reserve creation");

Annecoos Wiersema, A Train Without Tracks: Rethinidng the Place of Law and Goals in
Environmental and Natural Resources Law, 38 ENVTL. L. 1239, 1249 (2008) ("The traditional
belief by lawyers in the balance of nature has led to laws that focused on individual species and
setting aside sites of habitat without more.").
103 See generally Bosselman & Tarlock, supra note 95 (discussing the evolution of various
ecological science paradigms during the last century).
104 See R. Edward Grumbine, What Is Ecosystem Management., 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 27
(1994) (advocating management of ecosystems for their "native" properties); Bruce Pardy,
Ecosystem Managementin Question:A Reply to Rubi, 23 PACE ENvTL. L. REV. 209, 213-14 (2005)
(proposing management of ecosystems for "natural" conditions). For arguments against
retaining these conceptions of "nature" as the policy driver in environmental law, see J.B. Ruhl,

The Myth of What Is Inevitable Under Ecosystem Management A Response to Pardy,21 PACE

ENvrL L. REV. 315 (2005); J.B. Ruhl, The Pardy-Ruhi Dialogue on Ecosystem Managemen4
PartlV Narrowingand Sharpening the Questions, 24 PACE ENVTL L. REV. 25 (2007); Wiener,
supranote 99.
105 See J.B. Ruhl, CompensatoryMidgation in the Climate Change Era-Businessas Usual or
Time fora Change., NAT'L WETIANDS NEWSL, July-Aug. 2009, at 28, 28 (discussing the premises

of habitat mitigation programs and their poor fit with climate change).
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The stationarity premidse and all on which it based, however, are going
to fall to pieces in the era of climate change. In its stead ecologists now warn
of the no-analog future--ecological variability unprecedented in the history
of ecology, riddled with nonlinear feedback and feedforward loops,
previously unknown emergent properties, and new thresholds of irreversible
ichange.' The "envelope" of variability will grow to dimensions not
previously experienced, and ecologists, including paleoecologists who have
studied past climate change eras, have no analog for predicting where it is
headed.' 7 Clearly, therefore, the stationarity premise, which threw the
natural stability premise out the window, is about to be thrown out the
window itself.
Resource managers have begun to come to grips with this reality.
Climate change, in the words of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife* Service, "is the
trans-formational conservation challenge of our time, not only because of its
direct effects, but also because of its influence -on the other stressors that
have been and will continue to be, major conservation priorities."
Similarly, in the water resources context Milly et al. suggest that
[iun view of the magnitude and ubiquity of the hydroclimatic change
apparently now under way, however, we assert that stationarity is dead and
should no longer serve as a central, default assumption in water-resource riskassessment and planning. Finding a suitable successor is crucial for human
adaptation to changing climate. "o
So, what is the successor for conservation policy? Clearly, the

preservationist foundations of the habitat reserve strategy, whether applied
in the form of a wildlife refuge, a habitat mitigation set aside for an
endangered species, a wilderness area, or a wetlands mitigation bank, are on
shaky ground."0 What is it that the reserve is preserving if "natural" and
.native" no longer have the same meaning as they do under the stationarity
premise? Is a species migrating from a now inhospitable climate-altered
ecosystem "invasive" in its new ecosystem, or is it to be commended and
protected for its "natural" adaptation?. Is a wildlife refuge established for
waterfowl a failure if it dries up, and if so should we import water to keep it
"natural" so the "native" species can remain there?"'. We could debate these
questions, of course, but my point is that the prevailing model of

106 See supranote 32 and accompanying text.
107 SeeU.S. GLoBAL. CANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supm note 1,at 11 ("Climate will be continually
changing, moving at a relatively rapid rate, outside the range to which society has adapted in the
past The precise amounts and timing of these changes will not be known with certainty.").
108 U.S. FISH &WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 31, at 7.
109 Milly et al., supranote 97, at 573.
110 See Noss, supra note 96, at 893 ("[Gllassical preservationist approaches to conservation,
to the extent they attempt to hold nature static, do not reflect realities of nature.").

111 The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service warns that "the original purposes for which some of
our National Wildlife Refuges have been established may change or become obsolete." U.S. FISH
&WILIFE SERv., supra note 31, at 9.
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conservation has no answers. These questions only exist because we are
entering a whole different bailgame.
In short, if stationarity is dead in conservation science, preservationism
is dead in conservation policy. This is a constraint climate change Will
impose on environmental law regardless of our needs and desires.
Preservation of natural ecological conditions, which would require going all
in with our conservation chips in the resist mode of climate change
adaptation, is going to be either impossible in many2 circumstances or more
expensive than could possibly be justified in others."1
Over time, our ability to "manage for resilience" of current systems in the face
of climate change will be limited as temperature thresholds are exceeded,
climate impacts become severe and irreversible, and socioeconomic costs of
maintaining existing ecosystem structures, functions, and services become
excessive. At this point, it will be necessary to "manage for change," with a reexamination of priorities and a shift to adaptation options that incorporate
informat ion on projected ecosystem changes.13

Hence the successor, managing for change, must embrace the
transform and move modes, looking toward a transition to the future for its
reference points father than to the past as preservationism does. The
transition, to put it bluntly, is from the nature we once knew to the nature
that we expect to find around us on the other side of climate change. Only
when we get there, however, can we begin to talk again about what belongs
where under the new set of natural con ditions.
What does this mean for conservation policy during the century of
climate change adaptation? One option is simply to let ecosystems ride out
climate change and see what we get, but most ecologists believe active
management of some kind is needed to better serve the twin goals of
adaptation-to minimidze harm along the way and to position us to resume
sustalnability planning in the future."' Two overarching principles seem to
rise in answer to those goals. First, although techniques of restoration and
enhancement will still be used in practice, they must be directed toward new
transitional strategies."5 For example, whereas the critical habitat program
112 This is a major premise of Robin Craig's development of principles for implementing
adaptation policies. See Craig, supranote 18, at 32-40.
113 U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM & THE SIJBCOMM. ON GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH,
PRELIMINARY REviEw OF ADAPTATION OPTIONS FOR CLIMATE-SENSITVE ECOSYSTEMS
AND RESOURCES 1-6 (2008), avaflable at http://oaspub.epagov/einmseimscomnm.getfile~pdownload-id=474224.
114 See Kathy J. Wilis & Shonil A. Bhagwat, Biodiveisity and Climate Change, 326 Sd. 806,
807 (2009) (discussing the challenges of resources management as we "see species turnover,
migrations, and novel communities").
115 As Professor Debra Donahue suggested in comments on an early version of the Article,
restoration techniques developed under the stationarity premise of natural states will remain
useful as a means of reducing nonclimate stresses within ecological contexts. The U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Service has made this a priority of its climate change adaptation strategy. See U.S. FISH
& WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 31, at 22. Similarly, grazing law expert Joe Feller suggests that
drier conditions in the West will make it necessary to reduce livestock grazing on federal public
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under the ESA has been fixated on identifying and preserving existing
essential habitat for species, it will probably do many climate-threatened
species more good to roll in conservation strategies across the landscape
over time to track where species are migrating or likely will migrate."6 The
critical habitat for a climate-threatened species, in other words, might be not
only where the species is found today, but also where it will try to go in
the future."'
Second, the central objective of conservation policy for climate change
adaptation should be focused broadly on biodiversity conservation rather
than on conservation of particular species, particular refuge purposes, or
particular wilderness conditions."' Rather, ecosystem resilience is what will
best position us for resuming sustainability planning in the next century, and
ecosystem resilience resides in biodiversity." In short, environmental law is
going to have to give up on the preservation strategy, which will be
lands in order to put them in a position to be useful for other adaptation uses. See Joseph Feller,
Climate Change and Livestock Grazingon Western Rangelands,in CLIMATE CHANGE: A READER
(William Rodgers et al. eds.) (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 14-17, on file with author).
116 See Ruhl, supra note 26, at 35-37 (discussing this use of the critical habitat program of
the ESA).
117 Even further, serious consideration will need to be given to more active measures to help
species adapt, such as through "assisted migration," which involves the intentional relocation of
organisms to an area in which their species has never existed. See Alejandro E. Camacho, Assisted
Migration Redefing Nature and Natural Resources Law Under Climate Change, 27 YALE J. ON
REG. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1495370 (follow "One-Click
Download" hyperlink), (arguing that "contemporary natural resource law's fidelity to historic
baselines, protecting preexisting biota, and shielding nature from human activity is increasingly
untenable in light of climate change").
118 See ELISA BARBOUR & LARA KUEPPERS, PUB. PoucY INST. OF CAL., CONSERVATION AND
MANAGEMENT OF ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS IN A CHANGING CALIFORNIA 16 (2008), available at
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_1108EBR.pdf ("IMlaintaining an ecosystem that is
resistant or resilient to fire and invasive species might supplant a goal of maintaining a
particular species list in a given site."). For legal commentary on this topic, see Craig, supra
note 18, at 46-48 (recognizing the need for resilience-based management); Doremus, supra note
99 (manuscript at 48) (arguing that effective ecosystem resilience management cannot be based
on biodiversity metrics); Glicksman, supra note 26, at 881-84 (emphasizing the need for
ecosystem level management for resilience); James L Olmsted, Climate Surfing:A Conceptual
Guide to Drafting Conservation Agreements in the Age of Global Warming, 23 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 765 passim (2008) (emphasizing biodiversity management); and Noss, supra
note 96, at 904 ("Maintaining viable ecosystems is usually more efficient, economical, and
effective than a species-by-species approach." (emphasis omitted)). European scholars have
suggested the same for European Union policy. See An Cliquet et al., Adaptation to Clinate
Change: Legal Challengesfor ProtectedAreas, 5 UTRECHT L REV. 158, 174-75 (2009), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1440152 (follow "One-Click Download" hyperlink).
19 See Ahmed Djoghlaf, Climate Change and Biodiversity in PolarRegions, 8 SUSTAINABLE
DEv. L. & POL'Y 14, 16 (2008) ("[C]onservation and sustainable use of biodiversity is an essential
element of any strategy to adapt to climate change."); see also Jeffrey D. Sachs et al.,
Biodiversity Conservation and the Millennium Development Goals, 325 ScI. 1502 (2009)
(discussing the importance of biodiversity management to human well-being); W.J. Sutherland
et al., One Hundred Quesdons ofImportance to the Conservationof GlobalBiologicalDiveisity,
23 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 557, 561 (2009) (discussing the important research questions for
managing on a biodiversity basis in the climate change era); Matt Walpole et al., Tracldng
Progress Toward the 2010 Biodiveisity Target and Beyond, 325 ScI. 1503 (2009) (discussing
biodiversity management indicators).
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immensely difficult given how deeply ingrained it is in environmentalism's
psyche. The job of its successor, transitionalism, will be to shape
conservation policy toward the transform and move modes of climate
change adaptation.
B. Trend Two: RapidEvolution of PropertyRights andLiabilityRules
Associated with NaturalCapitalAdaptaionResources

A fairly reliable rule of thumb is that if the insurance industry is
convinced something is going to be a problem, it is going to be problem. And
the insurance industry is convinced climate change is going to be a
problem. 120 What this means is that insurers are anticipating that climate
change will lead to costly property losses, business damages, and personal
injuries to insured and insurable interests, and that adaptation to avoid or
repair those damages will also be costly.121 This, of course, raises both
120 See Ass'N OF BRITISH INSURERS, ASSESSING THE RISKS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: FINANCIAL
IMPLICATIONS 3, 5 (2009), available at http://www.abi.org.uk/Media/Releases/2009/11/45222.pdf
[hereinafter ABI, FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS] (examining the flow-through impact on insurance
prices and the impact on insurance capital requirements); ASS'N OF BRITISH INSURERS, THE
FINANCIAL RISKS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 5-8 (2009), available at http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/
insurance/abi-report.html [hereinafter ABI, FINANCIAL RISKS] (estimating necessary insurance
premium increases and insurance losses due to increased flood and wind damage); THE GENEVA
ASS'N, THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY AND CLIMATE CHANGE - CONTRIBUTION TO THE GLOBAL DEBATE

56-57 (2009), available at http://www.genevaassociation.org/PDF/GenevaReports/Geneva_
report%5B2%5D.pdf (identifying as key adaptations for the insurance industry storms and
flooding, agricultural issues, water availability, heat issues, and health issues); TIM LENTON ET
AL, MAJOR TIPPING PoImS IN THE EARTH'S CLIMATE SYSTEM AND CONSEQUENCES FOR THE INSURANCE
SECTOR 4 (2009) (providing a report commissioned by Allianz, a global financial company);
CAROLYN KOUSKY & ROGER M. COOKE, CLIMATE CHANGE AND RISK MANAGEMENT: CHALLENGES
FOR INSURANCE, ADAPTATION, AND LOSS ESTIMATION 6 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper
No. 09-03-REV, 2009), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-09-03.pdf. Legal
commentators have begun to explore the complex issues climate change will present for the
insurance and financial industries. See Richenda Connell et al., Evaluatingthe Plivate Sector
Perspectiveon the FinancialRisks of Climate Change,15 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
133 (2009); J. Wylie Donald & Craig W. Davis, Carbon Dioxide: Harmless, Ubiquitous and
CertainlyNot a "Pollutant"Under a Liability Polcy's Absolute Pollution Exclusion, 39 SETON
HALL L. REV. 107 (2009); Michael G. Faure, Commentary, Insurability of Damage Caused by
Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1875 (2007); Sean B. Hecht, Climate Change and the
Transformationof Risk InsuranceMatters,55 UCLA L. REV. 1559 (2008); Howard C. Kunreuther

& Erwann 0. Michel-Kerjan, Climate Change, Insurability of Large-Scale Disastes, and the
Emerging Liability Challenge, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1795 (2007); Evan Mills, The Role of US.
Insurance Regulators in Responding to Climate Change, 26 UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 129
(2008); Alberto Monti, Climate Change and Weather-RelatedDisasters:What Role for Insurance,
Reinsurance and Financial Sectos?, 15 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 151 (2009);
Christina Ross et al., Limiting Liability in the Greenhouse. Insurance Risk-Management
Strategiesin the Contextof GlobalClimate Change,43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 251 (2007).
121 See, ag, ABI, FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS, supra note 120, at 3, 5 (examining the flow-through
impact on insurance prices and the impact on insurance capital requirements); ABI, FINANCIAL
RISKS, supranote 120, at 5-8 (estimating necessary insurance premium increases and insurance
losses due to increased flood and wind damage); THE GENEVA AsS'N, supra note 120, at 56-57
(identifying as key adaptations for the insurance industry storms and flooding, agricultural
issues, water availability, heat issues, and health issues).
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opportunities and risks for insurers, but that is, after all, the nature of
insurance. My point in bringing up the insurance industry, though, is that
insurers tend to be astute at detecting significant shifts in relationships and
expectations looming on the horizon and try to anticipate how new forms of
injury will work their way through the insurance coverage and liability
system.In Thus it is no surprise that the industry has moved quickly to begin
to assess the impacts of climate change.
What has piqued the insurance industry's interest in climate changei
also sure to grab the attention of legal systems. Much of the focus in that
respect has been in establishing the public law of mitigation and adaptation
strategies through legislative and regulatory initiatives.in We should not
forget, however, about the common law. In particular, the same unsettling of
relationships and expectations- that is on the mind of insurers is bound to
creep into the common law through pressure on existing property rights and
liability rules. Climate change adaptation will inextricably and fundamentally
link people in ways they have not experienced before, and new
controversies are bound to surface in connection with their property and
their safety. Put simply, some people are going to take actions with their
property and personal behaviors, or fail to take actions, that put the property
and safety of other people at significant risk of injury. It is inevitable that
those injured will pursue remedies, and the courts will have to determine
who should pay.12
Take for example the owner of coastal property with an intact dune
system. As sea level rises and hurricane activity intensifies, that property
will become increasingly important as a buffer from storm surge for inland
properties. 25 Should that change the way we view the property rights
associated with the property? To be sure, an extensive public law regime
exists to limit the use of coastal and other natural resources in the interest
of public goals such as conservation, but it has not been directed primarily
at formulating the relationship between private parties with stakes in the
iigsea levels, loss of
protective functions of natural resources. 12,Wt
businesses, and
property,
to
inland
coastal dunes will increase 'risks
wetlands,
aquifer
out
for
coastal
people.' Similar scenarios could be played
122

Suraje Dessai et al., Defining and Experiencing Dangerous Clmate Change, 64

CiKTa

CHANGE 11, 14-15 (2004); Ross et al., supranote 120.
123 See Feldman & Kahan, supra note 26 (providing a broad survey of federal and state
adaptation policies); Alice Kaswan, The Domestic Response to Global Clmate Change:
What Role for Federal, State, and Litigatfon Initatives?, 42 U.S.F. L. REv. 39 (2007) (summarizing
existing and developing statutory and regulatory responses to climate change).
124 For the related question of who should bear the costs of implementing adaptation
measures, see Farber, supra note 18; Daniel A- Farber, Apportioning Climate Change Costs,
26 UCLA J. ENv'rL. L.& POL'Y 21 (2008).
125 See generallyAntonio Mascarenhas, OceanographicValidity of Buffer Zones for the East
Coast of India:~A Hydrometeorological Perspective, 86 CURRENT Sdi. 399, 399, 404 (2004)
(discussing "the protective value of coastal landforins" and acknowledging the need for
mandatory buffer zuiles").
126 See, e.g, Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1007-08 (1992) (examining pubhic
regulation of coastal property development).
127 Mascarenhas, supranote 125, at 404.
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recharge resources, inland wetlands providing groundwater recharge and
thermal regulation, and a host of other settings. To the extent the common
law is settled on the scope of relative property rights in these contexts-for
example, that there is no restraint as a matter of the common law of
nuisance on the destruction of- coastal dunes-that was all settled before
climate change came into the law's consciousness.
And we know the common law evolves to take into account new
developments in the law's consciousness. Indeed, Justice Scalia has
remrinded us of this in a context directly on point in his majority opinion in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coasta Council, where he established the 'relevant
background principles" of state property law as the reference point for
testing whether public regulation or private property-in that case,
development of coastal dunes-goes so far as to constitute a categorical
taking of property.'28 He also confirmed, however, that those background
principles evolve with "changed circumstances or new knowledge," such
that, over time, what was once allowed under common law no longer is.'
No doubt this is not what he intended, but those few lines have opened up a
cottage industry of lawyers searching for new knowledge and changed
circumstances to move the background principles one way or the other. "30
Over the past decade, for example, the discipline of ecological
economics has produced a burgeoning body of research illuminating the
significant economic value that functioning ecosystems, acting as natural
capital, supply humans in the form of direct and indirect ecosystem services,
such as the capacity of coastal wetlands to mitigate storm surges. 31
Even without having to take into account climate change impacts, this body
of new knowledge is already surfacing in commentary and the courts to
put pressure on common law property doctrine, particularly the law of
public and private nuisance and of the public trust doctrine, to reconfigure
relative property rights accordingly.3 ,2 And well it should, as it simply

128
129

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030.
Id at 1031.

130 See, e.g, Michael C. Bluinm & Lucas Ritchie, Lucas s5 Unlikely Legacy.- The Rise of
Background Principles as Categorical Taldngs Defenses, 29 HARv. ENvTL. L. REV. 321 (2005)
(surveying different bases for moving the common law under this principle); J.B. Ruh],
The "Background Priciples"of Natural Capital and Ecosystem Servces-Did Lucas Open
Pandora's Box?, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVrL L. 525 (2007) (exploring the new knowledge of
ecosystem services as a basis for influencing common law doctrine).
131 See Gretchen C. Daily, Introduction: What Are Ecosystem Services?, in7 NATURE'S
SERVICES: SOCIETAL. DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOsSTs'rM 1, 7-8 (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997).
Most recently, the United Nations's Millennium Ecosystem Ass~ssment published a global
survey of the production and delivery of ecosystem services. See WALTER V. REID ET AL.,
MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: SYNTHESIS
(2005), available at http://www.mflenrniumassessment.org/documents/docunent.356.aspx.pdf.
For a more detailed history, including coverage of the emergence of the ecosystem services
concept in legal literature, see James Salzman, A Field of Green? The Past and fliture of
Ecosystem Serices,21 J. LAND USE & ENvTL L. 133 (2006).
132 See J.B. Ruhi, Makidng Nuisance Ecological, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 753 (2008); J.B. Ruhi
& Jaynes Salzman, Ecosystem Seri~ces and the Public Thust Doctrine:- Working Change from
Within, 15 S. E. ENvTh L.J. 223, 230-37 (2007).
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requires that property owners use property efficiently and pay for their
negative externalities.
Climate change will only accelerate this evolutionary process.
Already, for example, renewable energy markets emerging in response to
climate change mitigation policies are causing property law scholars to
reexamine old topics such as access to solar energy" as well as to explore
uncharted territory such as access to wind energym and who owns the
underground space that might be devoted to carbon sequestration. '6 Climate
change adaptation strategies are even more likely to trigger property rights
disputes in need of new judicial examination given mounting knowledge
about ecosystem services.'37 As natural capital resources that provide
ecosystem services such as storm surge mitigation factor increasingly into
climate change adaptation policy-which will happen precisely because of
the ecosystem services provided-it is likely that the common law will grab
hold of this new knowledge even more aggressively. Indeed, whereas the
public nuisance and other common law claims that states and other interests
have lodged against large sources of greenhouse gas emissions as part of a
mitigation litigation strategy are high profile media stories notwithstanding
133 Other commentators have identified the potential for the needs of climate change
adaptation to profoundly influence the development of common law property rights. See, e.g.,
Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting to Climate Change: The PotentialRole of State Common Law
Public Trust Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=1431663 (follow "One-Click Download" hyperlink) [hereinafter Craig, Adapting to
Climate Change]; Craig, supra note 18, at 61-63; Michael Hiatt, Come Hell or ffgh Water
Reexamining the Takings Clause in a Climate ChangedFuture,18 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 371
(2008); Carol M. Rose, Big Roads, Big Rights: Varieties ofPublic infrastructureand TheirImpact

on Environmental Resources, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 409 (2008); Ruhl, supra note 132, at 776 n.83;
Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 132, at 230-31; Gregory Sergienko, Property Law and Climate
Change, NAT. RESOURCES &ENV'T, Winter 2008, at 25. For a similar theme involving water rights,
see infraPart III C.
134 See Sara C. Bronin, Modern Lights, 80 U. CoLO. L. REV. 881, 884-85 (2009) (proposing a
solar energy rights regime similar to water law); Sara C. Bronin, Solar Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV.
1217 (2009) (exploring likely rights conflicts under existing solar energy access rights).
135 See Troy Rule, A Downwind View of the Cathedrah Using Rule Four to Allocate Wind

lights, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 207 (2009) (examining property rights disputes emerging due to
competition for wind energy).
136 See Alexandra lass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change, Carbon Sequestration,and

PropertyRights, 2010 U. ILL. L.REV. (forthcoming), available at httpJ/ssrn.com/abstract=1371755
(follow "One-Click Download" hyperlink).
137 For example, although the beach renourishment project at issue in Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, No. 08-1151

(U.S. Dec. 2, 2009), was not designed as a climate change adaptation measure, the case is
representative of the property disputes likely to arise as communities take measures to enhance
coastal technological and natural resources to defend against storm surge. See Transcript of
Oral Argument at 3, Stop the Beach Renouishment; No. 08-1151 (on file with author). The case
arises out of the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Walton County v. Stop the Beach
Renourishment,Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2008), cert.granted, 129 S. Ct. 2792 (2009) (No. 081151), in which the court found a state beach renourishment statute that fixed property
boundaries for littoral property owners did not constitute a taking of property without just
compensation. Id. at 1121. For an in-depth discussion of the case, see Donna R. Christie, Of
Beaches, Boundaries and SOBs, 25 J. LAND USE & ENvrL L. (forthcoming 2009), available at

http://ssrn.com/abstract-1483348 (follow "One-Click Download" hyperlink).
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limited success,'38 it is likely to be in the more discrete, small-scale context
of adaptation in which the common law will have reason to evolve.
Of course, the common law ought to develop in this respect to serve the
purposes of the common law. Nuisance law, for example, polices
unreasonable use of property in particular contexts,'39 and the public trust
doctrine protects important but limited public interests in water resources.'4
They are by no means doctrines on which we can rest all or most of climate
change adaptation law, and I am not suggesting we violate the basic
underpinnings of the common law in order to get climate change adaptation
mileage out of them. Rather, it seems inevitable that many nuisance, public
trust, - and other claims like this are going to be made-claims that one
property owner can't take actions that substantially impair the climate
change adaptation profile of other property owners or the public-and that
courts are highly unlikely to (and should not) throw the claims out on
motions to dismiss. The litigation grist mill will gear up to resolve these
claims, and new ground is likely to be covered to further the traditional
common law interests of efficient use of property.
I will come clean here, however, and confess full awareness that an
important secondary effect of any movement of the common law along these
lines, perhaps more important than the evolution of relationships defined by
common law, will be the corollary Justice Scalia established in Lucas that
public environmental law can move in behind the common law evolutionary
step to establish more comprehensive regulatory regimes without pushback
from takings claims.'14 1 In this sense the development of the common law of
climate change adaptation may liberate the public environmental law of
adaptation to do more than it otherwise could have. Notwithstanding that
the underlying rationale for evolution of the common law I am suggesting
rests in economi 'c efficiency and cost internalization, this prospect sends
42
shivers down the backs of libertarians and free market environmentalists.
138 Although several such pieces of litigation have overcome motions to dismiss on a variety
of grounds, none has advanced to the merits of the public nuisance, private nuisance, trespass,

negligence, unjust enrichment, fraudulent

misrepresentation, or civil conspiracy claims.

See

Corner v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 860 (5th Cir. 2009) (reversing lower court's granting of
motion to dismiss), rehg granted en banc, No. 07-60756, 2010 WL 685796 (5th Cir. Feb. 26,
2010); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 315 (2d Cir. 2009) (reversing lower
court's granting of motion to dismiss); Native Vill. of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. C 08-1138
SBA, 2009 WL 3326113, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2009) (granting motion to dismiss). For legal
commentary on the use of comnmon law principles in mitigation litigation, see Daniel Farber,
Basic Compensation for Victims of Climnate Change, 38 Envti. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10, 521
(2008); Daniel A. Farber, Tort Law in the Era of Climate Change, Katina and 9/li.: Explorng
Liability for ExtraordinaryRisks; 43 VAL U. L. Rsv. 1075 (2009); David A. Grossman, Warming
Up to a Not-Soi-Radical Idea- Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 CoLum. J. ENvrL L. 1
(2003); Hilary Sigman, Legal Liabiityas Climate ChangePolicy, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1953 (2007).
139See Grossman, supra note 138, at 53.
140 See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 132, at 225.
141Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029-30 (1992).
142 See James L. Huffmnan, Beware of Greens in Praise of the Common Law, 58 CASE W. RES.
L. REv. 813, 813 (2008) (describing the use of the common law to protect natural capital "as a
Trojan horse-a gift to free marketeers and property rights supporters that is not what it
appears to be").
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I refer their complaints to Justice Scalia, who, after all, planted this Trojan
horse in Lucas; my interest is only in ensuring that common law doctrine
incorporates the immense economic value of ecosystem services the same
way it does other economic attributes of property. Climate change
adaptation is in all likelihood going to be the catalyst for that to happen with
uncharacteristic speed for the common law.
C. Trend Three AcceleratedMergerof Water Law Land-UseLaw,
andEnvironmentalLaw
Water law scholars, Professor Dan Tarlock in particular, were the first
to focus attention on climate change adaptation policy,'" and land-use law is
well represented among the now broader scope of legal scholarship
engaging adaptation.1" There is good reason both of these fields have
become prominent topics in the adaptation mix-land-use and water
allocation decisions are likely to be the hottest of hot button issues as
climate change effects take hold over the landscape.
The intersection between land-use law, water law, and environmental
law is nothing new, making "the interrelationship of water resources and
land use ...

one of the hottest topics in land-use today.""

Many

contemporary large-scale problems involve all three fields of law working in
a complex amalgam, making it difficult to characterize the problem as about
land use, water allocation, or the environment.'" Climate change will rapidly
move the three fields of law even closer together, likely to the point that it
will be meaningless in many contexts to think of them as separate fields of
law and policy.
It is no surprise that water law scholars were the first movers on
climate change adaptation, as water will likely be the first vital natural

l4 Tarlock's work during the 1990s forged the discipline of climate change adaptation law by
focusing on international and domestic legal regimes for allocation of water resources.

See A. Dan Tarlock, How Well Can International Water Allocation Regimes Adapt to Global
Climate Change., 15 J. LAND USE & ENVrtL L. 423 (2000); Tarlock, supra note 3; A. Dan Tarlock,
Western Water Law, Global Warming,and Growth Limitations,24 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 979 (1991).
144

This includes, for example, proposals to adopt a Netherlands-style land-use system for

coastal areas. See Damien Leonard, Raising the Levee: Dutch Land Use Law as a Modelfor US.
Adaptation to Climate Change,21 GEO. INT'L ENvTL L. REv. 543 (2009).
145 Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, 1s Wet Growth Smarter Than Smart Growth?:
The fagmentation and Integrationof Land Use and Water,35 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.)
10,152, 10,154 (2005); see also Christine A. Klein et al., Modernizing Water Law: The Example of
Florida,61 FLA. L. REV. 403, 448-57 (2009) ("[In planning for the future, a critical challenge for
states] lies in providing appropriate links between land use planning (typically at the local level)
and water resource planning (typically at the state level).").
146 See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, ModularEnvironmentalRegulation, 54 DUKE
L.J. 795 (2005) (discussing the Bay-Delta watershed in northern California); Holly Doremus & A.
Dan Tarlock, Fsh,Fanns,and the Clash of Cultures in the IMamath Basin,30 EcoLOGY LQ. 279,
306-16 (2003); Wiersema, supra note 102, at 1265-82 (discussing the Chesapeake Bay).
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resource hit hard by climate change. 47 Consider Milly et al.'s summary of the
climate change impacts scenario for water resources:
[S]ubstantial anthropogenic change of Earth's climate is altering the means and
extremes of precipitation, evapotranspiration, and rates of discharge of rivers.
Warming augments atmospheric humidity and water transport. This increases
precipitation, and possibly flood risk, where prevailing atmospheric watervapor fluxes converge. Rising sea level induces gradually heightened risk of
contamination of coastal freshwater supplies. Glacial meltwater temporarily
enhances water availability, but glacier and snow-pack losses diminish natural
seasonal and interannual storage.
Anthropogenic climate warming appears to be driving a poleward expansion
of the subtropical dry zone, thereby reducing runoff in some regions. Together,
circulatory and thermodynamic responses largely explain the picture of
regional gainers and losers of sustainable freshwater availability that has
emerged from climate models.1
The bottom line is that in some regions of the nation communities with
adequate or marginally adequate existing access to freshwater supplies will
find themselves high and dry. The move mode of adaptation strategies may
be viable for some small communities, but it is more likely that substantial
cities such as Los Angeles and Phoenix will, understandably, prefer to stay
where they are, meaning they will have to resort to the resist and transform
strategies. The resist strategy would likely involve searching for new
supplies, such as desalination and more water transfers, and more intensive
conservation measures. 4 In addition to shifts in regional industrial and
agricultural profiles, the transform strategy may involve taking a serious
look at the continued viability of applying what is now centuries old water
law to questions of allocation and conservation of water resources.
147 See CAL. NATURAL REs. AGENCY, supra note 31, at 79-92; U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH
PROGRAM, supranote 1, at 41-52.
148 Milly et al., supra note 97, at 573 (citations onitted).
149 See Robin Kundis Craig, Water Suppy, Desalinadon, Climate Change, and EnergyPolicy,
23 PAC. McGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L.J. (forthcoming 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1418675 (follow "One-Click Download" hyperlink) (desalination);

Noah'D. Hall & Bret B. Stuntz, Climate Change and GreatLakes Water Resources: Avoiding
Fture Conflicts with Conservation,31 HAMINE L. REv. 639 (2008) (conservation); Klein et al.,
supra note 145, at 457-67 (examining the demands for reform of water transfer law).
150 A growing number of water law scholars have argued that climate change adaptation will
demand fundamental reforms of domestic water-allocation law and water property rights. See

Adell Amos, TY-eshwater Conservadonin the Context of Energy and Climate Policy: Assessing
Progress and Identifying Challenges in Oregon and the Western United States, 12 U. DENV.
WATER L. REV. 1 (2008); John T. Andrews et al., Califonia Water Management: Subject to
Change, 14 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTrL. L. & POL'Y 1463 (2008); Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting
Water Law to Public Necessity: Reframing Cikmate Change as Emergency Response and
Preparedness 11 VT. J. ENvrL L (forthcoming 2010), available at http //ssrn.com/abstract-1528963
(follow "One-Click Download" hyperlink); Joseph W. Dellapenna, Adapting RiarianRights to
the Twenty-First Centwy, 106 W. VA. L. REv. 539 (2004); Joseph W. Dellapenna, Climate

Disruption, the Washington Consensus, and Water Law Reform, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 383 (2008);
Joseph W. Dellapenna, Developing Suitable Water Allocation Law for Pennsylvania, 17 ViLL.
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In either case, however, the fact that entire major cities and regions will be
on the line makes it likely that getting water to them will rise to the top of
adaptation law and policy priorities, leading to intensified controversies
between urban and rural areas as well as between states and regions of the
nation.' 5' Environmental impacts of these adaptive strategies, we can hope,
will be integrated in the decision making, but in all likelihood managing for
environmental, effects will take a back seat to keeping urban communities
and regional economies alive.
On the flip side, some regions of the nation presently lacking adequate
water resources will benefit from climate change through increased
precipitation, runoff, and recharge. 5 2 The new abundance of water will open
up opportunities, such as increased agricultural capacity and room for
residential and industrial development. Indeed, it may be critical to the
nationaladaptation strategy that the regions climate change blesses with
more water adapt specifically to provide a secure food supply and
industrial base. Once again, we can hope that the environmental impacts of
these adaptive uses of 'new water" will be integrated into water resources
development decisions. And so as not to repeat the mistakes of the
"old water" regions that were experiencing supply stress well before climate
change (and will be in crisis mode), one also can hope that the water law of
these newly wetter regions will strike a different path to ensure more
efficient use and allocation. in The bottom line, however, is that to the extent
our national food supply and industrial capacity are put in jeopardy as a
1 (206); Holly Doremus & Michael Hanemann, The Challenges of Dynamnic Water
Management in the American West 26 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 55 (2007); Brian E. Gray,
Global Climate Change: WaterSupply Risks and WaterManagement Opportunities,14 HASTINGS
ENVTi-L. U:

W.-Nw. J. ENvTL.

L. &

POL'Y 1453 (2008); Noah D. Hall et al., Climiate Change and Freshwater

Resources, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'r, Winter 2008, at 30; Kathleen A. Miller, Climate Change and
Water in the West: Complexities, Uncertainties and Strategies for Adaptation, 27 J. LAND
RESOURCES & ENvTh. L. 87 (2007); A. Dan Tarlock, Water Law Reform in West Virginia: The
Broader Context; 106 W.VA. L.REV. 495 (2004). Some of these changes in domestic law Will be
driven by adaptation 'pressures put on cross-border water regimes the United States has
established with and Mexico and Canada. See Kibel, supra note 2, passim.
151 See Robert W. Adler, Climate Change and the Hegemony of State Water Law, 29 STAN.
ENvrL. L.J. 1, 40-45 (2010) (examining the potential interstate and interregional conflicts);
Klein et al., supra note 145, at 448 ("Surprisingly fierce conflicts have developed as rapidly
urbanizing regions of the states seek, to capture water resources of wetter, slower-growing
areas."). Water law experts believe these interjurisdictional conflicts will put stress on settled
patterns of water law federalism, most likely leading to an increased federal role supplanting
tradltional state dominance. See Adler, supra, at 49-60; Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting Water
Federalism to Cimfate Change Impacts: Energy Policy Food Security, and the Allocation of
Water Resources 5 ENVrFL & ENERGY L. & Poi'Y J. (forthcoming 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1555944 (follow "One Click Download" hyperlink).
152 See Nat'I Drought Mitigation Ctr., What Is Drought? Drought and Climate Change,
http://drought.unl.edulwhatislcchange.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2010) (pointing out that
some regions might experience beneficial gains in agricultural production resulting from
adequate precipitation).
153 See Jonathan H. Adler, Water Marketing as an Adaptive Response to the Thireat of
Climate Change, 31 HAMLINE L REV. 729 (2008) (dlscussing greater use of water markets to
resolve allocation questions); Craig, Adapting to Climate Change,supra note 133 (exploring how
public trust doctrines can be used to adapt water rights law for climate change).
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result of a new hydroclimatic regime, getting water to the right places will be
the priority and the environmental impacts of doing so Will often be of
secondary concern.
Where water is and isn't influences land-use decisions. The altered
freshwater regime discussed above, therefore, will lead not only to new
water law developments but also to profound land-use decisions in regions
moving from wet to dry or dry to wet. Professor Tony Arnold has explored
the increasingly intimate connection between land-use law, water law, and
environmental law that existed well before this hydroclimatic shift.
His assessment is that "[hland use regulation and planning have taken an
genvironmental turn': a pervasive and inescapable attention to the impact of
land use and land development on the natural environment."5 This effect
unquestionably will grow in importance as climate change moves water
resources around the nation in ways never before contemplated. As we
chase water, temperature, and other resources to develop new agricultural
districts or expand existing ones, and as people move to locate new
employment and residential opportunities, new land-use decisions will be
made. As Arnold's work suggests, with tighter integration of land and water
concerns these new land-use decisions, we can hope, will be fused closely
with environmental management in mind. Yet while environental impacts
will -nest within these merged water allocation and land-use domains, the.
question will be under what priority.
Above all else, however, one has to believe that sea level rise will
trigger a phenomenal series of land-use decisions for coastal communities.
Assuming cities like Miami and New York plan to weather the century of
climate change adaptation, they will need a new land-use vision. One author
while
suggests, for example, that national land-use law will be nede,
another offers the Dutch levee land-use system as a new land-use model for
the coastal United States."n Clearly, this ultimate resist mode adaptation
strategy would be an immense infrastructure project for any community,
implicating property rights, land-use, and environmental concerns in a midx
unlike any they have previously encountered. Moreover, smaller coastal
communities may not have the resources to erect this kind of substantial
coastal barrier, and will have to rely on transform strategies such as
increased use of natural coastal resources for dampening the effects of sea
level rise. Some communities may simply yield to the sea and recede
landward, which would raise a host of land-use and property rights issues.'5
In all these and other possible scenarios, land, water, and the environment
will intersect in ways that will demand new forms of land-use regimes. "8
154

Arnold, supra note 145, at 10, 152.

15-5See Catherine J. LaCroix, Land Use and Clmate Change: Is It Time for a National Land
Use Policy?, 35 ECOLOGY L CURRENrS 124 (2008).

See Leonard, supra note 144.
See Jessica AkBacher, Yielding to the Rising Sea: The Land Use Challenge, 38 REAL
Esr. L.J. 96 (2009).
158 As with water allocation law, a growing number ,of land-use scholars argue for
fundamental reform of land-use law to respond to the needs of climate change adaptation.
See John R. Nolon & Jessica A. Bacher, Cliate Change, Zoning and Transportation Policy
156
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It is hard to say what the position of environmental law will be when
embedded in this new land and water policy mix. It is possible that in some
contexts, particularly the coastal contexts, the division between the three
fields will truly cease to exist and lawyers will be practicing a new breed
called "costal adaptation law." But it is not clear how the environment will
be represented. On the one hand, it may be pragmatic to reconnect what
were once fragmented areas of law, but through their merger environmental
interests could get lost in the amalgam. We can promise to be vigilant about
securing the environment its due priority, but the prospects of Los Angeles
without water and Miami knee deep in the wrong kind are likely to focus
policy attention more on getting the adaptive strategy in place and less on
worrying about its impacts on the environment.
D. Trend Four:Incorporationof a Human Rights Dimensionin
Climate ChangeAdaptation Policy
Just as climate change impacts will be felt unevenly across the globe, so
too is the capacity to adapt unevenly distributed. In both cases, unfortunately,
it is the least developed countries that drew the short straw-they will feel
climate change more severely and have the least capacity to reduce
vulnerability and boost resilience.'5 This double whammy effect has led the
international law community to characterize global adaptation policy as a
human rights issue.16 Indeed, the vast majority of legal scholarship on
climate change adaptation focuses on international law and international
relations addressing four principal facets of this human rights dimensionthe responsibilities of developed nations to 1) assist the adaptation efforts of
least developed nations,'6' 2) assist the adaptation efforts of small island
36 REAL EST. L.J. 211, 213 (2007); Porras, supra note 18, at 595; Heike Schroeder & Harriet
Bulkeley, Global Cities and the Governance of Climate Change: What Is the Rule of Law in
Cides., 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 313, 321 (2009).
159 See WORLD BANK, supra note 47, passim.
160 See Simon Caney, CosmopoltanJustice, Rights and Global Climate Change, 19 CANADIAN
J.L. &JURISPRUDENCE 255 (2006); John H. Knox, Climate Change and Human Rights Law, 50 VA.
J. INT'L L. 163, 165 (2009); John H. Knox, Linkdng Human Rights and Climate Change at the
United Nations, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 477 (2009); Siobhdn Mclnerney-Lankford, Climate
Changeand Human Rights: An Introductionto Legal Issues, 33 HARv. ENVTL. L.REV. 431 (2009);
Stephen Tully, The Contribution of Human Rights as an Additional Pemspective on Clmate
Change Impacts Within the Pacidfe,5 N.Z. J. PUB. & INT'L L. 169 (2007).
161 Sumudu Atapattu, Global Climate Change: Can Human ights (and Human Beinp)
Survive This Onslaught., 20 COLO. J. INT'L ENvrL. L & POL'Y 35, 66 (2008); Edward Cameron, The
Human Dimension of Global Climate Change, 15 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENvrL. L. & POL'Y 1, 14
(2009); Daniel H. Cole, Climate Change,Adaptation, and Development 26 UCIA J. ENVTL. L &
POL'Y 1, 3 (2008); Mark A. Drumbl, Poverty, Wealth, and Obhgation in International
Environmental Law, 76 TU. L. REv. 843 (2002); Daniel A. Farber, The Case for Climate
Compensation:Justicefor Climate Change Victims in a Complex World, 2008 UTAH L REV. 377,
413 (2008); Paul G. Harris, The European Union and Environmental Change: Sharing the
Burdens of Global Warming, 17 CoLO. J. INT'L ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 309, 326 (2006); Paul L. Joffe,
Conscience and Interest Law, Rights, and Poticsin the Struggle to Confront Climate Change
and the New Poverty,6 RUTGERS J.L & PUB. POL'y 269, 270 (2009); Marc Limon, Human Rights

and Climate Change: Constructinga Case for PolicalAcdon, 33 HARV. ENvTL L REY. 439, 455
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nations,ln 3) assist the adaptation efforts of indigenous people," and
4) assist the migration efforts of people from these three communities who
are displaced by climate change notwithstanding adaptation assistance.'*
While the United States will surely be at center stage as those "climate
justice" issues play out in the international community dialogue on climate
change adaptation,'" a domestic version of the human rights dimension of
adaptation policy is likely to emerge as well. Even before climate change
came into the picture, an environmental justice theme emerged around the
inequitable burdens the poor and people of color have sustained in terms of
disproportionate exposure to pollutants, proximity to industrial sites and
contaminated lands, and.limited access to environmental amenities.'6 And
from the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans and other hard-hit

(2009); Ann Prouty, The Clean Development Mechanism and Its Implications for Climate
Justice, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 513, 539 (2009); Edith Brown Weiss, Climate Change,
IntergenerationalEquity andInternadonalLaw, 9 VT. J. ENVTL L. 615,627 (2008).
162 See William C. Bums, Global Warning-The United Nations FrameworkConvention on
Climate Change and the Phture of Small Island States, 6 DICK. J. ENVTL L. & POL'Y 147, 175
(1997); John Crump, Snow, Sand, Ice, and Sun: Clmate Change and Equity in the Arctic and
Small Island Developing States, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEv. L. & POL'Y 8 (2008); Alexander Gillespie,
Small Island States in the Face of Climatic Change- The End of the Line in International
EnvirnmentalResponsibilty,22 UCLAJ. ENVTL. L & POLY 107, 121-22 (2004); Susan Glazebrook,
Human Rights andtheEnvironment 40 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L REv. 293,342 (2009).
16 See Randall S. Abate, Crimate Change, the United States, and the Impacts of Arctic

Melting A Case Study in the Need for Enforceable InternationalEnvironmentalHuman Rights,
43A STAN. J. INT'L L. 3, 71-72 (2007); James D. Ford, SupportngAdaptation:A PriorityforAction
on Clmate Change for Canadian Inuit; 8 SUSTAINABLE DEv. L. & PoL'Y 25 (2008); Donald M.
Goldberg & Tracy Badua, Do People Have Standing?Indigenous Peoples,Global Warming and
Humai Rights, 11 BARRY L. REV. 59, 61 (2008); Jesse Hohmann, Igloo as Icon: A Human Rights
Approach to Climate Change for the Inuit?, 18 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 295 (2009);
Margueritte E. Middaugh, Linking Global Wanning to Inuit Human Rights, 8 SAN DIEGO
INT'L L.J. 179, 207 (2006); E. Rania Rampersad, Indigenous Adaptation to Climate Change:
PreseringSustainableRelationships Through an Environmental Stewardship Claim & Thst
Fund Remedy, 21 GEO. INT'L ENvTL L REv. 591, 613 (2009); Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous People
and Environmental Justice The. Impact of Clmate Change, 78 U. COLO. L. REv. 1625, 1676
(2007); Erika Zimmerman, Comment, Valuing TraditionalEcological Knowledge Incorporadng
the Experiencesof IndigenousPeople into Global Climate Change Policies,13 N.Y.U. ENvTL L.J.
803, 846 (2005).
164 See Ben Saul &Jane McAdam, An Insecure ClimateforHumanSecurity?Climate-Induced
Displacementand InternationalLaw, in HUMAN SECURITY AND NON-CIZENS (Alice Edwards &
Carla Ferstman eds., forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1292605 (follow
"One-Click Download" hyperlink); McAdam, supra note 80 (manuscript at 27); Kara K Moberg,

Comment, . Extending Refugee Definitions to Cover Environmentally Displaced Persons
DisplacesNecessary Protection,94 IOWA L. REv. 1107, 1113 (2009).
165 For an overview, see INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CLINIc, UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY SCH. OF
LAW, PROTECTING PEOPLE AND THE PLANET: A PROPOSAL TO ADDRESS THE HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACTS
OF CuMATE CHANGE POLIcY (2009), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/IHRLC/
ProtectingPeopleandthePlanet.pdf (proposing a process to address the human rights
impacts of climate change policy).
166 For background on environmental justice, see CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL.,,
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LAW, PoLIcY & REGULATION (2d ed. 2009); THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE: THEORIES AND PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS (Michael B. Gerrard &
Sheila R. Foster eds., 2d ed. 2008).
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areas has emerged a similar theme of disaster justice.'67 As a report by the
Congressional Black Caucus Foundation suggested as early as 2004, climate
change will be a catalyst for fusing these two related movements into one
focused on securing a human rights dimension to domestic climate change
adaptation policy."8 Where and how equitably will adaptation capital such as
seawalls be deployed and financed? How will the health of low-income
urban populations vulnerable to heat waves and pollution be protected?
Who will get the water in areas drying out? For areas transforming with
climate change, how will redevelopment and job creation play out across the
community? If the only option is to move, how will low-income populations
manage that?
Only a few legal scholars have addressed even the tip of the iceberg of
this looming question of domestic climate justice policy,'" and in general
"the national debate on climate change policies has given insufficient
attention to their environmental justice implications."o Partly this may be
due to the fact that the United States on balance does not fare that badly
under generally accepted climate change scenarios, certainly not when
compared to many other countries."' But that is just on balance. A recent
study from the University of Southern California's Program for
Environmental and Regional Equity identifies how imbalances in
vulnerability to climate change impacts and access to climate change
adaptation resources will create a domestic "climate gap" in the United
States, with communities of color and low-income on the short end.'72 Of
principal concern are heat waves, increased air pollution, access to basic
necessities, reduced job oliportunities, and protection and recovery from

167 For background on disaster policy and disaster justice, see DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL.,
DISASTER LAW AND POLICY (2d ed. 2009).
168 See CONG. BLACK CAUCUS FOUND., AFRICAN AMERICANS AND CLIMATE CHANGE: AN UNEQUAL

BURDEN (2004), availableat httpJ/www.rprogress.orgpublications/2004/CBCFREPORITF.pdf.
169 See, e.g., Maxine Burkett, Just Solutions to Climate Change:A Climate Justice Proposal
fora Domestic CleanDevelopmentMechanism, 56 BUFF. L. REv. 169 (2008); Jacqueline P. Hand,

Global Climate Change: A Senous Threat to Native American Lands and Culture,38 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,329 (2008); Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice and Domestic
Climate Change Policy,38 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,287 (2008) [hereinafter Kaswan,
Domestic Cimate Change Policy]; Alice Kaswan, Reconciling Justice and Efficiency:

IntegratingEnvironmental Justice into Domestic Cap-And-Trade Programs for Controlling
Greenhouse Gases,in ETHICS, ENERGY, AND CLIMATE CHANGE (Denis G. Arnold ed., forthcoming
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442165 (follow "One-Click Download" hyperlink);
Robert R.M. Verchick, Adaptation, Economics, and Justice, in ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND U.S.
CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY (David Driesen ed., forthcoming 2010) (on file with author); Robert

R.M. Verchick, Adaptive Justice, in CLIMATE CHANGE: A READER, supra note 115. For a
discussion of how some prominent figures in the religious evangelical community have begun to
portray climate change as a human rights issue, see John Copeland Nagle, The Evangelical
Debate over Clmate Change,5 U. ST. THOMAS LJ. 53 (2008).
170 Kaswan, Domestic Cimate Change Polcy,supranote 169, at 10,288.
171 See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 1, passim.
172 See RACHEL MORELLO-FROSCH ET AL, THE CLIMATE GAP: INEQUALITIES IN How CLIMATE

CHANGE HuRS AMERICANS & How To CLOSE THE GAP (2009), available at http://coliege.usc.edu/
pereldocuments/The ClimateGap.FullReportFINALpdf.
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extreme weather events. 73 Professor Alice Kaswan offers a flavor of how the
already established environmental justice community has incorporated the
climate justice theme to address these concerns:
In the climate change context, environmental justice groups are beginning to
articulate overarching principles.... Recognizing the particular vulnerability of
the poor and people of color, a number of the principles focus on the potential
consequences of climate change and the critical importance of reducing GHG
emissions. Several other principles focus on the implications of climate change
policies, including a call for adaptation assistance for poor communities, as
well as compensation for workers and others impacted by the potential
economic costs of climate change policies. The environmental justice
movement's participatory goals are reflected in the call for comnmunity
participation. The principles express caution about the emergence of
justice
international and national carbon markets. California environmental
4
groups have been even more critical of market-based approaches.'
What lessons come out of this emerging theme of domestic human
rights for domestic environmental law? One seems inevitable and critical to
bear in midnd-that it will be important to define the human right of climate
justice and distinguish it from the concept that there is a human right to a
certain level of environmental quality. 7 1 With respect to the adaptation side
of climate policy, climate justice articulates not a right to environmental
quality, but rather a right to equitable distribution of the benefits of climate
change adaptation, which may or may not align with environmentalist norms
of minimum conditions of environmental quality. Equitable distribution of
climate adaptation resources and protections may not always fulfill
conventional environmental protection norms such as conserving
ecosystems and imperiled species, as, for example, when seawalls or beach
renourishment may be needed to protect human communities unable to
transform or move, or when water may need to be transferred to sustain
urban populations of poor and people of color who have no options. This is
not to say that climate justice will not promote environmental protection,
but primarily when doing so serves climate justice interests. Climate justice,
in other words, is first and foremost about protecting the poor and people of
color, not the environment.

See id. at 7-18.
174 Kaswan, Domestic Cliate ChangePolicy supra note 169, at 10,289 (footnotes omnitted).
k75 For some discussion of the latter, see Stephen T. Del Percio, Linking the Environment
and Human Rights: A Global Perspective, 29 WM. & MARY ENVTL L & POL'Y REv, at v (2005);
Monique Hardin, The Human Right to a Healthy and Safe Envirornent: The Right of Displaced
Hurricane Katrna Sumvvom to Return Home with Dignity and Justice,*101 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L
Paoc. 85 (2007); Barry E. HMl et aL, Human Rights and the Environment-A Synopsis and Some
Predictions, 16 GEO. INT'L ENvmL L. REV. 359 (2004); Dinah Shelton, Humian Rigts and the
Environmnent What Specific EnvironmentalRights Have Been Recognzed?, 35 DENV. J. INT'L L.
173

& POL'Y 129 (2006).
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E Thendfnve: Catastropheand CrisisAvoidance andResponse as an
OverarchzingAdaptation PolicyPriority
Generally speaking, people'are not in favor of catastrophes and crises.
Yet the synergistic effects of changes in variability of storm, flood, drought,
and fire events with absolute changes in sea level, temperature, and other
climate features will lead to higher risks of catastrophic events and
pandemic crises. People will demand protection.
This is not Chicken Little calling. Even relatively conservative scenarios
of increased mean surface temperature lead to significant increases in risk
of catastrophic events and pandemic health and safety crises. California's
adaptation strategy plan, for example, details high-level risk potentials
176
117
involving a wide array of factors including heat waves, disease vectors ,
78
79
coastal extreme weather events,' water shortages,
food security,"~
fires,'8' and infrastructure damage."~ Researchers anticipate numerous
localized and reversible "disasters" involving these effects, as well the
possible "mega-catastrophe"-"an event that is global in scale and has a
high degree of irreversibility" and which, notwithstanding its low
probability, "may account for a large portion of expected losses" from
climate change.'" Catastrophes of this magnitude could be triggered either
as climate regimes cross nonlinear thresholds"" or "the possibility that a
series of more localized disasters could trigger other disasters, and that this
cascade of consequences could become severe enough to create a
mega-catastrophe. This could include national security concerns, since a

176 See CAL.

NATuRAL REs.

AGENCY, supra note 31, at 39. See generally JONATHAN

ADAPTING TO CIMATE CHANGE: Pusuc HEALTH 7-10

M. SAMET,

(2009), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/

DocumentsfRFF-Rpt-Adaptation-Samet.pdf (discussing the health consequences of heat waves).
177 See CAL. NATuRAL REs. AGENCY, supranote 3 1, at 37.

178 See id at 70. See generallyDAVIDKLING & JAMES N.SANCHiRico, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, AN
ADAPTATION

PORTFOLIO FOR THE UNITED

STATES COASTAL AND MARINE ENVIRONMENT 7

(2009)

(discussing the problems caused by "elevated and more frequent extreme sea levels").

179 See CAL. NATURAL REs. AGENCY, supra note 31, at 82. See generally ALAN P. COVICH,
EMERGING CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON FRESHWATER RESOURCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON
TRANSFORMED WATERSHEDS (2009), available at http//www.rff.orgrffldoumentsRFF-RptAdaptation-Covich.pdf (discussing socioeconomic and biotic adaptation strategies designed to
protect freshwater resources).

180 See CA1LNATURAL

RES.

AGENCY, supra note 31, at 96. See generallyANTLE, supra note 49

(discussing the effects climate change will have on the agriculture industry and how, ,through
political planning and support, farmers and ranchers will be able to adjust to climate change
and continue with sustainable operations).

181 See CALNATuRAL RES. AGENCY, supra note 3 1, at 111.
182 See id at 123. See generally JAMES E. NEUMANN & JASON C. PRICE, ADAPTING TO CLIMATE
CHANGE: THE PUBIjC POLICY RESPONSE: PUBLcIC
NFRASTRUCTURE (2009), available at
http://www.rff.org/rff/documents/RFF-Rpt-Adaptation-NeumannPrice.pdf (assessing the threats
that climate change poses for public infrastructure and discussing how to respond to those threats).
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18 See id at 4; see also David E. Adelmnan, The Challenge of Abrupt climate Change for US
Environmentalegulatfon 58 EMORY LJ. 379 (2008).
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series of weather-related disasters could trigger political destabilization,
mass migration, or violence.""
Responding to this suite of risks, which will be demanded of both
public and private actors, is likely to include adaptation methods and
mechanisms to reduce vulnerability and enhance resilience, measures that in
many cases will not be environmentally friendly.""' On the table for
consideration, one can imagine, will be environmentally intrusive adaptation
initiatives such as seawalls, coastal armoring, water diversions, increased
energy demand, new dams, relocated agriculture, removing habitat of
disease vectors, new or raised levees, and other technological fixes that
laws and opposition
today receive intensive scrutiny under 1environmental
7
from environmental protection interests. 1
Measures like these when taken today, however, are implemented
primarily as conveniences to ease urban life and prop up suburban and
coastal property. values, not as matters of necessity."~ We can afford to
entertain tough environmental standards and slowed-down approval
procedures in that context, but as such measures are put into the climate
change adaptation policy mix they will be portrayed as facilitating urgent
and necessary adaptation strategies, particularly those built around the
resist and transform modes, not as environmental intrusions to be contested
until all the environmental impacts are fully accounted for. And to the extent
people flee areas experiencing heightened risk of catastrophe and crisis
notwithstanding improved technologies, the move mode of adaptation
imposes its own set of environmental stresses.
Although other nations are moving forward with planning and policy for
this scale of damage control'89and some climate policy scholars have offered

185 KousKy ET AL, supra note 183, at 4. The Central 'Intelligence Agency has established the
Center on Climate Change and National Security to study "the national security impact of
phenomena such as desertification, rising sea levels, population shifts, and heightened
competition for natural resources." Press Release, Cent. Intelligence Agency, CIA Opens
Center on Climate Change and National Security (Sept. 25, 2009), https://www.ciagov/

news-informnation/press-releases-statements/center-on-climate-change-and-national-security.hbml
(last visited Apr. 18, 20 10).
186 See Kousicy ET AL., supra note 183, at 12 (stating that in addition to drastic emissions
reduction and geoengineering, the third option for managing catastrophe risks will be "various
large-scale adaptation measures that would reduce the consequences of mega-catastrophes or
short-circuit the cascading of more localized disasters").
187 See Baldwin, supra note 1S, at 782 ("Unwavering falth in technology to defeat the effects
of climate change induces society to discount too heavily the possibility of catastrophe, so that
when disaster does occur, communities that are unprepared to face the challenge will inevitably
suffer the greatest losses. Understanding this tendency, communities must embrace the benefits
of technology in adaptation and recognize that it represents part of the solution-and not the
only mechanism-for combating the impacts of climate change." (footnote omnitted)).
188 See, e.g, Michael Perry, Coastal Homes Face Huge Losses from Rising Sea, REUTERS,
Sept 3, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/articleidUSTRE58209B20090903 (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
See generally Baldwin, supra note 18, at 783 (discussing societal tendency to cling to "industrial,
commercial, and residential activities" poorly suited to the areas they are located in).
189 See, e.g, IRISH AcAD. OF ENG'G, IRELAND AT RISK: CRMrcAL INFRASTRUCTURE (2009).
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thoughtful adaptation policy models,' 94 outside of a few states' fledgling
plannidng initiatives' 9' the United States has compiled close to zero in the way
of coordinated anticipatory adaptation policy for managing the risk in the
Uited States of climate change catastrophe and crisis' 9 2 Our existing
disaster management regime, moreover, was not designed around risk
causes and consequences of this complexity and potential physical and
geographic magnitude:
Despite the potential of both the Disaster Mitigation Act and the Coastal Zone
Management Act, neither law is specifically designed to address the nation's
ability to adapt to climate change. Moreover, the lack of solid connections
between and at various levels of government provides a significant barrier to
the integration of land use management and other Mitigation and response
strategies. Within the U.S. system, confusion in planning and response is far
more common than coordinated efforts and clearly delineated roles. As a
result, an effective federal approach to mitigation requires a law similar to the
Disaster Management Act but one that was specifically written to address
climate change adaptation.'9
This is a direct result of the adaptation deficit, not some rationalized
decision to adopt a wait-and-see reactive adaptation orientation. '9 There is
much catching up to be done.
I am headed here in much the same direction as with climate justice
policy, which is a form of risk management for particular populations:
Environmental law will be one among many players in the design of climate
change catastrophe and crisis risk management. As the United Nations
has sug gested,
190 See United Nations Dev. Programme, A Climate Risk Management Approach to Disaster
Reduction and Adaptation to Climate Change, in ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 4,
at 229, 230.
191 See CAL. NATURAL REs. AGENCY, supra note 31.
192 The first comprehensive impacts study designed to guide national policy for climate
change catastrophes and crises, among other climate change problems, is from 2009. See U.S.
GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supranote 1.
193 Leonard, supra note 144, at 557-58 (footnotes omitted). For other legal commentary on
this theme, which focuses in particular on water crises, see Joseph W. Dellapenna, International
WaterLa win a Climate of Disruption,17 MUcH. ST. J. INT'L L. 43 (2008); Gabriel Eckstein, Water

Scarcity, Conflict; and Security in a Climate Change World- Challenges and Opportunitiesifor
International Law and Policy(Tex. Tech Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Working Paper Group,
Paper No. 2009-01), available athttp://ssm.com/abstract--1425796 (follow "One-Click Download"
hyperlink); Charles W. Gould, The Right to Housing Recovery After NaturalDisasters, 22 HARV.
Hum. R'rs. J. 169 (2009); A. Dan Tarlock, Water Scarcity, Fear Mitiation, and International
Water Law, 31 HAMUINE L. REV. 703 (2008); Lindsay F. Wiley, Adaptation to the Health
Consequences of Climate Change as a Potential Influence on Public Health Law and Policy
Firomr Preparedness to Resilience, 15 WIDENER L. REv. (forthcoming 2010), available at
http://ssmn.conlabsract--1474844 (follow "One-Click Download" hyperlink). For an overview of

existing disaster law and policy, see

FARBER

Err AL,

supranote 167.

194 The walt-and-see reactive adaptation orientation is not generally regarded as an effective
risk management strategy for climate change. See United Nations Dev. Programme, supra note
190, at 247 ("Any approach to risk management and adaptation should be essentially
prospective or anticipatory, and promoted in the very short term.").
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[Tihe complexity of risk-generating processes, the range of socio-economic and
environmental considerations that would come into play, and the diverse and
complex nature of the social intervention required, requires the search for
coherence and coordination...
-*The complexity of risk contexts demands increased integration,
harmonization, and cooperation between until now separate concerns,
caucuses and interest groups.'
Environmental law will need to find its footing in this new policy
landscape, and given the high stakes for people it will not likely be the policy
realm calling the shots. If dengue fever comes to Florida,"86 all bets are off.
F Trend Six: FrequentReconfigurationsof Transpoicy Linkages

and Tradeoffs atAll Scales and Across Scale
The breadth and magnitude of problems associated with climate change,
only some of which I have surveyed above, have led to calls for nations to
assume a "war" mentality to combat the causes and consequences.' What is
meant, of course, is that the steps necessary to bring climate change under
control may require public and private measures on a scale similar to that of
wartime. Indeed, that may very well be necessary, but the war usually held
in mind in these policy proposals has been one against greenhouse gas
emissions. The war on climate change, however, will not begin and end with
mitigation-adaptation will be its other theater.
The adaptation front of this war is going to be fundamentally different
from the mitigation front. The enemy in the mitigation war is easy to
identify-greenhouse gas emission sources-so the battles will be over
modifying behavior and technology to win the day. By contrast, the
adaptation war, known in the adaptation theory literature as
"mainstrean-tng" adaptation, "8 has climate change itself as the enemy. We're
not fighting only ourselves, in other words, we're fighting something much
bigger and over which we will have little control for at least this century.
More akin to the Hundred Years War than an intense and swift battle, in this

195 Id
196 This is a very real probability. See U.S. ENvTL PROT. AGENCY, CLIMATE CHANGE AND
FLORIDA 3 (1997) ("[Wlarndng and other climate changes may expand the habitat and infectivity

of disease-carrying insects, increasing the potential for transmission of diseases such as malaria
and dengue ('break bone') fever.").
197 See, eag, Lisa Heinizerling & Frank Ackerman, Law and Economics for a Wamuing World,
1HAv. L. & POL~Y REv. 331, 359 (2007) ("A twenty-first-century war on climate change, if the
nation and the world should choose to fight it, will create a new round of technologies and
indstie... ."); War-Like Plan Needed to Tacide Climate Change, Stummit Told~ ABC NEws ONLINE
(Austl), Apr. 17, 2007, http://www.abc.netau/newsnewsitems/200704/sl888593.htmn (last visited
Apr. 18, 2010) ("An American weather expert has told a water summit in Sydney that global
warming is such an enormous problem [that] the world needs to go on a war footin to fight it").
198 See Burton, supra note 19, at 94; Saleemul Huq & Hannah Reid, Mainstreaming
Adaptationin.DeveiopmenA in ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 4, at 313.
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fight we resist, transform, and move over the long-term. That's why it's
called adaptation.
As my previous five trends have begun to suggest, however, there is a
lot more to how we fight in the adaptation theater of the war on climate
change than will fit under the umbrella of environmental law.
Adaptation to climate change does not occur in isolation from the influence
of other forces, but instead occurs amid a complex set of economic
(micro and macro), social and institutional circumstances which establish a
location-specific context for human-environment interactions. In effect, there
are many 'non-environmental' factors which impede or mediate change in
human systems ....
This complex of policy linkages will take place over three broad,
interconnected dynamics that will challenge the ability of law to continue to
operate on the premise of "stationarity" in social and economic affairs.
The first will involve feedback between various fronts of climate change
adaptation policy as local, state, federal, and private institutions attempt to
mainstream adaptation strategies as a flow of coordinated decisions linking
environmental policy with national security, immigration, trade, public
health, finance, foreign aid, tax, social welfare, business policy, and housing
polices, to name just a few, and do so across all governance scales2 0
Legal scholarship has begun to explore the depth to which the evolution of
these transpolicy linkages will disrupt and reorder legal and policy domains
that have depended on a relatively stable envelope of policy space within
which the domestic legal world has worked over time.'
The second major dynamic will be the interaction of climate change
adaptation policy holistically with other major global change drivers.
Chief among these, according to an interdisciplinary team of researchers,
will be increasing antibiotic resistance; increasing economic, social, and
199 Smithers & Smit, supra note 15, at 17.
200 See generallyU.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 1, passin (discussing
the political and geographical scales at which adaptation decisions must be made to address
climate change).
201 In addition to the numerous references to such work provided in supra Parts II.A-E, see, for
example, FREDERICK M. ABBoTr, INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO ADDRESS CLIMATE
CHANGE: LESSONS FROM THE GLOBAL DEBATE ON INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY AND PUBLIC HEALTH
(Intl Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Issue Paper No. 24, 2009), available at http-//ictsd.org/
downloads/2009/07linnovation-and-technology-transfer-to-address-cimate-change.pdf (focusing on
pharmaceutical technology); Kevin L Doran, Climate Change Risk Disclosure: A Sector by
SectorAnalysis of SEC 10-KFilingsfrom 1995-2008,34 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. (forthcoming
2010), available at http:I/ssrn.com/abstract=1416279(follow "One-Click Download" hyperlink)
(corporate disclosure policy); Ans Kolk & Jonatan Pinkse, Business and Clmate Change: Key

Challengesin the Face ofPolcy UncertaintyandEconomic Recession,MGMT. ONLINE REV., May
2009, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1433037 (follow "One-Click Download" hyperlink)
(exploring the implications of the "economy-climate-policy nexus" on the business sector);
Andrew Morris et al., Green Jobs Myths, 16 Mo. ENvrL L. & POL'Y REV. 326 (2009) (exploring the
implications of climate change policy in the employment sector); Perry E. Wallace, Global

Climate Change andthe Challenge to Modem American CoiporateGovernance, 55 SMU L. REV.
493 (2002) (corporate law).
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ecological connectivity; rising human numbers and urbanization; increasing
per capita resources use; nuclear proliferation; international terrorism;
energy, food, and water crises; declining fisheries; increasing ocean
acidification; and emerging diseases.202 These "intertwined global-scale
challenges spawned by the accelerating scale of human activity" are
"outpacing the development of institutions to deal with them and their many

interactive effects. "20
The third major dynamic integrates the international dimension of
climate change adaptation into national policy, as the United States loses its
global hegemonic position and thus increasingly must set its national
adaptation policy with other nations' adaptation strategies taken into
account. Some nations will hoard resources, some will send people outward,
some will become unstable politically, some will become belligerent to
neighbors, and so on. A number of international law scholars have identified
this aspect of climate change policy as being perhaps the most vexing for the
United States given the existing degree of fragmentation in international law
and relations and the history of the United States's self-proclaimed
exceptionalism in our posture with other nations.20
Domestic policy decisions about whether and how to resist, transform,
or move at local and regional scales thus will necessarily intersect a wide
and dynamic array of policy realms. Environmental law, to the extent it
retains a distinct identity in this complex, transpolicy, multiscalar network
of decision making, will be but just one player. Moreover, like any complex
network system, the linkages between components and between 'scales of
components will evolve over time, meaning environmental law better stay
alert and, like the Red Queen, run hard just to stay in place.
My ultimate message in this may be unsettling to environmentalists:
Climate change adaptation policy is going to transcend environmental law
quickly and decisively. Environmental law will be competing with a shifting
array of other adaptation policy demands possessing potentially greater
202

See Brian Walker et al., Looming Global-Scale Failures and Missing Institutions,

325 Scl. 1345, 1345 (2009).
203

204

Id
See Harro Van Asselt et al., Global Climate Change and the Fragmentation of

International Law, 30 LAw & POL'Y 423 (2008); Cinnamon Pihon Carlarte, Good Climate

Governance: Only a FragmentedSystem of lnteationallawAway.830 LAW &POL'Y 450 (2008);
Bonnie Docherty & Terry Giannini, Confrontinga Rising Yde: A Proposalfor a Convention on
Climate Change Refugees, 33 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 349 (2009); Meinhard Doelle, Linking the
Kyoto Protocol and Other Multilateral Enviromnental Agreements: From Fragmentation to
Integration., 14 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAc. 75 (2004); Ben Saul, Cibmate Change, Conlict andSecuity
International Law Challenges, 9 N.Z. ARMED, FORCES L. REV. 1 (2010), available at
http:I/ssrn.com/abstract=1485175 (follow "One-Click Download" hyperlink) (examining security
threats associated with climate change and how international environmental law can respond);

Ben Saul, Clirmate Change, Resources Scarcityand DistributiveJustice in InternationalLaw, in
REVELING IN THE WILDS OF CLIMATE LAw (R. Lyster ed., forthcoming 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1484340 (follow "One-Click Download" hyperlink); Lindsay F. Wiley,

Healthy Planet Healthy People: Integrating GlobalHealth into the InternationalResponse to
Climate Change, J. ENvTL L. & LITIG. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract= 1489564 (follow "One-Click Download" hyperlink).

416

416

~ERONMENTAL LAW

[o.4:6
[Vol.
40:363

urgency and importance. Unlike mitigation policy, where environmental law
is setting the agenda, 0 5 in adaptation policy environmental law is more likely
to be told its place in line. This will be a hard pill to swallow, for
environmental law has long positioned itself as the arbiter of what is good
and bad development. For many people, however, adaptation fundamentally
is not about development-it is about survival. It seems highly unlikely,
therefore,- that adaptation policy, as an amalgam of dozens of interests -and
needs ranging from urgent to critical, is going to anoint environmental law
as its czar.
So what is environental law to do? Adapt!
G. Trend Seven: Shift from "frYont-End" DecisionMethods Relying on
Robust Predictive Capacityto "Back-End-DecisionMethods
Relying on Active Adaptive Management
Environmental law has positioned itself over time as a gatekeeper of
development and infrastructure projects by imposing the requirement that a
comprehensive environmental impact assessment be conducted prior to
final government approval of the project under relevant permitting
programs, the classic example being the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) . 2 06 At the same time, environmental law, as part of the broader field
of regulatory law, has also incorporated (often less than willingly) the
discipline of cost-benefit analysis as the comprehensive gatekeeper test for
the merits of development and infrastructure projects. 0 The details of both

205 See supra note I and accompanying text.
206 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S. C.

§§ 4321-4370 (2006). NEPA requires
all federal agencies to "include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a
detailed statement by the responsible official on-(i) the environmental impact of the proposed
action, [and] (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented." Id. § 4332(2)(C). This provision also requires statements on
alternative actions, short- and long-term implications, and "any irreversible and irretrievable
commitments of resources." Id § 4332(2)(C)(iii)-(v). The Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ), responsible for issuing regulations implementing NEPA's mandated environmental
impact statement procedure for federal agencies, requires agencies to consider the impacts of
direct effects, indirect effects, and cumulative impacts. The CEQ has defined direct effects as
effects "which are caused by the action and occur at the same time and place," 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.8(a) (2009), indirect effects as effects "which are caused by the action and are later in
time or farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable,' id. § 1508.8(b), and
cumulative imnpacts as
the impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action
when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless
of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such other actiofis.
Cumulative impacts can result from individually minor but collectively significant
actions taking place over a period of time.
Id § 1508.7.
207 See, e.g., Cnss R. Sui~srm, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY
PROTECTON (2002).
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methodologies are intricate, and neither is free of criticism.208 All that
matters for my purposes are their two central attributes: 1) they are, as
Professors Rob Glicksman and Sidney Shapiro put it, "front-end" decision
tools comprehensively conducted and concluded prior to making the
decision final,2 " and 2) as such they rely on a robust capacity to predict and
assess environmental impacts of a project and the project's overall costs and
benefits. For example, regulations promulgated under the ESA provide for
consultations between the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and other
federal agencies about the effects of their actions on protected species.
These regulations require FWS to "[e]valuate the effects of the action and
cumulative effects" and decide "whether the action, taken together with
cumulative effects, is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of listed
species."1 o Section 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA) 211 similarly requires the
Corps to predict future cumulative effects and to integrate that prediction
into its decision whether or not to permit developments that involve filling
of wetlands.21 2
For purposes of climate change adaptation policy, the demand for
predictive capacity will be the Achilles' heel for the application of
conventional environmental impact assessment and cost-benefit analysis. As
previously discussed, the impacts of climate change necessitating human
and environmental adaptation will be excruciatingly difficult to predict. 2 13
Nonlinearities in change dynamics, environmental feedback properties, and
the interactions of social and ecological responses will soon exceed the
boundaries of environmental stationarity that have allowed environmental
impact assessment and cost-benefit analysis to maintain what reliability and
208 For critiques of using cost-benefit analysis in environmental and natural resources
decision contexts, see FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE
OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004); Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling,
Pricingthe Piceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of EnvironmentalProtection,150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553

(2002); David Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Ervimnmental, Health and Safety Pmrtection:
The FeasibilityPrinciple,Cost-Benefit Analyis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL AFF. L.
REV. 1 (2005); David Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 335 (2006);
Thomas 0. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7 (1998); Sidney A. Shapiro &
Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis- A PragmaticReozientation, 32 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 433 (2008).
209 See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GuCKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISI RESTORING A
PRAGMATIC APPROACH (2003); Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, The Mlissing
Perspective,ENVTL. F., Mar--Apr. 2003, at 42,43.
210 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(3)-(4) (2009). The agency defines cumulative effects as "those
effects of future State or private activities, not involving Federal activities, that are reasonably
certain to occur within the action area." Id. § 402.02.
211 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).
212 Id. § 1334. Statutory policies allow the Corps to issue general permits for disposal of fill
material in navigable waters covering classes of activities the agency determines "are similar in
nature, will cause only minimal adverse environmental effects when performed separately, and
will have only minimal cumulative adverse effect on the environment." Id. § 1344(e)(1). Corps
regulations for project-specific fill permits require the agency to conduct "an evaluation of the
probable impacts, including cumulative impacts, of the proposed activity." 33 C.F.R.
§ 320.4(a)(1) (2009).
213 See supraPart II.
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credibility they have. Indeed, even before climate change adaptation became
a pressing need, the challenges of front-end environmental impact
assessment were evident in ecological contexts increasingly understood to
be exceedingly complex. 14 For example, a 1997 guide on considering
cumulative effects under NEPA explains that "[d]etermining the cumulative
envirornental consequences of an action requires delineating the
cause-and-effect relationships between the multiple actions and the
resources, ecosystems, and human communities of concern. Analysts must
tease from the complex networks of possible interactions those that
substantially affect the resources."""5 The guide advises analysts to "gather
information about the cause-and-effect relationships between stresses and
resources" and to develop "a conceptual model of cause and effect ....
Networks and system diagrams are the preferred methods of
conceptualizing cause-and-effect relationships." 16
We simply don't have the tools to apply that methodology to climate
change adaptation and produce comprehensive front-end environmental
impact assessments that will prove reliable over the long term. As noted
previously, for example, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) estimates of climate change impacts made just three years ago.
217
already are proving to have overshot and undershot observed changes.
Regional impact studies remain very coarse in detail, 1 and this is even more
the case at local scales.
One of the main messages to emerge from the past decade of synthesis and
assessments is that while climate change is a global issue, it has a great deal of
regional variability. There is an indisputable need to improve understanding of
climate system effects at these smaller scales, because they are often the scales
of decision making in society. Understanding impacts at local scales will also
2111
help to target finite resources for adaptation measures.
With respect to the last point made-targeting finite resources* for
adaptation-cost-benefit analysis fares no better than environmental impact
assessment in the climate change adaptation world. The IPCC, for example,
has concluded that "[tihe literature on adaptation costs and benefits remains
quite limited and fragmented in terms of sectoral and regional coveyage."2 0
The upshot is that

214 See generally Daniel A. Farber, ProbabilitiesBehaving Badly: Complexity Theory and
Environmental Uncertainty 37 u.C. DAVIS L. REv. 145, 148-55 (2003) (discussing the problems
with uncertainty in environmental law); Ruh], supra note 99, at 954-67 (addressing the

complexities inherent to environmental law and the environment).
215 COUNCIL ON ENvTL QUALITY, CONSIDERING CUMULATIVE EFFECTrS UNDER THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POUCY ACr, at vi (1997).
216 Id at 38.
217 See supranote 6.
218 See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 107-52 (providing regional
studies for the United States).
219 Id at 154.
220 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON cLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2, at 724.
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adaptation costs and benefits are usually embedded within climate damage
functions which are often extrapolated from a limited number of regional
studies. Furthermore, the source studies which form the basis for the climate
damage functions do not always reflect the most recent findings. As a result,
these studies offer a global and integrated perspective but are based on
coarsely defined climate change and adaptation impacts and only provide
speculative estimates of adaptation costs and beeit.2
The greatest impediment to relying on conventional front-end
comprehensive cost-benefit analysis in the climate change adaptation
context will be what Carolyn Kousky and Roger Cooke of Resources for the
Future describe as the "unholy trinity" of fat tails, tail dependence, and
222
microcorrelations:
These are distinct aspects of loss distributions, such as .damages from a
disaster or insurance claims. With fat-tailed losses, the probability declines
slowly, relative to the severity of the loss. Tall dependence is that propensity of
dependence to concentrate in the tals, such that severe losses are more likely
to happen together. Micro-correlations are negligible correlations between
risks which may be individually harmless, but very dangerous when aggregated.
These three phenomena-types of catastrophic and dependent risksundermine traditional approaches to risk management.23
The double whamrny effect of the loss of predictive capacity in both
environmental impact assessment and cost-benefit analysis will materialize
when climate change adaptation decisions confront choices between
different adaptation technologies and between anticipatory and reactive
adaptation orientations. If both the environmental impacts and the overall
costs and benefits are difficult to predict, how useful will these
comprehensive front-end methodologies be? For example, should coastal
communities build seawalls, and if so how high, or should they rely on
enhanced coastal wetlands as a natural capital solution, or should they move
inland? It is difficult to say if we cannot reliably predict ultimate sea level
rise and its inshore impacts and if the relationship between storm surge
221 Id at 727; see also EUROPEAN ENVT AGENCY, supra note 47, at 7 (" [TI here is currently very
little quantified information on these costs, and further work is urgently needed to build the
evidence base to facilitate informed, cost effective and proportionate adaptation in Europe.").
222 See CAROLYN KousKY & ROGER M.COOKE, THE UNHOLY TRINIT: FAT TAR~S, TAIL DEPENDENCE,
AND) MICRO-CORRELATIONS (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 09-36-REV, 2009).
223 Id at 1; see also KousKY & COOKE, supra note 120, passimn (applying these concepts
specifically to climate change adaptation); Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty (Feb. 18, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrm.com/abstract= 1555343 (follow "One Click
Download" hyperlink) (describing analytic tools for assessing potential climate change
catastrophic outcomes). Aggregated microcorrelations have been described as leading to the
"Jenga effect," named after the game in which players stack pieces into a tower and then
remove them, one by one, stacking the removed pieces on the top of the tower. See Peter C. de
Ruiter et al., Food Web and Ecologyz-Playing Jenga and Beyond, 309 Sdi. 68, 68 (2005). With
skilled players, the structure can stay standing for quite awhile, but at some point one more
piece removed or stacked on top leads to a sudden crash of the entire structure. Food web
dynamics exhibit this effect. Id
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protection and area of coastal wetlands is nonlinear and thus not detected or
anticipated early in the history of gains or losses. 2
Recognizing these limitations, legal scholars have begun to question the
efficacy of using conventional comprehensive front-end environmental
impact assessments and cost-benefit analyses in climate change adaptation
decisions. m' The alternative they propose, however, is not to ditch
envirornental impact assessment and cost-benefit analysis and go blindly
forward, but rather to shift their methodological fundamentals toward a
more adaptive "back-end" approach. The critical component of this
approach is to scale back (but not abandon) the comprehensive front-end
focus, which assumes all effects can be predicted and assessed before the
decision, and introduce formal follow-up mechanisms demanding that the
decision maker integrate new information into an ongoing decision
adjustment process. As Professor Daniel Farber explains,
One of NEPA's major flaws, which climate assessment needs to avoid at all
costs, is the absence of dynamic learning. NEPA does not require agencies
to perform later checks on their EIS predictions, and agencies do not
generally do so. ...

Without the check provided by such feedback, overly optimistic predictions

can result. 2 6
Farber works through this and other lessons learned from the NEPA
experience to outline a more dynamic, learning oriented decision process he
calls "climate impact assessments."2

224 See Edward B. Barbier et al., Coastal Ecosy-stem-Based Management with Nonlinear
Ecologiceal R1mcions and Values, 319 Sci. 321 (2008) (examining the policy difficulties flowing
from such nonlinearities).
225 See Baldwin, supra note 18, at 771 (environmental impact assessments); Daniel A-Farber,
A daptationPlanningand Climate Impact Assessm ents Learningfrom NEPA 's flaws, 39 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,605 (2009) [hereinafter Farber, NEPA '5 Flaws] (environmental
impact assessments); Daniel A. Farber, Modeling Climate Change and Its Impacts: Law, Policy
and Science, 86 TEx. L. REv. 1655 (2008); Robert L. Glicksman, Global Climate Change and the
Risks, to CoastalAreas from Hurrianesand Risin Sea Levels: The Costs of Doing Nothing,
52 Loy. L. REv. 1127 (2006) (cost-benefit analysis); Douglas Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural
Transformation, and Comprehensive Rationalit 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 555 (2004)
(cost-benefit analysis).
226 Farber, NEPAs Flaws, supra note 225, at 10,610.
227 See id at 10,607-14; see also Caleb W. Christopher, Success by a Thousand Cuts The Use
of Environmental ImpactAssessment in Addressing Cliate Change, 9 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 549, 592
(2008) (proposing adaptive approaches for NEPA in the climate change context). To be sure,
there remains considerable value in retaining a front-end component of environmental
assessments to anticipate climate change impacts, particularly to the extent doing so helps to
increase public awareness and internalize consideration of climate change impacts in federal
agencies and state, local, and private actors whose actions are subject to NEPA and its state
law equivalents. See Michael 8. Gerrard, Climate Change and the Environental Impact
Review Process, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 2008, at 20 (surveying federal, state, and local
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Of course, in order to be able to learn from the feedback provided
through these climate impact assessments, decision making itself must
gravitate to adaptive back-end methodologies. Indeed, well before climate
change became a severe policy concern, scientists and lawyers in growing
numbers called for greater use of the discipline of "adaptive management" in
natural resources policy.m The adaptive management strategy traces its
origins to C.S. Holling's critique of front-end predecisional approaches in his
influential book from the late 1970s, Adaptive Environmental Assessment
and Management.2m Holling and his colleagues found conventional
environmental management methods, particularly the environmental impact
assessment process under NEPA, at odds with. the emerging model of
ecosystems as complex, dynamic systems. Under the dynamic model of
ecosystems, they concluded, management policy must put a premium on
collecting information, establishing measurements of success, monitoring
outcomes, using new information to adjust existing approaches, and
possessing a willingness to change.m Attempting to predict all the
consequences of an action before deciding to go forward and then never
looking back, they argued, was at odds with the adaptive management
strategy." Adaptive management theory thus rejects NEPA's premise that all
the cumulative effects caused by and affecting an action over time can be
reliably predicted at the time the action is designed.2 2 Yet effective adaptive
management goes beyond that to promote active "learning while doing" in
assessment programs);

Catherine J. LaCroix, SEPAs, Climate Change, and Corporate

Responsibility The Contribution of Local Government 58 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1289, 1291
(2008). Toward that end, in February 2010 the White House Council on Environmental Quality,
which develops general regulations and guidance for implementation of NEPA, issued draft
guidance on how to evaluate the effects of climate change and greenhouse gas emissions in
NEPA assessments. See Memorandum from Nancy H. Sutley, Chair, Council on Envtl. Quality,
to the Heads of Federal Departments and Agencies (Feb. 18, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/micrositesceq/20100218-nepa-consideration-effectsghg-draft-guidance.pdf (providing "Draft NEPA Guidance on Consideration of the Effects of
Climate Change and Greenhouse Gas Emissions"). The overwhelming focus of the guidance,
however, is on greenhouse gas emissions and evaluation of mitigation actions, with little
attention to adaptation beyond stating the obvious that "[iun cases where adaptation to the
effects of climate change is important, the significant aspects of these changes should be
identified in the agency's final decision and adoption of a monitoring program should be
considered." Id. at 7.
228 See Mary Jane Angelo, Stumbling Toward Success: A Story of Adaptive Law and
EcologicalResilience,87 NEB. L. REV. 950, 955 & n.24 (2009).
229 C.S. HOLUNG ET AL., ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT
(C.S. Holling ed., 1978); see also Kai N. Lee & Jody Lawrence, Adaptive Management Learning
from the Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 16 ENvL. L. 431, 442 n.45 (1986)
(tracing the term "adaptive management" to Holling's book).
2 See HOILING Er AL, supra note 229, at 20, 47-48. For background on the adaptive
management model, see Angelo, supra note 228; Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the

Endangered Species Act and the Institutional Challenges of "New Age" Environmental
Protection,41 WASHBURN L.J. 50 (2001); Bradley C. Karkkainen, PanarchyandAdaptiveChange:
Around the Loop and Back Again, 7 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 59 (2005); J.B. Ruh], Regulation by
Adaptive Management-IsIt Possible, 7 MINN. J.L. Sc. & TECH 21 (2005).
231 See HOLLING ET AL, supra note 229, at 133, 135.
232 See id. at 135.
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the implementation of decisions over time.m Thus, an adaptive management
plan must address how to handle new information and contingencies and
adjust decisions accordingly.23
Adaptive management has evolved well beyond an idea. For example,
FWS has portrayed it as an important practical tool that "can assist ... in
developing an adequate operating conservation program and improving its
effectiveness." m Indeed, there is broad consensus today among resource
managers and academidcs that adaptive management is the only practical way
to implement ecosystem-scale resource management. 2 '8 Not surprisingly, the
trend in climate change scholarship is moving in this direction as well.
For prominent examples, Professor Robert Glicksman has broadly outlined
how adaptive management would improve federal public lands management
policies and implementation in the climate change context, 21 Professor
Alejandro Camacho, has comprehensively ,detailed how adaptive
management can be applied for climate change adaptation in natural
resources management,'2 and Professor Robin Kundis Craig has made
adaptive management one of her principles of climate change adaptation
policy implementation.239Experts from environmental organizations, such as
the Environmental Law Institute's Carl Bruch, concur in the important role

233 PANEL ON ADAPTIVE MGMT. FOR RES. STEWARDSHIP ET AL., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
ADAPTivE MANAGEMENT FOR WATER RESOURCES PROJECT PLANNING 22 (2004).
234 The National Research Council explains:
Adaptive management is not a "one size fits all" or a "cookbook" process, as experience
with the concept and its related procedures to date is limited and evolving. There are
multiple views and definitions regarding adaptive management, but elements that have
been identified in theory and in practice are: management objectives that are regularly
revisited and accordingly revised, a model(s) of the system being managed, a range of
management options, monitoring and evaluating outcomes of management actions,
mechanisms for incorporating learming into future decisions, and a collaborative
structure for stakeholder participation and learnng.

Id at 2. For a thorough description of adaptive management theory and protocol, see id at 19-32.
235 Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat Conservation
Planning and Incidental Tale Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,242, 35,252 (June 1, 2000).
236 See Ronald D. Brunner & Tim W. Clark, A Practice-Based Approach to Ecosystem
Management; 11 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 48 (1997); Anne E. Heissenbuttel, Ecosystem
Management-Principlesfor Practical Application, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 730 (1996);
Paul L Ringold et al., Adaptive MonitoringDesign for Ecosystem Managemnent 6 ECOLOGICAL

APPLICATIONS 745 (1996). Indeed, the Ecological Society of America's comprehensive study of
ecosystem management treats the use of adaptive management methods as a given. See Norman

L. Christensen et al., The Report of the Ecological Society of Ameica Committee on the
Scientific Basisfor Ecosystem Management; 6 ECo0LOG ICAL APPiLCATIO0Ns 665 (1996).
237 See Glicksman, supra note 26, passim. "The land management agencies, in the planning
process as weil as in other contexts, must rely heavily on the management technique known as
adaptive management." Id at 868 (emphasis omitted).
28See Camacho, supra note 18, passim. Caniacho calls for "an adaptive methodology for
assessing and adjusting government decision making over time." Id at 64.
39 See Craig, supra note 18 (manuscript at 65-67) (utilizing the heading "Be Serious About
Using Adaptive Management-and Change Both Natural Resources and Administrative Laws to
Allow for It").
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adaptive management will play.no Fully institutionalizing adaptive
management in climate change adaptation policy, however, will require that
environmental law relax its front-end gatekeeper grip as well as
accommodate new forms of public participation and judicial review.?'
Yet given the serious limitations of using comprehensive front-end
environmental impact assessment and cost-benefit analysis in the climate
change adaptation context, this movement seems inevitable for
environmental law to remain a viable player in adaptation decision making.
H TrendEight: GreaterVariety andFlexibilityin RegulatoryInstruments
If adaptive management will be environmental law's methodology for
climate change adaptation, what will be its instruments for adaptation
decision implementation? Here environmental law's main concern will be
managing the effects of adaptation measures on the environment, in
particular how adaptation measures increase the scarcity of and competition
for critical adaptation resources such as land, timber, minerals, and water.
Given the need to shift resources and people around to bolster adaptive
capacities, adaptation will be a resource-intensive undertaking no matter
what blend of capital is used. For example, urban population growth over
the past century has occurred on less than 3% of the earth's land surface, but
that population accounts for 78% of carbon emissions, 60% of residential
242
water use, and 76% of industrial wood use. This kind of disproportionate
impact from the aggregates of local and individual behaviors is likely to be
experienced in many contexts of climate change adaptation.
As Professor Michael Vandenbergh has explored in a series of
co-authored publications, climate law mitigation policy has moved quickly to
lay blame for emissions primarily at the feet of power plants and the
automotive industry, with far less attention being given to the more obvious
low hanging fruit of emission sources-individuals' consumption
decisions.243 Putting the onus of mitigation responsibility on corporate
240 See Carl Bruch, The End of Equilbrium, -ENVTL. F., Sept.-Oct. 2008, at 30, 32
("Incorporating adaptive management into laws and institutions can enhance the capacity of
governance systems and ecosystems to adapt to changing climatic conditions, to develop and
deploy new technologies and techniques.").
241 Administrative law scholars have identified the need to reform administrative law at
fundamental levels if adaptive management is going to work. See Ruhl, supranote 230, at 46-53.
An underlying concern with this direction of change, however, is in retaining accountability,
participation, and transparency in decision making. See David L. Markell, Slack in the

AdrinistrativeState andIts Implcationsfor Governance: The Issue ofAccountabilty, 84 OR. L.
REV. 1 (2005); David Markell, The Role of Spotlighting Procedures to Promote Citizen
Participation,Thuzsparency, and Accountability Lessons from the CEC's Citizen Submissions
Process,45 WAKE FOREsT L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=1553125 (follow "One-Click Download" hyperlink); David L Markell &

Tom R. Tyler, Using EmpiricalResearch to Design GovernmentParticipationProcesses A Case
Study of Citizens'Rolesin EnvironmentalComplianceand Enforcement 57 KAN. L. REV. 1 (2008).
242 See Nancy B. Grimm, GlobalChange and the Ecology of Cities, 319 SCl. 756, 756 (2008).
243 See Mark A. Cohen & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Consumption, Happiness,and Climate
Change, 38 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,834 (2008); Douglas A. Kysar & Michael P.
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actors, while demanding little more of individual consumer choices than is
found in reduce, reuse, recycle jingles, may be a necessary expedient to
make mitigation politically viable, but it will be much harder for climate
change adaptation policy to let individuals and local communities off the
hook so easily. There is no easy policy bull's-eye in the form of concentrated
sources of adaptation problems, as power plants and other industrial
sources serve for mitigation policy. Adaptation policy, in other words, isn't
going to be about crunching down on some discrete, readily identifiable
behavior of environmental law's traditional industrial targets. Rather, for
environmental law, climate change adaptation will be about policing the
impacts of how hundreds of millions of people, millions of small businesses
and farms, and hundreds of thousands of local communities respond to
climate change in a multitude of decision contexts. Something far more
dynamic, deep, and norm-shaping than regulating the pants off of big
industry will be necessary to reach this level.
So far environmental law has not been very successful in this setting.
The classic example is nutrient-laden runoff pollution from farms, which has
led to the intractable problem of hypoxia in estuaries around the nation."
Traditional command-and-control regulation has proven ineffective in such

Vandenbergh, Introduction: Cihmate Change and Consumption, 38 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law
Inst.) 10,825 (2008); Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., idividual Carbon Emissions:
The Low-Hanging frhil, 55 UCLA L. REv. 1701 (2008); Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C.
Steinemann, The Carbon Neutral Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673 (2007); see also John
Dernbach, Stabilizing and then Reducing US. Energy Consumption: Legal and Policy Tools for
Efficiency and Conservation,37 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,003 (2007) (discussing the
success of Energy Star consumer products and residential energy efficiency); Alice Kaswan,
Climate Change, Consumption, and Cities, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 253, 255-68 (2009) (discussing
per capita emissions and the need for change beyond the industrial sector); Albert C. Lin,
Evangelizing Climate Change, 17 N.Y.U. ENVrL. L.J. 1135 (2009) (exploring the problem of
changing individual behaviors and attitudes relevant to global warming); Symposium,
Climate Changeand Consumption,38 Envtl. L.Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,825 (2008).
244 According to the U.S. Geological Survey,
Excessive nutrients, in particular nitrogen and phosphorus, have resulted in the growth
of large amounts of algae that decay and consume oxygen, thereby causing a zone of low
dissolved oxygen or "hypoxic zone" in the Northern Gulf of Mexico. This can stress and
cause death in bottom-dwelling organisms, threatening the economic and ecological
health of one of the nation's largest and most productive fisheries.
U.S. Geological Survey, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Mississippi River Basin and Gulf of Mexico
Hypoxia, http://water.usgs.gov/nawqa/sparrow/gulf findings/hypoxia.html (last visited Apr. 18,
2010). The most definitive study of the causes concludes that runoff from agricultural sources
contributes 70% of the excess nutrients. See Richard B. Alexander et al., Differences in
Phosphorousand Nitrogen Delivery to the Gulf of Mexico from the lississippi River Basin,
42 ENvr. Scl. & TECH. 822, 822 (2008), availableat http://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/es0716103.
Hypoxia from agricultural runoff and urban sewage is expanding exponentially throughout the
world as well, affecting 400 estuarine systems covering over 245,000 square kilometers.
See Robert J. Diaz & Rutger Rosenberg, Spreading Dead Zones and Consequencesfor Marine
Ecosystems, 321 SC. 926, 926 (2008). See generallyMINDY SELMAN ET AL, EUTROPHICATION AND
HYPOXIA IN COASTAL AREAS: A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT OF THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE (World Res.
Inst., Policy Note No. 1, 2008), available at httpJ//pdf.wri.org/eutrophication-and-hypoxia.incoastal-areas.pdf (providing an overview of eutrophication and hypoxia).
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contexts, where a multitude of actors' decisions, each individually negligible
in effect, aggregate into massive problems over large spatial and temporal
scales."' It takes little imagination to envision how climate change
adaptation could cascade into numerous such cumulative impact problems,
necessitating a serious overhaul of instrument choice decisions at all
governance scales.
In this regard, a growing number of environmental law scholars have
gravitated to what has been dubbed New Governance theory, which turns
'away from the familiar model of command-style, fixed-rule regulation by
administrative fiat, and toward a new model of collaborative, multi-party,
multi-level, adaptive, problem-solving" governance.246 The central organizing
principles of New Governance theory are stakeholder participation,
collaboration among interests, diversity of and competition between
instruments, decentralization of governance structures, integration of policy
domains, flexibility, and an emphasis on noncoerciveness and adaptation.247
Rigidly relying on fixed, uniform regulatory instruments, such as technology
standards and regulatory prescriptions, forecloses adaptation to the kind of
evolving, complex problems climate change adaptation will present.
Governance institutions will need a broader array of instruments, ranging
from "hard" prescriptive mandates to "soft" incentive- and information-based
tools, to test for leverage over the more tractable attributes of climate
change adaptation problems over time.
For example, as controversial as so-called compensatory mitigation has
become under the nation's core wetlands protection law, section 404 of the
CWA, 24 8 extensive structural infrastructure is likely to be placed in riparian and
coastal wetland areas to advance climate change adaptation, and flexible but
effective compensatory mitigation instruments will be necessary to manage
the environmental impacts of these projects. Sea level rise

245 See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Massive Problems in the Administrative State:
Strategiesfor Whittling Away, 98 CAL L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 4, 7),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1280896 (follow "One Click

Download" hyperlink).
246 Bradley C. Karkkainen, "New Governance" in Legal Thought and in the World Some
SpHtting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 473 (2004). For a sweeping
overview of New Governance theory, one which Karkkainen, supra note 230, reviews, see Orly

Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary
Legal Thought 89 MINN. L. REv. 342 (2004) [hereinafter Lobel, The Renew Deal. For additional
scholarship developing New Governance principles, see THE TooLs OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO
THE NEw GOVERNANCE (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002); Cristie L. Ford, New Governance,

Compliance,and Principles-BasedSecurities Regulation,45 AM. Bus. LJ. 1 (2008); Alana Klein,
Judgingas Nudging:New GovernanceApproachesfor the Enforcement of ConstitutionalSocial
and Economic Rights, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 351 (2008); Orly Lobel, Setting the Agenda
for New Governance Research, 89 MINN. L REV. 498 (2004); Lester M. Salamon, The New
Governance and the Tools of PublicAction: An Introduction,28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611 (2001);
Michael Waterstone, A New Vision ofPubicEnforcement 92 MINN. L. REV. 434 (2007).
247 See Lobel, The Renew Deal,supranote 246, at 371-404.
248 See J.B. Ruhl et al., Implementing the New Ecosystem Services Mandate of the Section
404 Compensatory Mitigation Program-A Catalyst for Advancing Science and Policy,

38 STETSON L. REV. 251, 256-59 (2009) (summarizing critiques).
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would expose a number of large U.S. cities, such as Miami and Boston, to storm
damage and, ultimately, inundation of low lying areas. It is unlikely that our
society will abandon this level of investment, so engineers are already
designing protection schemes. While non-structural "natural" protection
measures may help at some locations, structural solutions will be required at
others. As has been the case in the Netherlands, such solutions would likely
involve extensive dredging and filling of coastal wetlands and alteration of
other natural coastal features.249
The role of environmental law, if it is to contribute to climate change
adaptation, cannot be to impede and obstruct such measures through rigid
command-and-control mechanisms and endless litigation over the adequacy
of front-end impact assessments. Rather, environmental law will contribute
meaningfully if it delivers an adaptive process for "identify[ing] which areas
of the coastline can adapt to changing sea levels, where non-structural
measures can be employed, where engineered protection must be put in
place and how the impacts of such construction- can be mitigated."2an
Identifying and creatively responding to the needs of climate change
adaptation is how environmental law can retain a vital role in the policy
2511
development process.

L TrendNine: IncreasedReliance on MultiscalarGovernance Networks
As mentioned previously, climate change mitigation policy has become
fixated on the federalism question-which level or levels of governance
should bear primary responsibility, or even preemptive authority, for
instituting nationwide mitigation policy? 5 2 By contrast, "[tihere has been
little if any dicussion ... about the appropriate roles of the states and the
federal government in adapting to climate change."m Here again mitigation
and adaptation differ substantially in how such fundamentals will be framed
and resolved. Mitigation policy has the luxury of asking the federalism
question in a relatively narrow context because, regardless of which scale
prevails, it is all about the same goal-cutting down greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere. Adaptation, by contrast, is about many
different effects, varied across the nation, operating at many different and
sometimes competing scales.

249 JEssIcA B. WILKINSON EITAL, THE NExT GENERATION OF MITIGATION: LINKING CURRENT AND
FUTURE MITIGATION PROGRAMS wiTH STATE WILDLIFE AcTION PLANS AND OTHER STATE AND
REGIONAL PLANS 43 (2009) (noting the authors are from The Nature Conservancy and the
Environmental Law Institute).
250 Id
251 Some New Governance measures will be rather straightforward, such as strengthening
climate change risk disclosures by publicly traded companies under securities regulation.

See Mark Latham, EnvirornentalLiabilites and the FederalSecurities Law5.' A Proposal for
Improved Disclosure ofClimate change-RelatedRisks, 39 ENvTL L 647 (2009).
252 See supra note 24.
253 Farber, supra note 24, at 1.
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In the mitigation context, debate over the federalism question is
reminiscent of the well-known "Matching Principle," which claims that
"regulatory authority should go to the political jurisdiction that comes
closest to matching the geographic area affected by a particular
externality."' Yet it is difficult enough to conceive of which scale best does
so for mitigation policy;2 5 searching for the right scale in adaptation policy is
an even more complex undertaking.
On the one hand, the case for local and regional governance in
adaptation policy is strengthened by the variations in climate change
impacts across the landscape. Adaptation for Florida, where sea level rise is
the primary threat,2 5 will not be what it is for Nevada, where even less water
is the likely scenario.257 Even within many states, local impacts will be
sufficiently varied as to demand specialized adaptation profiles. 2 It seems
unlikely that the federal government could effectively devise a national
adaptation strategy that fulfills the needs of every state and local
community. By contrast, a molecule of carbon dioxide causes the same
impact on the climate system regardless of where it is emitted, hence there
is no inherent reason why local and regional autonomy is necessary for
mitigation policy to gain traction on causal factors. To be sure, mitigation
policy will need to be attentive to regional and local interests just as
conventional air pollution control has been, but the case for localism in
adaptation policy goes well beyond this political consideration-it is a
matter of physical reality. Not surprisingly, therefore, one finds legal
scholarship on adaptation often focusing on local and regional scales.*
On the other hand, it is not as if the federal government has no stake in
climate change adaptation as a matter of national interest. Some aspects of
adaptation policy are inherently national in scope, such as immigration
policy, a secure national food supply, conservation of marine resources,
migratory species, and pandemic disease control. Moreover, how state and
local governments respond to adaptation needs -will inevitably aggregate
socially and economically into nationwide impacts. Water scarcity may pit
state against state even more than is the case already, hard-nosed resistance
254 Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalidesandthe MatchingPrinciple:The Case
forReallocatingEnvironmentalRegulatoryAuthoity, 14 YALE L.&POL'Y REv. 23, 53 (1996).
255 See Hari M. Osofsky, s Climate Change "International"?
Litgation's DiagonalRegulatozy,

Role, 49 VA. J. INT'L L. 585, 587 (2009) (suggesting greater emphasis on connections between
governance institutions at different scales).
256 GOVERNOR'S AcTION TEAM ON ENERGY & CLIMATE CHANGE, STATE OF FIA., PHASE 1 REPORT:
FLORIDA'S ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE AcTION PLAN 55 (2007).
257 NEV. CLIMATE CHANGE ADVISORY COMM., FINAL REPORT 14 (2008).
258 See, e.g., Or. Dep't of Energy, Climate Change in Oregon, httpJ//www.oregon.gov/
ENERGY/GBLWRM/climhme.shtml (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
259 See, e.g., Lara Whitely Binder, Preparng for Climate Change in the US. Pacific
Northwest 15 HASTINGS'W.-Nw. J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 183 (2009); Alejandro E. Camacho,
Ciknate Change and RegulatoryFrapnentationin the Great Lakes Basin, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L.
139 (2008); Colin Crawford, Our Bandit Future? Cities, Shantytowns, and Climate Change
Governance, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 211 (2009); John C. Dernbach, Toward a Climate Change
Strateg for Pennsylvania, 12 PENN. ST. ENvTL. L REV. 181 (2004); Porras, supra note 18, at 591

(focusing on the role of cities).
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strategies in the face of increasingly severe weather may expose coastal
cities to catastrophic risks, and movement of people between states could
present new interstate conflicts. Yet outside of the issue of national policy
toward adaptation in least developed nations, which has received
considerable attention,26 few legal scholars have proposed comprehensive
development of national domestic adaptation policies.26'
Attempting to resolve this tension to find the just right scale of
governance for adaptation would be a futile undertaking-adaptation policy
must operate at all scales in an interconnected network of decision making.
Although it has not been focused on climate change adaptation policy, the
emerging theory of Dynamic Federalism2 has captured the attention of
environmental law scholars for how it could address the multiscalar
attributes of other large-scale environmental problems, and it is likely to
gain credence in the adaptation context as well. Under Dynamic Federalism,
"federal and state governments function as alternative centers of power and
any matter is presumptively within the authority of both the federal and the
state governments."263 The theory is not radical-it does not suggest
overhauling the basic federal-state-local structure of governance. Rather, it
explicitly calls for overlapping federal and state (and, through states, local)
jurisdictions.2n Scholars of Dynamic Federalism reject the "minimal overlap"

260 See Saul &McAdam, supranote 164, at 5-7.
261 Some examples include Robin Kundis Craig, Climate Change,RegulatoryFragmentadon,
and Water 7hage, 79 U. COLO. L. REv. 825 (2008) (focusing on national policy for marine
environment adaptation), and Leonard, supranote 144, at 560-62 (proposing a national land-use
regime and infrastructure development for protection of coastal communities).
262 See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in
EnvironmentalLaw, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 161 (2006).
263 Id. at 176. As Kirsten Engel explains, "Alternatively named 'empowerment federalism,'
'polyphonic federalism,' 'interactive federalism,' 'dynamic federalism,' and even 'vertical
regulatory competition,' this reconceptualization has come in the form of a cluster of
theoretical proposals, all rejecting dual federalism and all emphasizing the benefits of
overlapping federal and state power." Id. (citations omitted). For additional scholarship
developing Dynamic Federalism and related principles, see David E. Adelman & Kirsten H.
Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory
Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796 (2008); Robert B. Ahdieh, Fom Federalism to Intersystemic
Governance: The Changing Nature of Modern Juisdidon,57 EMORY LJ. 1 (2007); Renee M.
Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competion, Cooperationand Secuides Enforcement; 11 CONN.
INs. L.J. 107 (2005); Robert A. Schapiro, From Dualist Federalism to Interacdve Federalism,
56 EMORY L.J. 1 (2006); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of InteracdveFederalism,91 IOWA
L. REV. 243 (2005) [hereinafter Schapiro, Toward Interacive Federalism]; Robert B. Ahdieh,
ForeignAffairs, InternationalLaw, and the New Federalism:Lessonsfrom Coordination(Emory
Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Working Paper Group, Paper No. 08-30, 2008), available at

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1272967 (follow "One-Click Download" hyperlink).
264 Benjamin K Sovacool, The Best of Both Worlds: EnvironmentalFederalismand the Need
for FederalAction on Renewable Energy and Climate Change, 27 STAN. ENvrL L.J. 397, 448
(2008). Of course, overlap of authority can occur under dual federalism if federal and state
authorities independently regulate the same problem, and under cooperative federalism when
the federal government employs (or more accurately, coerces) state governments to implement
federal standards. By contrast, overlap of authority under Dynamic Federalism is neither
accidental nor coerced. Adelman and Engel explain that cooperative federalism
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model in which there is a "particular allocation of at least primary regulatory
authority between the states and the federal government," replacing it with
one "in which multiple levels of government interact in the regulatory
process.""n As a result, Dynamic Federalism "reject[s] the traditional static
optimization model fof an adaptive one."2" As Professors David Adelmnan
and Kirsten Engle explain, in a Dynamic Federalism strategy,
neither federal nor state governments limit themselves to what many legal
scholars have deemed to be their appropriate domains. The federal government
continues to regulate local issues, such as remediation of contaminated
industrial sites, which have few direct interstate connections and few benefits
from federal uniformity. At the same time, state and local governments are not
content to confine their attention to issues of local concern, but are developing
policies on environmental issues of national or even international scale, such as
global climate change. Nor do environmental issues "stay" in the control of any
particular level of government, but rather tend to pass back and forth between
them like the proverbial football."6

Proponents of Dynam-ic Federalism have primarily focused on its
advantages of plurality, dialogue, redundancy, accountability, and
economies of scale.2 8 The key point relating to the federalism question in
climate change adaptation policy is the theory's overlapping, flexible
distribution of authority between federal, state, and local agencies. Namtely,
while it may appear inefficient to have several agencies at different scales
working away on some mutual adaptation .policy problem,On the built-in
redundancy of Dynamic Federalism can provide significant benefits. It gives
the overall system of governance more rather than less policy space, 2 0 which
surely will be needed for climate change adaptation. Having multiple

fares somewhat better with the dynamic school. The overlapping authority, although
asymmetric, at least has the trappings of a dynamic system. Cooperative federalism
nonetheless falls short from the point of view of the dynamic school. The federal laws
and regulations are often, but not always, so comprehensive as to exclude for all
practical purposes alternative approaches by the states.
Adelmnan & Engel, supra note 263, at 1812-13. Still, many commentators express faith in the
ability of traditional cooperative federalism governance to respond effectively to climate
change. See, e.g, Holly Doremus & W. Michael Hanemann, Of Babies and Bath water WhY the
Clean Air Act's Cooperative Federalism Ls Usefl for Addressing Global Warmning, 50 ARIZ. L.
REV. 799 (2008).
265 Engel, supra note 262, at 161.
266 Adelman & Engel, supra note 263, at 1798.

Id at 1796.
id. at 1808; Schapiro, Toward interactive Federalism, supra note 263, at 292-93;
Sovacool, supra note 264, at 448-5 1.
269 See Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and UnderlappingJurisdton in Adnitraitive Law,
267

268 See

20068S. CT. REv. 201, 214.
270 See Adelman & Engel, supra note 263, at 1817-18.
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agencies working on a problem within overlapping scales can also promote
synergy between the agencies and the formation of informal networks.27 1
These properties resonate with the emerging theory of
Transgovernmental Networks. 2 Transgovernmental Network theory was
forged initially in the context of international law, where nation states, while
still the most important actors, have increasingly disaggregated into
component institutions sharing roles with nonsovereign bodies.273
Transgovernmental Network theory emphasizes the nonhierarchical
horizontal and vertical networks that are built among the officials of those
national and international institutions to exchange information, identify best
practices, harmonize approaches, and enforce the overall international
policy program.2 74 The movement toward Dynamic Federalism and New
Governance at domestic, federal and state scales portends the same
conditions that are giving rise to such networks in international contexts.2 75
Thus far, however, few commentators have examined the federalism
question in the context of climate change adaptation, much less explored
how the New Governance, Dynamic Federalism, and Transgovernmental
Networks models could be usefully employed in tandem to forge adaptation
institutions and instruments. 6 Several commentators deal with the topic
271 See id. at 1809-10 (summarizing literature suggesting that overlapping authority can
promote initiative at one governance scale and spark other scales to follow promising
policy innovations).
272 Transgovernmental
Networks theory emphasizes the role of "networks of
similarly-situated technocrats" who work in many different governance units, and "conceive[s]
of lawmaking as an organic enterprise, harnessing the technical expertise of bureaucrats who
do not possess heady titles but nonetheless intimately understand the practical exigencies of
their particular issue areas." Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to Internadonal
Lawmaking: The Tale of Three Trade FinanceInstruments,30 YALE J. INT'L L. 125, 182 (2005).
The seminal and still most comprehensive discussion of Transgovernmental Network theory is
found in ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004). For additional scholarship
developing Transgovernmental Network principles, see Neil Craik & Joseph DiMento,

Environmental Cooperationin the (Partialy)DisaggregatedState: Lessons from the Security
and ProsperityPartnershupof North America, 8 CH. J. INT'L L. 479, 484-92 (2008); Patrick X.
Delaney, Transnadonal Corruption:Regulation Across Borders, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 413 (2007);
Jenia Iontcheva Turner, ThansnationalNetworks and InternationalCririnalJustice, 105 MicH.
L. REv. 985 (2007); Eleanor D. Kinney, The EmergingPYeld of InternationalAdministrativeLaw:
Its Content and Potential,54 ADMIN. L. REv. 415, 425-27 (2002); Kal Raustiala, The Architecture

of International Cooperation: Transgovemmental Networks and the Future of Internadonal
Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Accountability of Government
Networks, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 347 (2001); Christopher Whytock, A Radonal Design

Theory of Thansgovernmentalism:The Case of E U-US. Merger Review Cooperation,23 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 1 (2005).
273 See SLAUGHTER, supranote 272, at 18, 22-23.
274

See id at 19-22.

275 See Freeman & Farber,supra note 146, at 899 ("It is intriguing to see the supposedly

hierarchical world of domestic regulation evolving in a direction reminiscent of modern
international relations.").
276 Grouping climate change mitigation with other large-scale massive problems, Jim
Salzman and I have argued that the convergence of New Governance, Dynamic Federalism, and
Transgovernmental Networks models fits well with the needs of mitigation policy. See Ruhl &
Salzman, supra note 245 (manuscript at 8-9). We use coastal hypoxia as the primary example,
however, and do not delve significantly into climate change adaptation. Id. (manuscript at
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tangentially, their focus being mitigation," but only Professor Daniel Farber
has offered a focused, albeit preliminary, examination of the federalism
question devoted primarily to adaptation.27" Farber identifies two key
issues-financing adaptation" and the constitutional limits of federal
authoritym 0while acknowledging much remains on the table for
consideration. I share his conclusion that "all levels of government will be
called upon to play a role in dealing with the impacts of climate change.""'
How they are configured and coordinated is the looming question for
environmental law.
J Trend Ten: Conciladon

Environmental law is not omnipotent,- though one would not gather so
from the rhetoric of environmental law on climate change mitigation policy.
To be sure, if our nation commits to significant reductions of greenhouse gas
enissions, we are unlikely to meet that goal without implementing
substantial controls on major enission sources as well as more intensive
regulation of smaller sources and individuals, such as controls on buildings
for energy efficiency, automobiles for emissions, and farms for land-use and
livestock practices. That alone will demand a major deployment of legal
resources extending well beyond environmental law. But some strident
proponents of emissions regulation have described their agenda as far
broader and deeper in scope and intensity. As they put it, "we must launch a
thousand arrows immediately,"m and the arrows they have in mind are
lawsuits under existing federal environmental laws such as the ESA, CWA,
and NEPA.

46-49); see also Markell, supra note 35 (manuscript at 16) (using New Governance theory to
explore climate change mitigation).
277 See, eg, Glicksman, supra note 26, at 872-74 (exploring multiagency coordination for
ecological management); Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change:
Restraining the Present to Liberate the F1ture, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1156 (2009)
(mentioning adaptation in connection with federal-state relations in climate change policy);
Bradford C. Mank, Protecting the Environment for Future Generations: A Proposal for a
"Republican"Superagency, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 444 (1996) (suggesting the role of a federal
"Superagency" for, among other things, climate change adaptation); Carol M. Rose, Federalism
and Climate Change: The Role of States in a Future FederalRegime-An Introduction,50 ARIz.
L. REV. 673 (2008) (recognizing the role of state and local governments in adaptation policy);
Jared Snyder & Jonathan Binder, The Changing Clmate of Cooperative Federalism: The
DynamicRole of the States in a NationalStrategyto Combat Climate Change,27 UCIA J. ENvrL.
L &POL'Y 231 (2009) (containing scattered references to adaptation as a state and local concern).
278 See Farber,supranote 24.
279 See id at 13-19.
280 See id at 19-32.
281 Id.at 33.
282 Anna T. Moritz et al., BiodiversityBaldng and Boiling: EndangeredSpecies Act Turning
Down the Hea4 44 TULSA L. REV. 205, 230 (2008).
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I have contested this strategy as being legally, practically, and politically
ill-advised. m The ESA, for example, is not structured to provide effective
greenhouse gas emidssions control. Applying it would require isolating and
linking emissions from, say, a power plant in Florida to effects on a distant
climate-threatened species-a feat beyond scientific capacity.2s' Saying that
climate change globally threatens a species does not establish causal blame
on any particular source of emissions; just the opposite, it lays blame on all
sources. Using the ESA to sort through that quagmire, in addition to being
legally untenable and beyond the capacity of the agencies that implement the
statute, would in all likelihood make the statute more of a lightening rod for
controversy than it already is.ff
My fear is that the "thousand arrows" strategy will creep into
environmental law's approach to climate change adaptation as well. If the
nation commidts to greenhouse gas emission reductions, people, businesses,
and governments will expect some regulation. If the nation commits to
adaptation-and there seems little choice but to do so aggressively-people,
businesses, and governments will expect adaptation. Climate change
adaptation thus presents an opportunity for environmental law to break free
from its culture of litigation and contestation and build back what that
culture has eroded most-trust!m Trust generally does not come about
through threats to sue.
I am not suggesting that environmental law roll over to every seawall
and water diversion project proposed in the name of adaptation. But
environmental law has a choice to make and the luxury of making it early in
283 See J.B. Ruhi, Climng Mount Mitigation. A Proposal for Legislative Suspension of
Climate Change "iigation Litigation,-"1 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE & ENV'T (forthcoming
2010) (on file with author).
284 See Memorandum from Mark D. Myers, Dir., U.S. Geological Survey, to Dir., U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Serv., and Solicitor, U.S. Dep't of the Interior 1 (May 14, 2008), available at
http://www.usgs.govglobal-change/docs/director-.memo-4may08.pdf.
285 1 provide a detailed discussion of what I believe is the poor fit between the Endangered
Species Act (ESA) and greenhouse gas emission reduction policy in Ruhi, supra note 26, at 39-49.
See also ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., USE OF THE POLAR BEAR LISTING To FORCE
REDUCTION OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: THE LEGAL ARGUMENTS 3-5 (2008) (laying out the
legal basis for both positions); Matthew Gerhart, Climate Change and the EndangeredSpecies
Act.- The Difficulty of Proving Causation, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 167, 171-82 (2009) (detailing the
causation obstacles to using the ESA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions); John K~styack &

Dan Rohif, ConservingBiodiveisity in an Era of Global Warming, An Environmental Community
Peispective, in ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES 374, 388 (Donald C.
Bauer & Win. Robert Irvin eds., 2d ed. 2010) (concluding "such a use of the ESA has a number of
inherent flaws" and "the Act simply cannot serve as a driver of GHG emissions reductions"). But
see Mi N. Somnmer, Taking the It Bull off the Leash: Siccing the Endangered Species Act on
Climate Change, 36 B.C. ENvTL Arr. L REv. 273, 303-4, 307-08 (2009) (arguing that there is no
significant obstacle to proving causation in a claim that greenhouse gas emissions cause injury
to species in violation of the ESA).
28 See Bruch, supra note 240, at 35 (noting in an outline of key issues in "[tihe transition to
adaptation" that "[ult is first necessary to build trust"). For a general exposition on the lack of
trust between the interests working in environmental policy, see Douglas A. Kysar & James
Salzman, Environmental Tribalism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1099 (2003) (exploring the contested nature
of environmental law and policy).
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the formulation of climate change adaptation policy-is it going to be about
conflict or conciliation?
The other trends I have predicted suggest that it should be about
conciliation. Fighting in court to hold on to preservationism defies the
biological reality of climate change, Whereas using environmental law to
facilitate transitional strategies for species and ecosystems holds much
promidse (Trend One). Following the path of the common law to secure
critical natural capital resources through regulation solidifies property rights
rather than challenges them (Trend Two). Working with land-use and water
law rather than standing alone will put environmental law at the core of
adaptation policy rather than on the sidelines (Trend Three). Acknowledging
the need to respond to climate justice and catastrophe risk management
concerns, the necessary measures for which may not always be
environmentally benign, will provide environmental law the chance to
influence how these concerns are satisfied (Trends Four and Five).
Participating in, rather than against, the complex policy mix that will form
around adaptation keeps environmental concerns within the dialogue, not an
afterthought (Tend Six). And recalibrating how environmental law uses
instruments and institutions to fulfill its objectives will allow it to keep pace
with the demand for an adaptive adaptation policy (Trends Seven through
Nine). Conflict may be called for at times along the way to fulfilling these
trends, but conciliation-the essence of which is overcoming distrust and
hostility-must be environmental law's core 'norm for participating in
climate change adaptation policy.
I fuly expect some 'of the "thousand arrows" crowd to be repulsed by
the theme of conciliation. Many of the battles environmental law has fought
it had to fight just to get a toehold on development and infrastructure
policy,2n? and it is not easy to forget the wounds suffered. But climate change
adaptation is not business as usual. It is no exaggeration to think that
"[i]f society is faced with massive climate impacts..' adaptation will become
one of society's highest priorities.m Environmental law must treat it as such.
IV. CONCLUSION

Climate change adaptation is profoundly about the environment, but it
is not profoundly about environmental law. Indeed, environmental law has a
debt to repay to the nation's adaptation deficit. After more than a decade of
demanding the nation's myopic and relentless attention to formulating
mitigation policy as a supercharged form of pollution control law,
environmental law has discovered adaptation. Yet, while environmental law
now recognizes mitigation and adaptation as being joined at the hip,
adaptation policy dialogue has thus far not allowed environmental law to
287 Cf Cary Coglianese & Jocelyn D'Ambrosio, Policymaking Under Pressure:The Perils of
Incrementa Responses to Climate Change, 40 GoNN. L. REv. 1411 (2008) (describing the
prevalence of incremental environmental policymnaking and the inherent problems it presents,
particularly in the climate change context).
28Farber, supra note 24, at 33.
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stake adaptation as its domain. Rather, environmental law will have to earn
its position in the multipolicy mix that will coalesce around the
tremendously complex demands of climate change adaptation.
This take on climate change adaptation and environmental law may
disappoint or offend those who view environmental law as a mighty weapon
in the war against climate change. Recently, for example, the Environmental
Law Institute asked a group of environmental law experts what
environmental law will look like forty years from now.' Some of the
prognostications were quite optimistic. One respondent surmised, for
example, that "[t]he field of environmental protection will have grown in
importance and stature,"20 and another predicted that "[c]arbon
sequestration will prove to be a success.""' One respondent believes "[iln
2049, the practice of environmental law will be on the wane," but only
because "[tihe nation's most pressing environmental challenges will have
taken a dramatic turn for the better following bold actions in Congress,
corporate board rooms, and communities across the country."2 Similarly,
another respondent predicts that "[b]y the midpoint of the 21st century,
government-driven environmental regulation will be on a path of increasing
irrelevance," but that will be so only because of the rise of
"nongovernmental consensus standards driven by consumer demand and a
robust and active market for pollutants and carbon."29 3
I am not so sanguine. Certainly these predictions cannot be justified as
mere extrapolations of current politics and social norms. I would be
delighted to be proven wrong (and live to see it), thus making this Article all
for naught. But I don't see that in the cards. Rather, I have to agree with
other respondents in conceiving the very real possibility that in 2049
mitigation policy will have come out of the box a watered-down weakling,m
that "environmental law will be a law of coping with crisis and urgent
remediation,""' and that we will be focused on "adaptation to a changing
climate, evaluating geoengineering options, and addressing disputes over
competition for increasingly scarce resources."'
In that scenario, the more likely scenario, my prediction is that
environmental law will have trifurcated into three distinct branches. One
289 See In the Year 2049 What -Will EnvironmentalProtectionBe Like 40 Years from Now,
ENvrTL F., Nov.-Dec. 2009, at 46.
290 John C. Cruden, Ten Reasons for EnvironmentalOptimism, ENVrTL. F., Nov.-Dec. 2009,
at 48, 48.
291 Lee A. DeHihns, Ill, Loolingat the Percentagesof Possibilty,ENVrt. F., Nov.-Dec. 2009,
at 48, 48.
292 Paul E. Hagen, The End of the Environmental Profession, ENVTL. F., Nov.-Dec. 2009,
at 49, 49.

293 Sara Kendall, The CFR Will Still Exist, but Markets Will Rule the Day, ENVTL. F.,
Nov.-Dec. 2009, at 50, 50.
24 See Michael B. Gerrard, EnvironmentalLaw in 2049 A Look Back, ENvr.. F., Nov.-Dec.
2009, at 49, 49.
295 James Gustave Speth, On One Hand,Danger,On the Other,Security,ENVrT. F., Nov.-Dec.
2009, at 51, 51.
296 Michael P. Vandenbergh, Two Scenarios Offer ContrastingFtures for Feld, ENVrL. F.,
Nov.-Dec. 2009, at 51, 51.
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will retain the conventional focus on pollution control and ecological
conservation, but narrowed in the sense that it will have lost dominion over
anything having to do with climate change. There will be some
environmental issues, however, that go untouched by climate change, such
as the level of .toxins in groundwater and the regulation of mercury
emissions from industrial sources. Environmental law will retain its vitality
and relevance for those purposes. The other two branches will deal with
climate change mitigation and adaptation, respectively. They are more likely,
however, to be identified as the environmental components of mitigation

and adaptation law rather than discrete bodies of environmental

law.2 7

Whatever they are called, however, the environmental interests will share a
very large table with a multitude of policy realms, and likely will not be
seated at its head.
So I do not see climate change adaptation as necessarily a growth
industry for environmental law, one that strengthens its force and expands
its scope to match the massive problem the demands of adaptation will
present. Rather, if the ten trends I have identified come true, the capacity of
environmental law will be seriously tested, and it seems likely what we think
of as environmental law will be dramatically transformed and likely
constrained in its reach. Ironically, with the growth of climate change
mitigation and adaptation legal regimes, both of which Will form as
amalgams primarily of economic and social policy goals and tradeoffs, it is
likely that what lawyers think of fitting under the umbrella of
"environmental law" in 50 or 100 years will be close to what environmental
law was 40 years ago-mainly a narrow, technical realm of pollution control
measures complemented by focused conservation programs. The story of
environmental law in the century of climate change adaptation may be about
a journey back to the future.

297 Accord Bruch, supra note 240, at 35 (outlining the key elements of "adaptation law");
John C. Dernbach & Seema Kakade, Clmate Change Law. An Introduction, 29 ENERGY L.. 1, 2
(2008) (describing the emergence of "climate change law" as "the intersection of several areas
of law, including environmental law, energy law, business law, and international law");
Jacqueline Peel, Climate Change Law: The Emergence of a New Legal Discipline,32 MELB. U. L.
REv. 922, 924 (2008) (arguing that climate change law must be developed with an awareness of
"the diverse disciplines (such as science, economics, and social science) that underpin
conceptions of the climate change challenge").

